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Official Discusses Arms Exports

91UM0577A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY
VESTNIK in Russian No 2, Jan 91 (signed to press
04 Jan 91) p 12

[Interview with I.S. Belousov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the State Commission for Military-Industrial Affairs of the USSR Council of Ministers, by S. Yakovlev, under the rubric "Published for the First Time": "Military Exports in the Light of Glasnost"]

[Text] To paraphrase the well-known song, our tanks are fast and our MIGs are light. No wonder they are in great demand abroad.

Everything pertaining to our military exports has been shrouded in secrecy, however, and to inquire about them was tantamount to registering as a spy. Recently, however, a decision was adopted in accordance with instructions from the President of the USSR to publicize certain facts about military cooperation between the USSR and foreign nations, about overall amounts and the geography of Soviet exports.

We asked I.S. Belousov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the State Commission for Military-Industrial Affairs of the USSR Council of Ministers, to "reveal" the state secret.

[Belousov] Remember that no country in the world publishes complete information about its military exports. And journalists can only guess at amounts, relying at best on annual reports from the Stockholm-based Institute for the Study of Peace, which provides an approximate picture of world trade in weapons and military technology. Certain facts, however, which will do no harm either to us or to our trade partners can be published.

[Yakovlev] Our long silence, then, was due to commercial secrecy?

[Belousov] Not exactly. Every nation has a right to ensure its own security. By purchasing weapons, among other things.

On the other hand, if there is a demand for weapons, there will be a supply. This is why military-technological cooperation is developed throughout the world. Around 50 billion dollars worth of weapons and military equipment is sold each year.

Naturally, the main military suppliers abroad are the industrially developed nations: the USA, France, the FRG, Italy, China, Brazil, Switzerland, Sweden and Great Britain. The largest quantities of weapons have been supplied by the USSR and the USA, of course.

[Yakovlev] Could you illustrate this with figures?

[Belousov] During the last five-year period the Soviet Union shipped almost 56.7 billion rubles worth of weapons and military equipment abroad. This includes

approximately 9.7 billion rubles worth in 1990. Our military assistance provided without recompense amounted to 8.5 billion rubles during the past five years.

[Belousov] Do these figures include outlays for building military facilities and for the assistance of specialists?

[Yakovlev] Construction and installation work accounts for the bulk of the cost of building oil storage facilities, bases, airfields and colleges. These do not involve arms shipments. And even the status of military facilities is conditional. Today they are used to benefit the army; tomorrow, the civilian economy.

The assistance provided by military specialists is not quantitatively commensurate amounts directly with arms exports. It is incomparably less.

[Belousov] Are there in effect any international standards for the sale of conventional weapons?

[Yakovlev] There are no international conventions on this matter as of now. There are treaties on the nonproliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons, however. We have never provided either chemical or nuclear weapons.

Trading in Soviet weapons is the monopoly of the state. It is handled by specialized subdivisions of the USSR MVS [Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations] with direct involvement by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which export weapons and military equipment only on the basis of intergovernmental agreements. They are guided in this matter by considerations of international security, and stick to the line of halting the arms race and achieving political settlement of regional conflicts. The recipient states commit themselves not to transfer the weapons without our approval or re-export them to third countries.

[Yakovlev] To whom do we give preference for providing weapons?

[Belousov] In the arms trade we consider our own strategic interests, of course, and the matter of preserving the overall balance of forces in the world. For the USSR it has always been primarily a political matter. We first considered our Warsaw Pact allies and the developing nations, as well as certain others. They include Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, India, Vietnam, North Korea, Algeria, Libya, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola and Cuba. Naturally, all shipments of military supplies to Iraq ceased following the annexation of Kuwait.

Furthermore, military exports to regions with diverse climatic conditions help to reveal and rectify deficiencies in our weapons, thereby considerably reducing the cost of modifications.

They also provide us with a certain profit.

[Yakovlev] Have we sold weapons to capitalist nations?

[Belousov] No. For the reasons about which I have already spoken, but also because each bloc, whether it be NATO or the Warsaw Pact, has for reasons of its own security attempted to have its own weapons with their own specific servicing.

I can not rule out such exports today, however. At the initiative of certain Western nations the probability of concluding deals for the purchase of our MIGs is just being explored. It is too early to speak of any specific results, however. In any case we shall handle these matters with great caution, taking into account the security of the USSR and our allies, the economic and other aspects.

[Yakovlev] What is going to happen to our military exports to the Warsaw Pact nations?

[Belousov] Shipments of weapons and military equipment to the nations of Eastern Europe will drop significantly. Mainly due to the altered economic relations with those states. We have to switch to convertible rubles in our dealings with them, after all. Military exports will not be the exception, of course. We will also be paying hard currency for our purchases, including military purchases, in those countries.

Where will we ship Soviet weapons, if the East European arms market shrinks for us?

Apparently, nowhere. We know that our capacities for the production of weapons and military equipment are being converted to a considerable degree to the production of civilian products. This will continue. There is no other way. We shall sell exactly as much equipment as we can on the world market in the situation of stiff competition, which has become even more intense lately.

[Yakovlev] It is a known fact that weapons have frequently accounted for the bulk of our assistance to other states. Could you briefly describe the overall situation with respect to foreign debts?

[Belousov] As a rule, the recipients of our military equipment and weapons have generally paid us fairly promptly. This applies primarily to the Warsaw Pact states, India, Iraq and a number of other countries.

We do have debtors, however. They are mainly third-world nations. The total debt for both economic and military assistance amounts to 86 billion rubles. We intend to collect this. But not from all the countries, unfortunately, because the economic situation in some of them is so difficult that they have become insolvent for a long time to come. We are granting them deferments.

[Yakovlev] How have the amounts of our military exports changed lately.

[Belousov] The quantity of weapons exported during this five-year period has decreased drastically from that for the previous period: by 64% for missile systems, for example, 25-30% for tanks, infantry combat vehicles and

armored personnel carriers, 48% for artillery, 53% and 56% respectively for combat aircraft and ships. This has to do with the thaw in the international climate. I would add that certain Western newspapers are wrong in alleging that the Soviet Union is going to flood the market with weapons freed as a result of concluding arms control agreements. The weapons cut are to a significant degree being destroyed, and tanks and other military equipment, for example, are being used in the civilian economy after modification.

[Yakovlev] Will the reduction in military exports not harm our strategic national interests?

[Belousov] We must carefully weigh our approach to the reduction of military exports. If we are talking about reasonable sufficiency for the national defense or about preventing the creation of an offensive capability in this or that region, a reduction of exports is perfectly understandable and essential. This is only possible with reciprocity on the part of other suppliers, however. A void will be filled. Other nations will provide the weapons instead of the USSR.

On the other hand, a certain depoliticizing of arms exports fits perfectly well into our current policy. That is, possibilities are opening up for expanding the geography of exports. Not every nation can take advantage of the latest technology. Less complex weapons systems would satisfy many. Why not export part of the military equipment to those states to replace their old weapons?

In the future the Soviet Union intends to further limit arms exports based on the principle of reciprocity from other world traders in military goods and the principle of reasonable sufficiency for the defense of friendly nations. We support the idea of establishing an international arms sales registry in the UN and are prepared to participate in its development.

With all of this in mind, we are presently preparing a draft Law on USSR Military Cooperation With Foreign Nations. It calls for stringent monitoring of military shipments not only by the government, but also by the USSR Supreme Soviet, to prevent loss of the monopoly and the spread of military exports to the republics. The prerogative of possessing nuclear and other weapons must always remain with the central government.

Officers' Financial Difficulties Discussed

91UM0585A Moscow *KOMMUNIST*
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 4, Feb 91
(Signed to press 20 Feb 91) pp 17-24

[Interview, published under the heading "Ideas, Reality, We," with Doctor of Economic Sciences, Prof I.I. Yudin and written up by Colonel Ya. Renkas, candidate of historical sciences: "How Are You Living, Officer Family?"; it is recommended that these materials be employed in the political training groups of officers,

generals and admirals in studying the question "Social Policy of the Soviet State and Its Implementation in the Armed Forces"]

[Text] Under the conditions of the very difficult economic situation in the nation, the increased prices, the drop in the purchasing power of the ruble, the exacerbated problem of supplying the public with food and industrial goods and the instability of the political situation in a number of regions, the flow of letters to KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL has increased particularly from officers and their wives and these letters are full of concern for the drop in the standard of living of the officer family. The editors have turned to Doctor of Economic Sciences and Prof I.I. Yudin with a request to answer certain questions.

[Renkas] Ivan Ivanovich [Yudin], how valid are the grounds for such concern?

[Yudin] The economic situation in the USSR is actually difficult. There are no goods and their production is not only not increasing but even declining. Due to the shortage of raw products, materials, obsolete equipment, low labor discipline and mass inefficiency, scores of enterprises are standing idle even in such a vitally important sector for supplying the public as light industry. There is galloping inflation throughout the nation and we can observe an outburst of speculation, crime and so forth. All of this has a negative impact on the standard of living for a predominant majority of the people, particularly for those whose labor is paid from the state budget and who does not have additional sources of income. This category also includes servicemen.

Of course, it cannot be said that the state is not concerned for the military and is not taking measures to improve their material situation. The range of social guarantees has been significantly broadened. In this regard, of important significance is the Ukase of the USSR President on Certain Measures to Strengthen the Social and Legal Defense of Servicemen. Moreover, obligatory state personal insurance has been introduced for those who are serving as well as for reservists undergoing assemblies. The amount of housing construction is increasing in the garrisons. In a word, the state to the degree that it is able is making every effort so that the officers and their families live under normal material conditions. However, both at the center and on the spot the life of the officer family in many instances remains more difficult than the life of other Soviet families. Here one can also feel restrictions in residence permits existing in a number of cities and republics for the officers and members of their families. This is not only an infringement of their legal rights but also the impossibility of finding jobs for officer wives. Hence, a loss of a portion of the income in the family budget and, consequently, less material sufficiency.

[Renkas] At present, in the officer families there are fears that with the transition to a market their standard of living will drop sharply. What can be said about this?

[Yudin] In the initial stage of entering into market relations clearly the incomes of persons with fixed wages will not rise. But I feel there should not be a fear of the market. With the carrying out of a range of measures for social guarantees, the standard of living should rise for the servicemen. However, everything will depend upon the success of economic stabilization and the emergence of the nation from the crisis.

[Renkas] Is it possible to give a detailed description of the standard of living for an officer family at present? What are the most acute social problems which it must now solve?

[Yudin] As research indicates, for an officer family of the greatest importance are the following: the amount of monetary pay for the husband and the earnings of his wife, if, of course, she is employed; the situation on the consumer market in the nation and particularly the regional standard; the price level for goods and services; availability of housing, the size of it and the presence of amenities. Precisely these factors play the crucial role in daily life and determine the everyday existence and mood of the officer family.

It must be emphasized that both in terms of income and expenditures an officer's family budget differs noticeably from the budget of the average statistical Soviet family. In it there virtually are no such incomes, for example, as assistance from the social security funds, scholarships, earnings from subsidiary and garden plots or individual labor activity. At the same time, for civilian workers this income comprises something on the order of 20-25 percent.

In the family budget of an officer family the pay of the head of the family is predominant, making up approximately 75-84 percent of the aggregate income. The share of the wife's wages varies from 0 to 16 percent. We would point out that in the average statistical Soviet family the share of the husband's wages is around 60 percent and that of the wife 40 percent of the budget. Such a situation is caused by the fact that in line with the frequent moves, the problem of finding a job and the shortage of preschool institutions, officer wives, in the first place, work an average of only a third of the total time of their husband's service and they often lack the required length of employment upon reaching pension age. Secondly, they, in having a rather high educational level and, as a rule, a prestigious profession such as physician, engineer, economist or technician, are forced to take any job and in a majority of instances a lowly paid one such as librarian, office worker, worker at a garrison hospital and so forth. At the same time, the officer wives gradually lose their main qualification and even in finding employment in their specialty cannot count on rapid advancement and ultimately on higher earnings.

It must be pointed out particularly that the families of the junior officers have the least social protection and their pay is on the level or even below the income of civilian workers of approximately their equal education, qualification, age and length of job employment.

[Renkas] But, I feel, it is one thing to have one or another family income, but it is more important what one can purchase on the consumer market and at what prices. Is this not so?

[Yudin] Of course it is. Let me give specific figures. Over the last 40 years, the pay of junior officers of the troop level has increased by 2.5-fold. Does this mean that the standard of living of an officer family has increased in the same ratio? Undoubtedly it has not. With an average price rise for consumer goods of approximately three percent, inflation has "eaten up" over one-half of the higher pay. Research has shown that an officer family is particularly vulnerable to inflation and the commodity shortage for in a majority of garrisons the supply of food products and also numerous industrial items is worse than in the cities. An officer family purchases more than one-third of the required goods outside the military trade stores. A dealer in the "shadow" economy feeds off the pay of a serviceman as an officer family purchases around 15 percent of its goods on the "black" market and pays for around 20 percent of the services at speculative prices. In a word, the officer's purse, regardless of a certain increase in pay, has melted like ice in the summer sun.

[Renkas] However, it is certainly not just the monetary income that determines the standard of living of an officer family. A great deal also depends upon the housing availability. What is your opinion on this problem?

[Yudin] An officer is forced to wander approximately a third of his entire service in "the places of others," paying out of his meager budget up to a quarter of his pay to rent housing area. At present, as is known, the state is partially compensating for such expenditures. But this is not the way out of the situation. As a result of living in private apartments there is increased dissatisfaction with service and family problems grow.

At the same time, the situation involving housing supply for the officers, as statistics indicates, has not been improving. Moreover, the trend is such that the apartment problem in the immediate future will clearly become exacerbated. While 2.5 years ago the number of officer families without apartments was around 150,000, in 1990, this figure had risen to 200,000. The withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the Eastern European countries and from Mongolia will significantly exacerbate the housing question. I feel that by the end of 1991, the number of apartmentless officer families and warrant officers ["praporshchik," "michman"] will approach 300,000 and this undoubtedly will tell on the prestige of service and lead to increased social tension in the troop collectives.

The opportunities for satisfying the apartmentless officers with housing are limited. The USSR Ministry of Defense using its own forces builds approximately 86,000 apartments annually. Moreover, until recently the Army and Navy annually obtained about another 14,000 apartments from the housing of the local soviets. As a whole, this was approximately 100,000 apartments. But due to the current replacement of personnel, around 70,000 apartments a year have been "lost" from the military department. In other words, the real increase in housing has been on a level of 30,000 apartments a year. It is not hard to estimate that with such a situation it would take a minimum of seven years to provide housing for just the apartmentless officers and warrant officers. In addition to the housing question, the standard of living of an officer family is negatively influenced by the absence of preschool institutions in many garrisons, the overcrowding of the schools and their unsatisfactory technical facilities. There are numerous problems also in medical services for the officer families. All of this must be quickly settled, otherwise the combat readiness of the troops and naval forces will steadily drop due to the lack of resolution of social questions.

[Renkas] What criteria underlie the calculating of those material facilities which are necessary for the normal life of an officer family?

[Yudin] Economic science and sociology already have an arsenal of procedures by which it is possible more or less precisely to say that the standard of living of an officer family should be not lower than certain limits. This limit is the minimum amount of goods of life necessary in daily life for each member of an officer family. For instance, let us use the method worked out by the USSR Goskomtrud [State Committee for Labor and Social Problems] for calculating the minimum consumer budget of a man of working age. The given method makes it possible to calculate that base budget of officer families below which they simply cannot live without harming their health and spiritual development and performing their service duties. This limit of the minimum consumer budget for an adult male of working age has been set by the USSR Goskomtrud at 138.2 rubles a month, proceeding from the price level in 1988. Of course recently, even according to the conservative estimates of our statistics, prices have been rising within the limits of 4-8 percent and in the opinion of a number of economists, significantly more, by 15-20 percent. We feel that the second figure is closer to the truth.

Proceeding from this, let us determine the minimum size of an officer family budget. In order not to confuse the reader, let us agree that the family consists of four persons, including two children under the age of 17 and 6 years. The coefficient for the minimum consumption of children in relation to an adult male, as the specialists at the USSR Goskomtrud feel, is, respectively, 0.6 and 0.4. On the basis of this method, the minimum budget of material support for an officer family can be set as follows [diagram not reproduced in this report].

The given calculations make it possible to assert that the minimum expenditures of an officer's family without children in 1988 were 294.05 rubles a month; with husband, wife and one school-age child the figure rose to 373.41 rubles; in a family with three children the figure is at least 479.2 rubles a month.

Now, let us recall the total pay for regular military personnel in 1988. As an average, junior officers received somewhere on the order of 270 rubles and this was only 15 percent more than the average wage in our state. Calculated per family member with one child, this would be 90 rubles. If there were two children there would be less than 70 rubles. In families with three children there would be just 54 rubles. This is already true poverty. And so the officer's wife is forced to take any job, in wracking their brains over what they can do with the children. The husband and wife beseech their parents requesting aid while the parents themselves often find it difficult to make ends meet in the family of a lieutenant or captain.

In the offing is one other uncertainty which concerns people, and this is the nation's transition to market relations. According to the estimates of specialists, prices for industrial and food goods will increase by 53-90 percent. The level of the minimum consumer budget of the population and primarily the socially vulnerable officer family will rise by the same percentage. That increase in pay which has been promised in the near future to the servicemen will be "eaten up" by inflation in the first 6 months.

The budget of an officer family to a decisive degree depends upon the amount of pay of its head. For this reason, this should correspond to the labor contribution by the officer and change depending upon the level of prices and encourage increased skills. At the same time, the pay to some degree should compensate for the loss of the family budget related to the difficulty of finding a job for the officer's wife. Unfortunately, the existing pay system for servicemen only partially considers these important aspects or does not consider them at all.

[Renkas] How can this system be reformed then under the conditions of converting to the market?

[Yudin] I feel there must be a starting point from which one can proceed in calculating the amount of the required officer pay. Such a point could be the average wage in the nation adjusting it for the first position of an officer as platoon commander or equal to this in skill and labor intensity. With an average wage of 240 rubles in the USSR in 1988, considering world experience, the pay of a platoon commander should be 40 percent more, that is, be approximately 366 rubles. Correspondingly, officers performing more complex functions should receive more. However, practice in recent years has developed in such a manner that the officer's pay is not "pegged" either to the subsistence level or to the average national wage. As a result, various measures have been taken to increase the pay by 20 or 50 rubles due to the

increase in prices. This "stop gap" method in the past has not produced the necessary effect and will not do so particularly in converting to the market.

For localizing the influence of inflationary processes on the material situation of an officer family, the national program for stabilizing the economy and converting to the market provides for the indexing of pay, that is, an increase in pay by a certain percentage depending upon the increase in prices. This is a very essential measure for the social protection of the officers. However, indexing, judging from the sense of the national program, makes no provision for an increase in the other types of monetary pay including payments for class qualifications, extreme service conditions and so forth. The restricting of these and other types of pay in the indexing would be an unjust step.

[Renkas] In converting to the market, the young large families will be in a particularly difficult situation. How will they live in the future?

[Yudin] It would be a just thing if the state would allocate additional payments to officers for their children out of the national fund and not from the defense budget. For example, with a nonworking wife and two or three children, there should be 50 or 60 rubles for each child without any stipulations. This would be a sort of social benefit supplementing the income of the officer family. Other approaches are also possible. But in all instances there must be a well thought out system of compensation in order to soften the negative influence of market relations on the material situation of large serviceman families.

[Renkas] But how can we solve the housing problems under conditions of market relations when this problem is so acute in the Army and Navy?

[Yudin] If we follow the previous approach of increasing housing construction drawing on the forces of just the military construction organizations and simultaneously count on obtaining housing from the local soviets, then we will make only a little headway. There must be a new approach to providing housing for the servicemen. In my view, the center of gravity must be shifted from the construction of housing in the garrisons and military compounds to the voluntary departure from them of discharged officers and warrant officers as well as those apartment occupiers who no longer are employed by the military department. Clearly, we must return to a situation where the main available housing for the troop units is service-provided. Here it is important to consider the fact that with market relations and the acute shortage of housing in the nation, the local soviet bodies and the production collectives will not be interested in providing apartments for servicemen in the cities and other settlements. And no ukases from the president will force them to give up their own housing.

[Renkas] What should we do then?

[Yudin] Clearly, we must create a material incentive so that the servicemen who have been discharged into the reserves or who are completing their service will turn over the apartments in the military compounds under certain conditions.

[Renkas] I would like to clarify one question. Undoubtedly, the income of an officer family, the purchasing power of its budget and the solving of the apartment problem are crucial. But under the conditions of denationalization and the privatization of property and the development of a market for goods, labor and capital, the officer family will be in an unequal situation with the "civilian" families which will receive not only wages but also profit from stocks. How can this inequality be avoided?

[Yudin] In my view, along with the statewide measures relating to the social protection of the servicemen, there must be active entrepreneurial activities by all the administrative bodies of the Armed Forces as well as the officers and warrant officers themselves. There must be an effective revision of the attitude toward economic work in the Army and Navy. For example, take the existing system for selling the army nondisposable articles, the material stockpiles and even equipment decommissioned from the troops. Up to the present, everything has been sold in the national economy without any immediate material benefit for the troop units and formations. As a result of the disinterest of the troop collectives, the surpluses have been sold for a song or generally destroyed, thrown out or pilfered. But certainly this problem could be settled differently. For example, the Ministry of Defense would receive from the government the right to sell nondisposable items and surplus materials itself or through independent marketing organizations which have been set up within the structure of the military department. And they should be sold under definite conditions with 50 percent of the realized total going into the budget while the second half of the amount would remain with the Ministry of Defense with a certain share being turned over to the troop collectives for use for social needs such as building housing, schools and children's institutions.

We should also note the problem of developing entrepreneurial activities among the officer collectives and women's councils. The trade unions, the Komsomol, the parties as well as other social organizations are already concerned with this. We feel that it would be possible with the proper desire present to establish in the garrisons small garment enterprises, artistic trades and self-financing independent sections raising vegetables, flowers, producing toys and so forth. At present, state laws do not prohibit such activities.

In the aim of employing temporarily free money of the servicemen, thought must also be given to setting up a voluntary commercial bank for the social mutual aid of servicemen. In accord with a law adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet, such a bank could hold the money of the officers for a higher interest rate than the Savings

Bank, it could sell stocks for its fund, it could invest money in the same "officer" ZhSK [housing construction cooperatives], finance small enterprises in the troop garrisons, provide easy credits for needy officers and much else. Such experience does exist in world practice. Thus, in Turkey the officers' bank, having begun as a small one, is now the largest owner of housing and land plots, it owns small and large construction firms and industrial enterprises while the officers are bank stockholders who receive the income exceeding the annual amount of their pay. Without claiming any irrefutability of arguments and proposals, it would be a good thing that the officers made their opinions felt about the advisability of setting up such a bank.

[Renkas] In the problem of converting to a market there are not only economic aspects of Army and Navy life, but also political ones. In line with the change in the functions of the Armed Forces political bodies, how do you see their role in ensuring the social protection of the officers and their families?

[Yudin] In army circles, there have been many discussions of this question. A majority is inclined to feel that the political bodies must also be given the function of defending social justice for all servicemen including the rank-and-file, NCOs, warrant officers and officers. But for this it is not enough to have lawyers, sociologists and psychologists in the new structure of the political bodies. There must also be military economists who would study the material needs of the serviceman families, who would work out recommendations for ensuring an optimum standard of living of the officers and utilizing the labor potential of their wives and who would fight for realizing many other social programs.

In conclusion, I would like to reemphasize that at present the life of the officer family, and this is being said on all levels, is extremely joyless. Radical measures and specific steps are required to quickly rectify the situation. Otherwise, the prestige of officer service which has now been so undermined could drop to zero. Who then would enter the combat ranks of the armed defenders of our motherland?!

From the Editors. KOMMUNIST VOORUZHEN-NYKH SIL has more than once raised the question of the need to improve the material sufficiency of the officer family. It cannot be said that nothing has changed in this regard. However, under the conditions of converting to a market, this problem has again been exacerbated as can be seen from the letters to the editors. The readers are insisting upon the adopting of necessary measures aimed at improving the social protection of the servicemen and the members of their families. They have also raised the question of why have the appropriate directorates of the USSR Ministry of Defense as well as the Committee on the Questions of Defense and State Security of the USSR Supreme Soviet done so little for solving the given problems?

We are hopeful that the Central Financial Directorate as well as the other competent bodies of the USSR Ministry of Defense will provide our readers with explanations of this on the pages of our journal.

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Transcript of Metropolitan Pitirim's Phone Call-In Session

91UM0731A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 May 91 First Edition pp 1,4

[Telephone interview with Metropolitan Pitirim, reported by Captain 2d Rank V. Urban, Moscow, 14 May 1991: "Patriotism and Morality Are Inseparable"]

[Text] "Religion. Morality. Army." Such was the theme that dominated during a telephone call-in session on 14 May, when questions from readers were answered by USSR people's deputy, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Soldier-Internationalist Affairs, Metropolitan Pitirim of Volokolamsk and Yuryev (Vladimir Konstantin Nechayev in the secular world).

Even before the session, the editor's office began receiving telephone calls from people with questions and requests. But most of the time, the people called to voice their support of Metropolitan Pitirim's proposal to create several settlements in Central Russia for servicemen discharged into the reserves. Here is what Metropolitan Pitirim had to say about this prior to the call-in session:

"Central Russia has become depopulated. Here is one small example. In 1913, there were 121,000 persons in Staritskiy Rayon. Now its population is only 29,000.

"My proposal is this: to establish settlements or homesteads on land in Central Russia that is not being farmed. The settlements would be small, averaging 30 homes each. People who had finished their military service, and especially those who had served in the groups of forces abroad, would gather together here, where they would become farmers.

"Of course, I realize that working the land requires certain habits, intuition and skill. But it's never too late to learn. True, it's already too late for a person 40-45 years old to master some complex technology. But in agriculture, where the object is to grow grain, feed and vegetables, one can always learn the work. All that's needed is the desire.

"It would be my wish for these military settlements (let's call them that) to become associated primarily with an honorable relationship to labor. And for the people to serve as models of discipline. This is also very important today. These former servicemen could spark the rebirth of Russia."

Then followed two hours of interviews with readers:

[Yezhelin] Valeriy Vasilyevich Yezhelin on the line. I know you often say that anyone desiring to work on the land should be given that opportunity, and provided with everything necessary to start up a farm.

[Pitirim] Yes, I have often said that, and urged it.

[Yezhelin] But the people can't be sure that all of it will not end with just empty promises, like what happened on more than one occasion in our country in the past 70 years. And they may find themselves the losers. The resources that are allocated to them are not enough. They can't buy anything at state prices. Everything has to be gotten for amounts considerably over state prices. And add to this the fact that under the system that has evolved in our country, peasants would end up spending all of their time waiting in lines in offices. What do you think in this regard?

[Pitirim] What I think is this: We need to organize a protective structure. It was with this purpose that the Vozrozhdeniye Association was created. It is staffed by scientists, industrialists, and USSR and Russian deputies. If we put all of our efforts together, we will achieve certain technical possibilities. It is of course a complex matter. But there's never an easy way.

[Yezhelin] I have another question for you. Why has our country gone into such a decline? Does the fault lie only with the bureaucratic command system? And am I right in thinking that the system announced a boycott of the church some time ago because no clergyman would ever have consented to such outrage?

[Pitirim] This issue is now being discussed widely in the press, Valeriy Vasilyevich. I think that our present situation is a derivative of the fact that traditional ties were severed, and the production system, and primarily agriculture, was ruined. This is precisely the system that we now need to restore. Where are you calling from?

[Yezhelin] From Rostov-on-Don.

[Pitirim] Just you wait. The Cossack nation is currently experiencing a rebirth. This is a mighty force. The Cossacks have always been good farmers. Let's also think about how we can resurrect the forgotten traditions of the Cossacks.

[Romanova] Valentina Antonovna Romanova. From Moscow. You said on the radio that the church plans to create its own private farms. How can we become a part of this? Who do we talk to?

[Pitirim] To me. I will try to help. And tell others. The address is 119435, Moscow, Pogodinskaya Street, 20, Metropolitan Pitirim. This is the address of the Publishing Department of the Moscow Patriarchate. Come and see us, write to us....

[Merkushev] Lev Georgiyevich Merkushev. Candidate of philosophical sciences. Moscow. How do you feel, Your Reverence, about the freedom of conscience law adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet?

[Pitirim] It's a beginning. It's a great, and most importantly, a progressive step forward. Yes, there are some points in it that require refinement. But this law is itself a sign of new times. There is now a great movement toward the church. And the law is aiding this movement.

[Merkushev] As I understand it, you propose establishing a prep school in which to educate future officers.

[Pitirim] Yes, we need to show some concern for educating our young generation. Suvorov and Nakhimov schools were established at one time. This was a very noble idea. But it seems to me that they gradually degenerated in some ways. The child should be educated in particular traditions from his youngest years.

We need to gather together orphans and children from poor families. Money with which to establish such educational institutions must be collected. I know that you can't make it happen all at once. A prep school sounds a little too ambitious at the moment. But we could begin with a small orphanage in the countryside. Let it have an enrollment of 20-25 children. Let it have its own subsidiary farm.

Children of different ages will begin spending their days in labor and studies. Their studies must be of the classical sort. To include history and culture. To include moral education. There should be a church or monastery nearby, so that the children could learn Christian traditions. They will make their final choice of occupation when they reach adulthood. It may be that some of them may decide not to be officers. But they must be prepared for life at a high level of spiritual and intellectual culture. And as for teachers, I would suggest specialists who have finished their army service.

One of the best places for implementing this idea would be the Volokolamsk vicinity, which is rich in heroic tradition.

[Skobtsev] This is Senior Lieutenant Nikolay Skobtsev. I'm calling from Kiev. I would like to know what you think about alternative service.

[Pitirim] I support introduction of alternative service. There are many possibilities in the army and civilian life, after all, for doing service without bearing arms. From medical corpsmen in the units to work in the hospitals. And what about helping patients and invalids? I have always felt that caring for the sick is the hardest vocation in the church. Were we to organize such hospitals for the disabled, there would be some very demanding job opportunities there for young people.

And so, why do we need alternative service? First, to provide assistance to soldiers and invalids. Second, it is very important to understand the moral level of the young generation. Extremely important. What I'm saying is that such service in medicine is especially necessary. And third, we need to think about our international acts.

[Gayevskiy] Colonel (Reserve) Viktor Pavlovich Gayevskiy. Moscow. The questions I'm interested in. Your Reverence, are these. Is there a religious element in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan? What is your evaluation of this armed conflict?

[Pitirim] My evaluation of this conflict is this. It didn't come about out of religious soil. As a rule in our times, religious motives have secondary significance in the social sphere. There are of course examples in the world where interethnic enmity is encouraged by certain religious leaders, and often orchestrated by them as well. But in our country, the conditions for such a thing do not exist. From my point of view, the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict was generated by socioeconomic and political causes. It was only later on that religious and some kind of tribal and other motives were attached.

[Vlasov] Captain Nikolay Vasilyevich Vlasov. I'm serving in Kharkov. What manifestations, in your opinion, should mutual relations between the army and church take?

[Pitirim] We need to raise the army, our army, onto the highest pedestal. Without the army, there is no state. One time when I was visiting the FRG I spoke before the Bundeswehr, and I said that to me, despite all of the differences in their position and in the directions of their activity, monks and soldiers are people of the same category. People who devote themselves to serving society, in forms all the way up to and including self-sacrifice. And I still hold to this principle.

Therefore, those moral qualities which had been introduced into army education in Russia in the past, and which are embodied in today's army education, and those moral requirements which we need today in order to pull our fatherland out of the quagmire in which it has found itself, must all be utilized. We need to act together.

Of course, not all people are believers. Not all people share certain religious views. Our army is multiethnic. But each religion possesses that positive core which confirms high moral values, and primary among them, heroism. Heroism is self-restraint, it is selfless service to an ideal. The ideals of all moral people are the same. Patriotism and morality are inseparable.

And then there is discipline, which in the church we call obedience. It is an order that is identically necessary both in wartime and in peacetime—both in the military ranks and in business affairs. Therefore if we could combine military regulations and the professional habits of the military with moral criteria preached by the church, the army would become stronger, and our society would become healthier.

[Vlasov] But are there any sort of problems in this area?

[Pitirim] Problems do of course exist. Because not everyone has yet come to understand that atheistic views are not the only ones held in society. And atheism

naturally excludes the participation of religion in education of army youth. But atheism, you see, is not society's only moral criterion. It's about time to give this some thought.

The church has its problems as well. First of all, there is the absence of the appropriate personnel. I think that in order to unite our efforts, creating garrison churches might be a first step. Creating them in each city in which a military contingent exists.

What meaning do we impart to the concept of a "garrison church"? Not that it should be in a unit's territory. But that soldiers could go there and talk with a knowledgeable person. All of our seminarians, you see, have served in the military. Therefore the clergyman knows from his own experience what is in the soldier's soul. That a soldier could meet in this church with a veteran who is not a clergyman but who is a member of the parish.

And the young soldier must have a spiritual outlet. He shouldn't have to go AWOL to go to church. Soldiers often visit me these days. A handsome lad in shoulder-boards stands before me. I ask him: "So what's this, have you gone AWOL?" "No," he replies, "I have a pass until evening." That's always nice to hear.

[Okuntsov] Colonel (Reserve) Valentin Fedorovich Okuntsov. I work in the Military Academy of the General Staff. My question, Konstantin Vladimirovich, is this. In any civilized society, nurturing the members of this society and their love for the motherland is always the main thing. What is our church doing, or what will it be doing, in this regard?

[Pitirim] We embarked upon such work from a new, wider perspective after 1988, when we celebrated the millennium of Russian Orthodoxy. The new legislation on freedom of conscience provides us such an opportunity.

Practically every church now offers Sunday school for the young. We would like to expand the network of elective courses in schools of general education. I think that this door will open ever wider, and I myself am taking an active part in this effort. My hope is that in the next 2 or 3 years we will be able to work jointly with the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences to develop a complete cycle of ethical and moral education, of our ancient traditions and spiritual values for institutions of general education.

[Okuntsov] Thank you for your reply. I wish you success in this highly important work. This is precisely the area of education that has been neglected here.

[Pitirim] You're right, Valentin Fedorovich. I suffer over this constantly. And now I'm happy with the opportunities that have been granted to us. We know that difficult work lies ahead.

[Okuntsov] Very difficult.

[Pitirim] But a beginning must be made. As they say in that old Russian saying, the eyes are fearful, but the hands work on.

[Sycheva] May I ask the Metropolitan?

[Pitirim] Please, what's your name?

[Sycheva] Stefanida Yevseyevna. My last name is Sycheva. I live in Moscow. I'm already quite old. I stopped going to church, because my legs are failing me. But I read sacred books, and I observe the lentils. But I pray sitting down. I'm unable to stand up, or to walk. Can one pray in this way? What is your advice?

[Pitirim] You can, Stefanida Yevseyevna. Back when you were young they used to say it is better to pray seated than to complain of leg pains. So don't trouble yourself by it. I wish you good health. God bless you.

[Kuzmin] This is Colonel (Reserve) Yuri Ivanovich Kuzmin. I have wanted to meet you for a long time. Perhaps in Moscow, or in Volokolamsk perhaps. But now I have this opportunity to talk with you on the telephone. I live in the village of Leninis.

[Pitirim] I know the village, Istrinskii Rayon.

[Kuzmin] There is a museum of military history in the village. Local residents oppose displaying fascist equipment there. They've made an obscenity out of the entire lawn with them. We can't find a common language with the rayon authorities. The people gathered together for meetings three times, and they appealed to the rayon executive committee. But all in vain. Military-patriotic education is always the excuse. But the Tiger tanks standing there were manufactured in 1943, while the Lenin line was in existence in 1941, during the Battle of Moscow. An American Sherman tank appeared for some reason. It didn't reach our country till 1944, after all.

The tanks are all dirty and mangled. What sort of education is this? Everyone seems to understand that this is not the place for such a display, and yet... What is your opinion?

[Pitirim] Yuri Ivanovich, let's talk about it. I feel that it is mandatory for such a museum to exist.

[Kuzmin] But we're not against the museum. It must be. And the local residents aren't against it. But the equipment is wrong, and it shouldn't be displayed in this way. Ours was the Moscow defensive line. Army General Beloborodov is buried here. This rusty equipment is but 50 meters from his grave.

[Pitirim] Well, let's think about this together. I'll telephone you. I'll keep in touch with you.

[Kuznetsov] This is Tashkent calling Moscow. I'm a veteran of the Afghanistan war. I'm deputy director of the Internationalist Psychological Rehabilitation

Center. My last name is Kuznetsov, and I'm called Aleksandr. I would like to speak with Metropolitan Pitirim.

[Pitirim] This is Metropolitan Pitirim.

[Kuznetsov] Your Reverence, I have a great favor to ask of you. There is no other center similar to ours in the Soviet Union as yet. We were visited by American Vietnam War veterans. They have had such centers for a long time. They provide good help to veterans of the war in rehabilitating themselves. Especially when it comes to psychoneurological diseases.

This is something we would like to do as well. We have the space, and we have purchased the medical equipment. Some minor finish work and repairs are all that are left to do. And we would like to have your recommendations. We know that we can't cover it all over the telephone. But we need support. We are aware of your benevolent activities.

[Pitirim] Thank you. I will definitely support you. I will definitely stand by your side, Sasha. Give me your address....

[Kuznetsov] We have great plans. We would like to keep you informed about them. Here's our address: Tashkent, Khamib Alimzhan Square, 1-B. Internatsionalist Center.

[Pitirim] I'll send you a letter today. Better yet, I'll send a telegram.

[Dmitriyenko] I'm calling from the Museum of Soldier Internationalists of Moscow's Lyublinskiy Rayon. My name is Marina....

[Pitirim] And what is your last name and patronymical, Marina?

[Dmitriyenko] Marina Igorevna Dmitriyenko.

[Pitirim] What is it that is troubling you, Marinochka?

[Dmitriyenko] I have a request. We've just started up the museum. It doesn't have very many exhibits as yet. At the moment it is the only museum in Moscow. We are in a three-room apartment. I would think that such a museum should be established not at rayon scale, but for the city as a whole.

[Pitirim] And what's your address?

[Dmitriyenko] Lyublinskaya, 117. Can we count on you?

[Pitirim] I'll certainly look into it. I'll try to get out and see you.

[Alekseyev] Your Reverence, this is Colonel of Medical Service Valeriy Fedorovich Alekseyev, chief of the Zhitomir military hospital. I would like to talk to you in your station as a people's deputy.

[Pitirim] What sort of problems are there, Colonel?

[Alekseyev] Here's the gist of it: Our hospital is 170 years old. We have cost estimates for erecting a new ward, and they have been defended successfully at all levels.

[Pitirim] What sort of ward is this?

[Alekseyev] A surgical ward, with a capacity of 200 beds. But the title, which has been signed by the troop commander of the Carpathian Military District, is presently in Moscow, in the Main Billeting Directorate. I would like to ask you to do what you can to get construction of the ward included in the defense minister's title list. Then financing would be available.

Do you know why I am appealing namely to you? I was myself a participant of the events in Afghanistan. I was chief of the Kabul infection hospital. We are located in the Chernobyl zone. We have an entire scientific research complex. We very much need the new ward.

[Pitirim] I understand what you're saying, Valeriy Fedorovich. Let's do this. In order that I would have something substantial to work from, please send me a letter explaining it all in detail. I'll study it carefully.

[Sergeyev] Colonel (Reserve) Sergey Ivanovich Sergeyev. Tell me what kind of measures are being implemented by the Russian Orthodox Church to nurture morality in military servicemen, and particularly in officers.

[Pitirim] You must understand that we can't implement any kind of measures in someone else's jurisdiction, as they say. We work mainly in the church. And the church is open to all. But increasingly more discussion is presently being conducted on the problem of making it more convenient for servicemen to go to church. I'm not saying they can't go—the can, but I would like them to be able to go conveniently.

Let me tell you that I have recently been receiving many requests in this regard. And many ideas have been suggested as to how to combine patriotic with moral education. There is a broad avenue for activity here.

[Sergeyev] And what sort of mutual relations do you have with the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, with the recently established All-Army Party Committee?

[Pitirim] I have friendly personal ties with many military servicemen. The chairs we sit in as deputies are close together. And when it comes to personal communication, we have many common spiritual interests.

This direction should develop further given the existence of mutual good will.

[Sergeyev] Does this mean that progress is being made?

[Pitirim] Yes, at the personal level. Sympathies are being displayed. It seems to me that some sort of decision will have to be adopted in order to cross this line of formal alienation that has existed from former times.

We are working toward this end. Each year we conduct a memorial service for soldiers who died in Afghanistan.

We celebrate the day the troops left Afghanistan. On 9 May we conduct a service in Volokolamsk—now in the central square at that. This year on Victory Day we buried recently found remains of our Soviet soldiers. Everything was done in accordance with Orthodox tradition.

[Karpenko] Mikhail Mikhaylovich Karpenko, a reserve private, Moscow. My question is this. In a certain meeting with the writer Mikhail Fedorovich Antonov, we were told that supposedly during the Battle of Moscow, when the Red Army's position was critical, Russian clergymen toured the defensive line carrying sacred icons. After that, the enemy never crossed this line. Is this just a legend, or did this really happen?

[Pitirim] I never heard about this before personally. But I do know very many things. I know that even during the occupation, services were never interrupted in the damaged churches of Volokolamsk. I know that in Vereya for example, some of our soldiers were shot in a chapel. Very many graves in Belorussia contain the remains of clergymen who were shot for their contacts with partisans. I visited these graves myself. There are several clergymen serving here in Moscow who participated in the combat activities. But when it comes to your remarks, I must admit that I have never heard anything about that. But we should remember that the counteroffensive at Moscow began on the day commemorating Alexander Nevsky.

[Bobrov] I'm calling from Stavropol Kray. I'm a construction worker by specialty. Vladimir Ivanovich Bobrov. I was raised in the '30's in a children's home at the Volokolamsk monastery. I left it in '35. I went back there 10 years ago. Everything was in ruins, and the bell tower had collapsed. I don't know what's there now, but 10 years ago there was a little children's home. There were 300-400 of us. And we worked as farmers. We were taught to work well. I've now been employed as a construction worker for 50 years, rising from a common laborer to manager of a trust. My suggestion is this. Could a really good children's home be organized at the monastery? My suggestion is to provide land so that the children could work it. To provide equipment, and to provide good teachers. Good people will be the result. Because otherwise, bad things are happening in the children's homes.

What do you think about my idea?

[Pitirim] That's the sort of thing I'm working on. And I've received many phone calls about this today. Do you ever visit Moscow, Vladimir Ivanovich?

[Bobrov] I do. I plan to be there in late May or early June with my grandson.

[Pitirim] Get in touch with me then. Make a note of my telephone number.... We'll talk about it all in detail.

[Karpusov] Your Reverence, is it not too late to ask you a question?

[Pitirim] Please, ask away.

[Karpusov] My name is Anatoliy Andreyevich Karpusov. I'm a doctor from Ryazan. What is your attitude toward the Slavophile idea, toward General Skobelev, the official who preached this idea? He was a native of Ryazan Oblast. He's buried here as well. His grave in Zaborovo Cemetery is left unattended. And he was a hero of the Russo-Turkish War, a person who did much to liberate the Slavs.

[Pitirim] You know, we were intending to shut down our call-in line. It's already after twelve, you see. We had already gotten up to leave, considering that time had run out, but something stopped me. And as it turns out, your phone call is a great joy to me. Thank you. I will answer everything for you, Anatoliy Andreyevich.

Last year a representative of mine visited General Skobelev's grave. We assumed the moral obligation to restore the grave. We will begin work this year. My friends from Bulgaria will also help. Although Zaborovo is far away from you, we would like you to participate in this as much as you can.

[Karpusov] We have a group of interested individuals. We are trying to create our own Slavic Center. We'll try to help.

[Pitirim] Please do. I'm president of Russia's Slavic Fund. Let's be friends. Give me your telephone. And write mine down. Please, let's keep in touch. This is very important.

All-Army Party Secretary Surkov Interviewed

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Second Edition p. 2

[Interview with M. Surkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the All-Army Party Committee, by V. Izgarshev; place and date not given: "Side by Side With the Soldier"]

[Text]

[Izgarshev] Mikhail Semenovich, albeit belated, accept our cordial congratulations on your election to our party's Central Committee Politburo. How did you take your election?

[Surkov] Thank you for the congratulations. I attribute the high honor of election to the highest party authority wholly and fully to the million-strong combat detachment of Army and Navy communists, whose party committee I was entrusted to lead at the first All-Army Party Conference. In accordance with the 28th party congress resolution "Guidelines of the Party's Military Policy at the Current Stage," the conference completed the reforming of party structures in the Army and Navy. A single party organization of our state's armed forces was created as a component of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

[Izgarshev] The methods of party work also have been infused with new content and extraneous features of the period of stagnation have been removed in the six years of perestroika. This, of course, applies to the Army party organization also?

[Surkov] Relations based on glasnost, freedom of opinion, and the truly equal position of the communists have taken shape in the majority of party outfits. There are no zones closed to criticism now, and there has come to be less dogmatism and blinkered thinking in ideological work.

Political dialogue and debate on topical questions of the theory and practice of perestroika with us in the Army also are now becoming a part of the daily practice of the party organizations. And, you know, this is in no way, apparently, undermining the fighting capacity and cohesion of the party outfits. On the contrary, it is contributing to their consolidation.

[Izgarshev] I would like to hear from you, Mikhail Semenovich, about what the party committee considers paramount under the new conditions.

[Surkov] Mention should be made first and foremost, I believe, of questions of ideological work, the problem which of late, in my view, has been the most acute, socially significant issue. Our political opponents are demanding: "Away With the CPSU!" "Down With Marxism-Leninism!" Any party Central Committee document is greeted by the authors of these demands with prejudice, to put it mildly.

Let us be frank, many communists have found themselves inadequately prepared for a cogent rebuff in this respect. Nor have they been additionally primed by political training, which has for many years been conducted formally. There has been a striking difference between word and deed. And there continues to be, unfortunately.

I recently visited the Leningrad Military District and the Northern Fleet. I saw much there that was good in the activity of the party organizations. But I saw also that the level of political assertiveness of considerable numbers of the communists had dropped off noticeably. This is naturally having a negative effect on the nature of political-educational work with the personnel. The fear of some people to take on opponents is perceived.

How should we influence the state of affairs? V. Kozlov, secretary of the party committee of the Moscow Military District, believes that instruction in effective forms and methods of political struggle should be conducted not only in the party family, among the communists, but at the heart of life itself—at mass meetings and demonstrations, in appearances on radio and television, and in articles in the press. The secretary is right, I believe. He himself, incidentally, is setting an example of such aggressive, assertive political activity.

[Izgarshev] What we are still losing sight of, I think, are questions of people's international schooling. Or, rather, we are conducting this in the old way. But your service in the Transcaucasus is, I believe, full of convincing and instructive observations and examples.

[Surkov] You are right, in this sphere of party work there have been not only many malfunctions and blunders but also foot-dragging and a lag behind the dynamically unfolding process in the sphere of interethnic relations in the country and the Army. Whence the costs in relations between servicemen and the growth of offenses and conflicts on national grounds, including such dangerous ones as evasion of military service, taunting incidents, desertion, violation of regulation relationships, and excesses in respect of the local population.

All these and other negative phenomena are connected not only with the overall situation in the country and the anti-Army campaign staged by certain political forces but also with the fact that some party organizations are failing to take account of the entirely new sociopolitical nature of relations between servicemen and people's increased sense of national self-awareness. Things are frequently reduced, as formerly, to hollow appeals and general measures. It is here, more than anywhere else, that any oversimplification is impermissible. It cannot be expected that everything will take its course and come about of its own accord. Not only diverse forms for an explanation of the Leninist idea of federation and the new Union treaty but individual work with men of different nationalities with regard for their language, culture, customs, and traditions are needed, as the experience of the party committees of the Baltic, Transcaucasus, and Odessa Military Districts shows.

[Izgarshev] We need here, evidently, to be talking about the style of party work?

[Surkov] The problem of the style of work would seem to me one of the most important. The new party structures are democratic by nature and may under no circumstances blindly copy the work methods of the former political authorities, which, as you know, were endowed with administrative powers. It is very important here to delineate the functions of party committees of different levels in order to avoid duplication and the interference of the senior party bodies in the solution of questions which fall within the jurisdiction of the lower committees and bureaus, the primary organizations particularly. They are, in accordance with the CPSU Rules, independent in the accomplishment of quite a wide range of tasks.

It is this that is a principal direction of the democratization of intraparty relations.

[Izgarshev] Judging by PRAVDA's mailbag, not all organizations have known how to correctly realize the new rights and authority accorded them by the CPSU Rules.

[Surkov] The point is that in emerging from the strict control of the political authorities, certain activists have absented themselves from performance of their assignments. A scrupulous approach in an evaluation of shortcomings, particularly concerning the activity and behavior of the communists, has been lost. This is an alarming symptom and requires the adoption of the corresponding measures for the increased influence of the directive party bodies on the lower components.

[Izgarshev] But at the same time there should be no return either to administrative methods of leadership, and the attempts of individual party committees to bring order to bear exclusively by repressive measures are all the more impermissible.

[Surkov] Party exactingness is necessary, but the main thing was and remains ideological, educative influence and an ability to persuade the masses and create in the outfits the moral-ethical prerequisites for concerted, coordinated work.

[Izgarshev] The authority of the party organization and its influence on the personnel, it was said earlier, would largely depend on the moral purity, honesty, and scrupulousness of the communists.

[Surkov] Well, it is a very correct provision today also. The party and each member are the object of the close attention of millions of eyes. Particular significance is attached to assurance of the vanguard role of members of the CPSU. Can such forms of work which justified themselves in the past as the communists' reports and accounts to their party comrades on the fulfillment of statutory requirements be superfluous now? And a system of the moral and material stimulation of those who represent a model of the performance of their service and party duty is needed also. As is high-minded exactingness in respect of those who discredit and disgrace the name of member of the Leninist Communist Party. We must have this.

An indispensable condition of an increase in the assertiveness and militancy of the party organizations is their organizational reinforcement and an expansion of the network of lower party structures. An aspiration, unwarranted, in my view, to the elimination of the small party organizations and party groups in subunits of the company level has been observed of late. We are profoundly interested in the network of party organizations penetrating all levels of the Army organism and in party organizations or party groups functioning in the most critical sectors and being replenished by new members from the ranks of progressive servicemen. And for this it is necessary to decisively step up work on selection for the CPSU and engage in it daily, know those who replenish our ranks and always be in touch with them.

[Izgarshev] The purpose of party work ultimately amounts to assurance of the Army outfits' high-quality accomplishment of the tasks of combat training of the troops, strengthening of Army discipline....

[Surkov] Of course. And these questions require new approaches and appreciable amplification under the conditions of military reform, what is more. I would emphasize particularly that the influence of the party organizations on the communists' professional activity should be exerted exclusively by political methods in accordance with the USSR Law "On public Associations in the USSR."

[Izgarshev] Some leaders are attempting to explain the narrowing of the sphere of party work in the units and on the ships, incidentally, by the action of this law.

[Surkov] This is happening. But the reference to the provision of the law to the effect that servicemen may not in their activity be bound by the decisions of party organizations is far from incontestable. If a party decision is geared to an increase in the responsibility and quality of the work of members of the CPSU and their professional competence, is it not legitimate? That the issues brought up for discussion and the clauses of the decision adopted in respect of them should be formulated properly and in legally correct fashion is another matter.

[Izgarshev] And what would you highlight in the many important spheres of party work today?

[Surkov] Questions of a strengthening of Army discipline and the maintenance in the units and on the ships of regulation order. At the present time this problem is the most acute and politically significant to the highest degree inasmuch as it is directly connected with the authority of the Army and its evaluation by public opinion. Without going into details, I would note that the party committees, operating in a single front with the communist commanders and military-political authorities, could do much when it comes to the cohesion of the Army outfits and the eradication from them of nonregulation and other negative phenomena. It is important to seek to ensure that each communist, whatever position he hold, have from the party organization a permanent assignment pertaining to the question of a strengthening of discipline and periodically render account of its fulfillment. Each member of the CPSU is required to assume personal responsibility for the maintenance in the Army of discipline and law and order and for his own contribution to the accomplishment of this statewide task.

[Izgarshev] You said at the All-Army Party Conference that the elective party authorities would only enjoy authority when they had secured daily close communication with the servicemen masses and had put at the center of their activity concern for man and defense of his rights based on the principle of social justice.

[Surkov] I repeat this now also. But this is the problem—there is no shortage of appeals, on this issue included, but we are in practice only taking hesitant steps. Yet the ukase of the president of the USSR on the social protection of the servicemen also affords the party organizations a wide field of activity.

The interests of the servicemen and Army and Navy communists are inseparable from the interests of the people. Soviet fighting men firmly advocate the preservation and strengthening of the Union and the speediest and just solution of interethnic problems, support the program of the USSR Government pertaining to extrication of the country from the crisis, and are participating in its realization to the best of their ability. They will do everything to reliably secure Soviet people's

peaceful labor. The communists in shoulder boards always have been and will continue to be side by side with the soldier and sailor and in single Army and Navy formation with them. There is for them nothing higher than concern for the fighting man, the authority of our Army, and the strengthening of its unity with the people, which was so dazzlingly and wholesomely manifested in the years of the war, the 50th anniversary of the start of which we are all commemorating at this time.

Trofimenko on Military Doctrine, Part II

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[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences Professor Genrikh Aleksandrovich Trofimenko, chief academic associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences United States of America and Canada Institute: "What Military Doctrine Do We Need?"; conclusion—for beginning see: Moscow MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN, 1990, No. 12]

[Text] Having determined that reasonable sufficiency in the sphere of strategic offensive weapons signifies their rough equilibrium in relations between the USSR and the United States, USSR Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen Army M.A. Moiseyev effectively skirted the question of strategic defensive weapons in his Vienna speech in January of 1990. What is the attitude of the Soviet military leadership toward this issue in light of the new Soviet military doctrine? It is no secret to anyone that it is exclusively negative when the issue is the American program to create an ABM system with space-based elements, which has received the name of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

"If the ABM system of the United States, and especially its space strike elements, are created, strategic stability will be undermined," noted Gen Moiseyev. "An arms race could begin in the realm of strategic weapons with unpredictable consequences"¹.

On the other hand, insofar as we ourselves are keeping, and not only keeping but upgrading, the ballistic-missile defense system around Moscow that was permitted by the 1972 ABM Treaty, our approach to strategic defense in principle would seemingly be a positive one. Our civilian and military leaders are affirming at the same time that the maintenance of security on the basis of mutual restraint, by the threat of a shattering answering strike, is also not suitable, that the concept of restraint must be relegated to the archives. An absolutely vicious circle results—the one is bad, the other is unacceptable, and the third has become outmoded.

It is clear at the same time that notwithstanding the enormous progress in Soviet-American relations, the concepts of reinforcing collaboration and rejecting the "image of the enemy" cannot serve to replace military doctrine. The more so as military doctrine is not a concept for the creation and use of armed forces by a given state only apropos of some specific "potential enemy" or specific current situation, but is rather a more or less universal theoretical construct applied to the whole spectrum of possible threats to the USSR, both today's and the powerful new ones that could arise in the foreseeable future.

Our military theoreticians, in an attempt to break out of this vicious circle, are beginning to transform defensive systems into offensive ones, classifying an ABM system with space-based elements as **space strike weapons**. But even that does not help, insofar as we ourselves are

continuing to try to link **that system** with the existing Soviet-American ABM Treaty on anti-missile **defense**! Completely confused by the inherent contradictions, we are beginning to raise a hue and cry that if the American SDI program is continued, we will have "an asymmetrical reply" to it, even though no one is forcing us to tell the whole world the nature of our possible response. The more so, as becomes clear, as this asymmetrical response will itself consist of the augmentation of various types of strategic offensive weapons.

It turns out as a result that the Americans with their "aggressive military doctrine" are focusing on reinforcing strategic defense, while we with our doctrine of defensive sufficiency intend, under certain circumstances, to place the emphasis on offensive strategic weapons!

I do not know how the Ministry of Defense will ultimately untangle this knot of contradictions, but untangled it must be, at least so as to impart a trustworthy and logical nature to our doctrinal stance. And since the military leaders of our country seemingly do not object to the fact that civilian theoreticians make their contributions to the debate on military policy, I will allow myself to express my own opinion on this score. Despite even the impending signing of the new Soviet-American treaty for substantial reductions in the strategic offensive arms of both countries, a situation of mutual restraint, mutual dissuasion on the basis of parity in those arms at a reduced level, will be maintained for many years and will serve the cause of stability of the world strategic situation, taking into account the proportionate share of the arsenals of the two powers in the global balance of forces. "The main thing in military force development is the preservation of strategic parity,"² emphasizes CPSU Central Committee Secretary O.D. Baklanov.

As for strategic defensive weapons in the context of parity, then however frenzied our criticism of them at this stage, the future belongs to them if the world community is unable to get rid of nuclear weapons entirely. And there is nothing to cross swords over here. No ABM system at the current "state of military art," including space systems, will protect either the USSR or the United States against a mass nuclear-missile strike by the other side. But they will be able to protect against all sorts of terrorists—be they some organized international gang of blackmailers who have gotten hold of nuclear weapons, or some new nuclear power with suicidal leaders (like Iraq).

So the creation of a new ABM system by us or the United States is almost inevitable in the future. We have in fact confirmed for everyone that we ourselves are convinced of this in our heart of hearts. Doesn't our multitude of proposals to the United States to wait for us on that path, agreeing that we will not go beyond the ABM Treaty for 8-10 years and then receive a free hand, testify to this?

I am convinced that the new quality of Soviet-American relations, the actual elimination of the "Soviet threat"

for the Americans and the "American threat" for us through a whole series of bilateral agreements and unilateral actions, makes the problem of anti-missile defense based on new physical principles resolvable not on the path of asymmetrical initiatives or responses, but through cooperative interaction in the interest of international stability and the avoidance of accidental warfare.

The idea expressed by the famous American physicist E. Teller—the "father" of the American hydrogen bomb—that the American technology of "brilliant pebbles" that has been developed for non-nuclear space-based anti-missile defense could possibly be utilized to create an inexpensive global network of artificial Earth satellites that could efficiently perform the function of monitoring global military activity, as well as track the pollution of the environment, forecast the weather etc., is an interesting one. "This would make aggressive warfare virtually impossible," emphasized Teller, who, apparently, is also restructuring in the spirit of the times, "All should collaborate."¹

USSR President M.S. Gorbachev answered the questions of deputies after his speech to the 3rd Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet summing up his state visits to Canada and the United States. Deputy Yu.A. Koltsov, noting that the United States had rejected our proposals on negotiations to reduce naval forces, said, "Does that mean that this stance by the United States will force us to develop our navy further, improving our major aircraft-carrying vessels first and foremost?" Our whole policy of arms development was concentrated, focused, in that question.

The essence of the policy is repeating, late, everything that the United States does in the military sphere. If they have 15 aircraft carriers, then we should have 15 aircraft carriers. We take that stand and do not move off it, even though sometimes it borders on madness. Is it really so difficult to understand that we have a different geopolitical situation than the United States, differing geopolitical surroundings, differing strategic tasks? That would be clearer to the broad public if we had a clearly formulated **military** doctrine.

Of course, when the discussion concerns contemporary strategic forces with their global reach of operations, the instantaneous nature of reactions and catastrophic destructive power, then we, as was noted above, could not and cannot fail to take American potential—the sole threat of an intercontinental nature—into account in our own military force development. But even in that sphere, our blind mirroring of everything done by the United States is scarcely justified.

It is, however, impossible to understand the squabbles that have been underway for months now between Soviet military and civilian experts on the desirable optimum size for our professional army, in which the principal reasoning and initial criterion is references to

the size of the U.S. Army, regarding which a lack of clarity supposedly exists. I want to shout: what business is it of ours what the size of the U.S. Army is? If the United States wants to have an army of 10 million people, that is their business. Let them have it and, paying each soldier 1,500 dollars a month, they will finally feel what a real military burden is. (In truth, they still intend to reduce their armed forces by 300,000 people by 1994²).

I am exaggerating, of course, understanding that in determining the optimal size for our ground forces we cannot fail to take into account both the quantity of American troops in Europe and the possibility of the redeployment there of additional contingents of armed forces from the United States in the event of a large conflict. But the size of our army today, when we have the opportunity of "dissuading" the United States without using Western Europe as a hostage, should be determined first of all by the actual geopolitical surroundings, and not by the size of the U.S. Army.

True, in accordance with the new principles we now do not have enemies, only partners and friends all around. But we maintain armed forces nonetheless. The 28th CPSU Congress resolution "Basic Guidelines for Contemporary Party Military Policy" emphasizes that "guarantees of the irreversibility of positive changes have not taken shape" in the military and political climate, and "the military danger to the USSR remains."³ It is not difficult to estimate the size of the ground forces of the states neighboring us, both in peacetime and in wartime, and to draw a conclusion on the expedient optimal size of our army from that with a regard for the size and nature of the territory being defended, the quality of the troops and arms, their technical sophistication, the quality of that equipment itself etc.

The aggregate size of the regular armed forces of just those states bordering our country to the south, for example, is 4.5 million men today. And if the armed forces of those countries were to comprise the same percentage of their populations as ours do, then their aggregate size should be 12 million men or more. And that would be—as here—their size in peacetime. And what if we add to that the armies of the United States, the other NATO countries and Japan?

It is clear that it is impossible for us to seek parity in the size of armed forces with all of the states around us, with every good intention (as we strove for it in strategic arms with the United States), and there is no need for it anyway if we pursue a reasonable and non-aggressive foreign policy and do not scare our neighbors, as we did first with Western Europe, and then China in the 1970s, putting 25 divisions on its borders and thereby creating long-term tensions in relations with our great neighbor to the south, to the crowning satisfaction of some Western strategists. And the Chinese leaders of the time, inclined in favor of the West, after all, were undoubtedly frightened both by the entry of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia and, especially, by the "Brezhnev doctrine," which

provided the grounds for the indispensability of this entry to set the lost "class brethren" onto "the path of truth as the duty of internationalist aid." To our great good fortune, the "Brezhnev doctrine," like the "Truman doctrine" before it, came a cropper of China; otherwise, we would have had to drink a cup more bitter than Afghanistan!

My thesis, more briefly, is that the chief criterion for the development of the conventional armed forces of the USSR should be a correct assessment of the surrounding military and political climate, proceeding from the fundamental mission of the continental defense of our country and its actual economic and technical military capabilities. Reading a feature by Marshal S.F. Akhromyev in the Soviet press, I understand that it is seemingly just this that is done when planning the size of our armed forces. "The size of the armed forces of the USSR—3,760,000 people as of 1 Jan 91—is the result of research by large collectives. There is no place for the whims of the military here,"⁶ he writes.

The only thing that puts one on guard in the marshal's features are the figures he cites for the use of tens of thousands of military men for construction, agriculture and other work, as well as on the sovkhozes belonging to the army. I cannot fail to recall in this regard a story told by the chairman of the Orenburg Oblast ispolkom about calling his namesake, Marshal G.K. Zhukov, then minister of defense of the USSR, asking him to come to the rescue in the grave transport situation that existed in the oblast at the time, with them unable to truck out the hay from the fields due to snowdrifts. "I'm not a cart driver," the marshal declared in reply, and hung up the phone. But correspondents from the central press could not contain their raptures last summer over the fact that 60 motor transport battalions would again be joining the—thirtieth? fortieth?—harvest rush. "Thirty thousand trucks! Many taken from the special reserve warehouses—an emergency ration, from important Army transport shipments."⁷

Maybe it is time for us all the same, in reforming socialism, to break ourselves of the habit of approaching the gathering of the harvest as an unforeseen natural disaster? Maybe willing peasants and professional construction workers should till the land, mow the hay and build bridges and roads, and not the soldiers with which they are trying to replace the thinning *gratis* slave labor of the GULAG? Perhaps then the size of the army could be decreased as well.

If the military leaders do not want to create a professional hired army, then let them at least be engaged entirely in their business of professional military training of inductees. And one can only welcome warmly the first step taken in that direction by the Committee on Issues of Defense and State Security of the USSR Supreme Soviet, which has proposed disbanding the military construction units being used in the national economy of the USSR entirely in the next two years.

But if one can believe that the size of the army here is determined on the basis of objective criteria and careful analysis, there have to be doubts when the discussion touches on the fleet of surface vessels. Submarines (both missile and attack) do not count here—that is a special item connected first and foremost with the Soviet-American strategic balance, and it should be considered separately, although perhaps in the foreseeable future the chief problem in that sphere may be not so much the issue of how many and which submarines must be built as it will how to get rid of the old nuclear submarines, built in large numbers, in an ecologically safe manner.

The problem of a navy is an enormous topic deserving of special, careful consideration. I will thus permit myself to express a few considerations in concise fashion as a contribution to the on-going debate, connected first of all with aircraft carriers. The chief initial premise herein for future argument is the fact that we have just one military budget "war chest," as large as it may be, and that for well-known reasons it will be decreasing in size in the future. All of the funds that go to the development of the surface fleet are thus taken from the other branches of the armed forces, and vice versa.

Why does the Soviet Union need a mighty ocean-going surface fleet that is comparable in its parameters with the fleet of the world's leading naval power, the United States? I think one of the main reasons is considerations of prestige, although this is mentioned, as a rule, under one's breath, since the payment for such prestige is too excessive. But it is mentioned nonetheless. Our chief naval theoretician, Fleet Adm SU S.G. Gorshkov, wrote the following about this: "The Soviet Union, with the access of its navy to the open sea, has obtained new and broader opportunities for its use during peacetime for the purpose of supporting state interests..."

"The friendly port calls of Soviet sailors offer an opportunity for the peoples of the countries they visit to be convinced with their own eyes of the triumph of socialist principles in our country, the genuine equality of peoples in the Soviet Union, their high cultural level. They see in our ships the achievements of Soviet science, engineering and industry. Soviet seamen, from sailor to admiral, bear the truth about our socialist country, our Soviet ideology and culture, our Soviet way of life to the peoples of other countries."⁸ While the then-editor of *Voenizdat* could get carried away by such "high style," the authorities providing the money need something a little more solid. Two tenets were formulated for this purpose.

The first: "The contemporary historical purpose of the Soviet armed forces is **not limited** (emphasis mine—G.T.) to their function of defending our homeland and the other countries of socialism."⁹ That being the case, the "Soviet Navy is not only a means of defending our Motherland, but also... serves as an important instrument of policy in peacetime, protecting the interests of

our country and supporting friendly countries."¹⁰ "The navy, of all the branches of the armed forces, is most able to support efficiently the country's interests beyond its borders."¹¹

The second: "The naval forces are gradually becoming the chief carrier of nuclear weapons, able to strike an enemy on all continents and seas. The imperialists are giving greater and greater preference to an oceanic strategy and warfare from the sea against the shore in this regard. The historical experience of the failures of marches against the USSR by the mightiest of the land armies of imperialism have played a significant role in the shift of the center of gravity to naval forces."¹²

In actuality, if we look closely, Gorshkov's statements were asserting the following fantastic theory: a fascist army with its 5.5 million soldiers was unable to defeat the USSR in a land war, and now, extracting lessons from this failure, the "imperialists" have decided to defeat the USSR from the sea! Judging from everything, the Soviet leadership at the time liked these tenets—a green light was given to the broad-scale development of the surface fleet. I am assuming that the feeling of guilt being felt by our leaders over the new ships that had been cut up into scrap by order of N.S. Khrushchev—who had decided that the country did not need a fleet in the nuclear-missile age (for us, as always, extremes)—also played a role here. The personal "penetrating power" of Gorshkov, his many years of ties with the highest political leaders of the country, also facilitated a substantial increase in appropriations for the navy to a large extent as well. It is not for nothing, after all, that he alone among the commanders-in-chief has held his post without replacement for 30 years.

For the fulfillment of the first task, which can be defined today as an attempt to build a Soviet empire (the socialist-oriented countries) in maritime territories, ships were needed that were able to carry out prolonged autonomous sailing in the world's oceans, along with aircraft carriers, of course. But the engineering and technical capabilities for the construction of full-scale aircraft carriers were lacking at first. At first, therefore—at the end of the 1970s and the 1980s—four of the Kiev-class aircraft-carrying ships equipped with short takeoff and landing aircraft were built and delivered to the navy, while the first full-scale aircraft carrier, the Tbilisi, was launched in 1989 (displacement of 60,000 tons, and initially named the Leonid Brezhnev).

It was called a heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser, although that term cannot be found in any Soviet encyclopedia. I assume this naive linguistic stunt was contrived so as to get those who had solemnly sworn from on high for many years that we were not, and would not be, building aircraft carriers, that our country did not need them, out of their awkward position somehow. And that was declaimed at a time when reconnaissance satellites could easily detect a hole dug in the ground for a new missile shaft, never mind a gigantic ship being built in the slips

for years! The Tbilisi, according to Western sources, is just the first of a series of ships under construction in this class.

According to American data, the cost of one aircraft-carrier group (an aircraft carrier with support ships) over the thirty years of its service life (including everything—the cost of the vessels, aircraft, ordnance, pay for the crews, repairs) is on the order of 45-50 billion American dollars in current prices. This is, according to American data, roughly equal to the cost of deploying an anti-missile defense system in space.¹³ Do we—a continental power that has, it would seem, today rejected the idea of building an oceanic empire and foreign adventures in the spirit of the "Brezhnev doctrine"—need more and more ships of this class? Or are the material and human resources that go for the construction and upkeep of that sort of combat vessel better used for other, even military purposes, that correspond more to the accepted concept of defensive sufficiency?

It is no accident that this question is being asked by an ever larger number of both regular citizens and people's deputies of the USSR. And if we were to approach the redistribution of budget funds in a broader context, one may recall here the oft-quoted statement of U.S. president D. Eisenhower: "Every rifle fired, every ship launched, every missile launched ultimately signifies the robbing of those who are hungry and not fed, who are cold and have no clothes."¹⁴

It must be kept in mind herein that the American military, and first and foremost the leaders of the U.S. Navy, were perfectly delighted by the direction we have taken toward the mass construction of ships and the upgrading of the surface components of our navy. Posing no danger to the United States, since the potentials of the USSR and the United States in this sphere are not commensurate, it has allowed the leaders of the American Navy literally to pump money from Congress by trafficking in the "Soviet naval threat."

I myself saw a set of slides prepared by propaganda workers in the U.S. Department of the Navy in which the two "naval gods" figured—the American theoretician of a global oceanic strategy, Admiral Mahan, and the "continuer of his cause," Admiral Gorshkov, who is also the only one who can correctly evaluate the true purpose of a navy. These slides were being shown everywhere—from the military academies to secondary schools—fueling the readiness of the Americans to sacrifice a great deal for the sake of a strong navy.

"Gorshkov's concept of naval might has engendered both the operational doctrines and the ships that could be used by American strategists to justify augmenting the naval potential of the United States," notes one of the major American specialists on the Soviet Navy, Professor Michael (Blekhus), who was occupied with this problem at the CIA. "The Gorshkov manifesto of the 'naval might of the state' was describing the political

base for Soviet oceanic means... He has only reunited the elements of the Mahan mission. The noticeable rise in Soviet oceanic capabilities renewed the wartime designs of the U.S. Navy as well. The offensive role of the major American carriers was rehabilitated to oppose the increasing role of the Soviet fleet and naval aviation at the northern and southern flanks of NATO and north-western Asia... The yearly successes of the navy in supporting their programs depend directly on how sufficiently frighteningly the Soviet naval threat is depicted."¹²

It turns out that the two navies are closely coupled, as it were, each nodding toward the other. But the Americans, with their transoceanic activities and their close ties with Asia and Europe, really do need a strong navy to protect naval lines of communication and their capital investments. This, as the president of the USSR says, is understandable to all military people who are more or less experienced. And what would we be protecting with an analogous armada? A surface fleet doubtless has many truly defensive tasks, arising out of the specific geopolitical situation in the USSR and from the fact that sea-launched cruise missiles are becoming a terrible weapon today.

But that in no way justifies our attempts to mirror the naval force development of the United States and "catch up" with the Americans in that sphere. And the fact that this stipulation takes funds away from much more urgent needs of the Soviet armed forces, as well as the whole economy of the country, is understood very well in the United States. That is why the Pentagon has made such noisy depictions of its fears of our navy in recent years—God forbid we stop building aircraft carriers, stop larding Chukotka and Kamchatka with military hardware (in anticipation of an American assault?) and switch our attention to something else more useful to us. It is pointed out directly in the latest guiding military directives of the Pentagon, as the American press reports, that the United States should seek ways of "diverting the utilization of Soviet military resources to the realization of tasks that are relatively less efficient for them."

As for Admiral Gorshkov's theory that the imperialists are shifting the center of gravity of their fight against the USSR to operations at sea (a theory which, although false, is convenient for shaking loose a little more money for one's own agency), it had, by the beginning of the 1990s, virtually been transformed into the direct stipulation that the chief military danger to the USSR comes from the U.S. Navy, thanks to the constant repetition of our theoreticians (and everyone, after all, wants to "tighten things up"). "One of the most important problems, and today even the chief problem, in the security of the Soviet Union," asserts Marshal Akhromyev, "is naval forces."¹³

Other senior military comrades speaking in a like manner could also be quoted. With all due respect to the reputation of our marshals and generals and with every

understanding of the significance of the threat from sea-launched cruise missiles, a person thinking normally cannot in any way agree with this theory. Does not the experience of the American interventions in Korea and Vietnam, where the United States was unable to gain victory when operating against weaker adversaries, completely refute this fecklessly inflated theory of Gorshkov? Walter Lippman said at one time on this score that a whale cannot defeat an elephant.

After all, we could even come to the point that one of the probable directions for an "American intervention" could be an attack across the "natural narrows"—the Bering Strait! But praise God, a friendship park is now being created on both sides of the strait in accordance with the decisions of the presidents of both countries, and our military will evidently have to clear some of its "toys" out of there.

It follows from all this that the consistent development of Soviet military doctrine, like the pursuit of military reform, requires a continuation of broad public debate on these issues.

Fundamental military and political decisions, and especially those in the realm of disarmament, are impossible without the support of the people in the face of the epochal foreign-policy events in the world arena. It is all the more necessary to the political leadership of the country when, as is becoming clear, our officer corps still has figures of a Napoleonic bent, pining for the strong hand and barracks discipline for the whole country. And events show that the pressure of those figures, condemning the "euphoria" in foreign policy founded on the new thinking, inveighing for "strict and strong pressure," is increasing. That is just why public support is so essential for the new approaches to the problems of security and radical military reform with the aim of profound transformations in the country's armed forces in accordance with its actual requirements and economic capabilities. The more fully and deeply our aware citizens, including those who have only recently come to state leadership, investigate issues of military policy, the greater will be the guarantees that there will be no military dictatorship in the country.

It is emphasized in the resolutions of the most important forums and speeches of military leaders, as it was ten and twenty years ago, that the military danger to the USSR remains, and that we must therefore keep our powder dry. And even though it is difficult for the average person to see any military danger aside from the sweeping military actions in some regions of our country, the world really has not yet disarmed, and combat-ready armed forces should remain the chief instrument of defense against any outside threat as before. We must also see, however, that external danger is not some kind of phenomenon given from on high for all time.

We ourselves played no small role in creating the "total danger" from outside by our super-armament against

everyone, by the attempt to achieve absolute security exclusively through military force development with complete neglect of the art of policy and diplomacy, by our own ideological irreconcilability toward all who structure their lives on different principles and, finally, by our own concrete actions in the spirit of the "Brezhnev doctrine." Absolute security, however, is unattainable in the world of contemporary arms. The way of the arms race is endless and leads nowhere. Yesterday we were rivals with America, and tomorrow we would have to enter into exhausting competition with somebody else.

The main thing is that by our own understanding of security exclusively as military sufficiency and the concentration of all efforts on military force development, we have undermined and distorted our economy—the fundamental basis for the security and independence of the country. As has been noted more than once already, our distribution system was the economics of war communism, while the state proved to exist under an army, where the people are supplied with what is left from military production.

The paradox, however, is the fact that the super-hypertrophied military economy, under which the military-industrial complex has at its disposal half of the country's budget at a minimum, is proving to be unable to create normal living conditions even for its own military. They live well in their uninvited quarters in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the like, but not in their own country. And the point here is not the mistakes of our foreign policy, not "Shevardnadze's errors," but the organic and initially assigned neglect, by the monstrous mechanical military octopus, of the interests of the soldiers, officers and even generals serving it that do not reside in the capital. After all, for that octopus they are not even the "human factor," but just "manpower" all in all.

The new political leadership of the USSR that came to power in 1985 has decisively knocked the arms race from its well-worn rails and undertaken effective measures to dismantle the military danger to the country, eliminating the Soviet threat to the world, the objective presence of which, by virtue of the colossal nature of the Soviet military arsenal, we did not want to admit for a long time. And the reciprocal steps on the part of the Western democracies have not forced us to wait long. The successfully concluded INF Treaty and the recently signed Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe recently signed by the 22 states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, as well as the work on a Soviet-American treaty on substantial reductions in strategic offensive arms that is approaching completion, testify namely to this.

The opportunity has thus opened up to build universal security, that is, security for all countries large and small, through a real reining in of militarism and reductions in arms. NATO is reconsidering its military doctrine and strategy, to a considerable extent in response to our initiatives. The further development of the principle of reasonable sufficiency for the defense of our country, its interpretation in concrete and realistic formulations of military doctrine, will be a most important guarantee that the military policy devised in that way will fully meet the vital needs and interests of Soviet civilian society and enjoy unqualified support from it under these conditions.

Footnotes

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Belorussia Debates National Army, Defense Budget

91UM0741A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Jun 91 First Edition p 5

[Article by R. Tokhta-Khodzhayeva: "From Minsk: An Attack or a Reconnaissance in Force?"]

[Text] In the difficult sociopolitical situation the session of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet is continuing its work. Even the first days have shown that the Belorussian Parliament is becoming an arena of acute political struggle which, incidentally, has a military aspect. Thus, in the course of discussing the anticrisis program of the government, the opposition representatives constantly recalled, for example, the military budget to which the republic contributes. There were appeals heard to demand that the USSR Ministry of Defense return the funds invested by Belorussia and begin the establishment of its own national army. A bit before the opposition, having demanded that the government step down and the Supreme Soviet be abrogated, proposed for the agenda a draft election law prepared by it. This document also contains a sort of antiarmy attack, as it proposes that limitations be placed on the voting rights of servicemen.

This unexpected turn of events by the deputies caused indignation among many participants in the session as it was an attempt to infringe on the elementary right of man which had been reinforced as an axiom in international agreements.

Whatever the case, the trial balloon was launched, the idea struck a responsive chord and not at an ordinary street demonstration but from the rostrum of the parliament.

Latvian Commission Meets With Baltic Servicemen's Union

91UM0741C Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 12 May 91 p 2

[BALTIA—ETA article from Riga on 10 May: "'A Union of Servicemen': To Be or Not To Be?"]

[Text] Today on neutral territory—at the gorispolkom—a meeting was held for the commission of the Latvian Republic Supreme Soviet on Defense and Internal Affairs with members of the Coordinating Center of the Union of Baltic Servicemen which yesterday was declared by the republic government to be an anticonstitutional organization. The commission's chairman, Talavs Jundzis, in summing up the meeting, said that it had been necessary and had been marked by constructive elements. T. Jundzis particularly emphasized the fact that the meeting was held in a calm situation. It was made clear that those provisions in the program documents of the organization which had led to such radical decisions by the government had now been clarified.

Let us recall that from the viewpoint of the parliamentary commission in the initial versions of the bylaws and provisions of the Union, one could clearly trace such goals as destabilizing the political situation in the Baltic states and replacing the power structures by an armed coup. The new versions of the documents submitted during the meeting, at the first glance of the commission, did not contain any dangerous formulations; in addition, they will be further reviewed in detail. In those statements made by the military at the meeting, in the words of Jundzis, one could feel a purely human concern for their future.

At a press conference held after the meeting, to the question of what the actions would be by the Union of Servicemen in the event that the army received orders contradictory to the laws of the Latvian Republic, one of the co-chairmen of the coordinating center of this organization, Lieutenant-Colonel Aleksandr Avdeyev, said: "I do not intend to fire at the people."

Goals of Latvian Aizsargs Noted

91UM0741D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 31 May 91 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed article: "What 'Cultural' Traditions Will the Aizsargs Restore?"]

[Text] At the end of April of this year in Latvia, to the east of the town of Ventspils, at Lake Usmas, a monument was unveiled to the former leaders of the Latvian Legion of SS Troops and to the "forest brothers" who terrorized the local population in the postwar years. Even now, elders recall with trepidation the names of certain supporters of the Nazis and which have been cut in stone. Among them are those who particularly "distinguished themselves" in reprisals against the peaceful inhabitants, the Soviet prisoners of war, the partisans and underground members, including the Abwehr agent Rudolf Opmanis, the Gestapo co-worker Peteris Shaveys, the bandits Bruno Skrastinsh, Rudolf Klyava, Alfred Gravelsinsh and Janis Seklinsh.

The monument was put up by the Aizsarg members of the Kurzem Regiment and leaders of the local division of the semimilitary youth organization, Daugavas Vanagi. A wreath from the Aizsarg leadership, from the Latvian National Independence Movement (DNNL) and the Congress of Latvian Citizens (KGL) was laid by the Chairman of the All-Latvian Aizsarg Organization, Janis Riba.

Quite recently the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, I. Bisers, and the Chairman of the Commission on Defense and Internal Affairs of the Republic Supreme Soviet, T. Jundzis, asserted that the basic goal of the Aizsargs was a restoring of national cultural

traditions. But do the Latvian people consider in such traditions the bloody crimes of the Nazi supporters or the involvement of the Aizsargs in the state coup on 15 May 1934?

Incidentally, of interest in the context of the regular anniversary of this unpopular event in Latvian history are the comments by the editor of the printed organ of the NFL [Latvian People's Front], the newspaper *ATMODA*, Elita Veideman. In turning to the possibility of a repetition of the historical precedent, in an interview with the correspondent of *LATVIJAS YAUNATNES*, she made the following forecast: "Possibly nothing will happen but what also seems impossible might also happen. In six months, everything will be abolished and the parliament prorogued, the ministries and parties eliminated...." How can we know whether her proposals will become a reality? It is then that the Aizsargs in taking an active part in restoring

the "cultural traditions," will clearly be needed in their customary quality as a punitive detachment and butchers of their own people?

Quota for Uzbek Officers Raised

*91UM0741B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 18 Jun 91 First Edition p 5*

[Unattributed article: "The Officer Corps Will Soon be Filled Out With Uzbeks. This Is a Very Good Thing"]

[Text] For persons from the indigenous nationalities of the Uzbek SSR, this year an additional number of places have been set aside for the noncompetitive admission to military schools, academies and other institutions of learning of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Rogov Compares U.S., USSR Defense Budgets

91UM0571A Moscow *NOVOYE VREMYA* in Russian
No 11, Mar 91 pp 18-20

[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences Sergey Rogov under the rubric "The Army and Society": "Mysteries of the Defense Budget"]

[Text] For many years our country maintained a military parity with the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and China combined. As a result, the weight of the arms race turned out to be a much heavier burden for our economy than for America's.

According to official data, the defense expenditures of the Soviet Union comprised 8.5 percent of gross national product in 1989 and 7.6 percent in 1990; in the United States these figures were 5.9 and 5.4 percent respectively; in most countries in Western Europe, approximately three percent; and in Japan, one percent.

The Invincible 'Gross Output'

A comparison of the official military budgets of the USSR and the United States reveals substantial differences in the structure of military expenditures of the two countries. For the Soviet Union, the largest item is the procurement of weapons and equipment; for the United States, it is the armed forces' operational supply expenditures. Total expenses on research and development and experimental design work, procurement of weapons and equipment, and military organizational development comprise more than 66 percent of the entire defense budget in the USSR, and only 42 percent in the United States.

America spends twice as large a share of its military budget on maintenance of its armed forces than we do. It is not only the fact that the professional army of the United States requires considerably greater outlays. The important point is that the share of budgeted expenses that goes for logistical support and combat training comprises 29 percent of all American military appropriations, as opposed to 12.5 percent in the Soviet Union.

The ratio between investment (America puts research and development and experimental design work expenses, procurement of new weapons and equipment, and military organizational development into this category) and current expenditures on maintenance of the armed forces in the USSR is in mirror-like opposition to that in the United States. This reflects general tendencies in both the Soviet economy, where the ratio of accumulation to consumption is far too high, and in the budget, where excessive emphasis is placed on "gross output" and capital investments, while the importance of developing the infrastructure, especially material and technical supply, is regularly underestimated. Salaries are also kept low.

An especially unfavorable indicator in our budget is the relationship between expenses for operational supply parts and technical equipment.

The result of this is a low quality of storage of combat equipment, a high accident rate, shortages of fuel and lubrication materials and spare parts, insufficient intensity of combat training, and so on. One needs only recall the catastrophes on Soviet submarines.

An extremely difficult situation is developing in the high-technology-oriented services of the Armed Forces. Specialists note that there are practically no spare parts for many aircraft currently in service. The situation in the Air Force is simply critical—there is a catastrophic shortage of spare parts and instrumentation, which adversely affects combat preparedness and flight safety. Under these circumstances the only solution is to take the needed spare parts and working instrumentation from fully operational aircraft.

Now about the manufacture of weapons, four to five percent of which need to be modernized on an annual basis (if the lifespan of a weapon is 20 to 25 years, such a production quota appears to be reasonable). The problem is that as of 16 December 1989, after we had already begun the reductions announced by M.S. Gorbachev, the Soviet Armed Forces had 63,900 tanks, 76,500 armored personnel carriers and infantry combat vehicles, and 66,900 artillery systems. This means that our defense industry manufactured annually 3,000 to 4,000 tanks, armored personnel carriers and infantry combat vehicles, and artillery systems. That is, almost as many as the rest of the world combined.

The publication of Soviet official data on expenditures on the procurement of each type of weapons in 1989 permits a comparison of the approximate value of USSR and U.S. expenses in this area. For instance, we spent 2.169 billion rubles [R] on the procurement of missiles and warheads, while the United States spent \$15.123 billion. According to American data (no Soviet data is available), the USSR procured 2,240 missiles, the United States—630. This makes the purchasing capacity of R1 equal to almost \$14. A similar picture emerges in regard to airplanes, tanks, and artillery—between \$6 and \$14 depending on the type of weapons. That is, in the defense sector our ruble turns out to be far from "wooden"; rather, it is golden, especially in the air space industry.

Thus, expenditures on weapons procurement in rubles did not reflect their real cost, since the prices of weapons in the environment of the Soviet administrative command economy had been artificially understated by a multiple factor.

From this point of view the disproportion in the USSR defense budget between expenses for weapons and military equipment procurement and current expenses for maintenance of the armed forces is even greater, and the real cost of procured weapons is several times higher (eight times, by some estimates) than the declared one. Accordingly, real Soviet military expenditures under "normal" price formation—taking into account that

actual expenditures on weapons and equipment procurement comprise over 40 percent of the total—would have been 2.5 to 3.5 times higher than those officially announced in the 1989 and 1990 USSR defense budgets.

Therefore, one cannot agree with the statement that on the whole our defense expenditures are one-fifth of American expenditures. The perception that our defense is "cheap" does not correspond to reality.

Analysis of the structure of defense expenditures also shows the reason for the officer corps' poor social safety net, which inevitably leads to the lower level of combat readiness of the USSR Armed Forces and of their prestige in society.

Is This Unilateral Disarmament?

The USSR Supreme Soviet decisions on the reduction of defense expenditures have not actually been carried out. The military budget, which according to plans was supposed to be cut by R10 billion in 1989-1991, grew from R77.3 to R96.5 billion in current prices. At the same time, it is maintained that in constant prices military expenditures fell by 16 percent. However, for the period 1991-1995 the Ministry of Defense is planning an increase, in this-year constant prices, to R122.4 billion, on the average, that is, 57 percent more than the 1989 level.

In 1991 the military budget is roughly equal to total USSR expenditures on the financing of the national economy, science, social and cultural developments, the maintenance of law enforcement organs, liquidation of the consequences of the Chernobyl accident, and the "Aral" program combined.

The reduction in military expenditures in comparison with the figures in the five-year plan was about R30 billion in the USSR. In the United States, previously planned Pentagon expenditures for 1989-1993 totalling \$1,829 billion in current prices were cut by \$349 billion by new Minister of Defense R. Cheney. The cuts made last fall by Congress should further reduce this sum by more than \$60 billion.

The U.S. appropriations for military purposes were reduced during the last two years from \$303.3 to \$285.6 billion, that is by six percent in current prices or 12 percent in constant prices. In comparison with fiscal year 1985, appropriations for the Pentagon were cut by 20 percent in constant prices.

The Bush administration announced that by 1996 military expenditures would be cut by a further 12 percent, and the Armed Forces—by 25 percent. The United States is cutting its Armed Forces strength by 200,000 in fiscal year 1991-1992, and will bring their total numerical strength down to 1.6 million men in 1996.

As to the reductions in the USSR Armed Forces, as is known, they are supposed to be cut by 12 percent—from 4.258 to 3.758 million men.

It follows from the draft of the military reform that our Ministry of Defense is planning to bring troop strength to 3-3.2 million (that is, reduce it by 25-30 percent in comparison to 1989) by the end of the 1990's.

Thus, if we compare the military budget in current prices, the result will be unexpected: We have sharply increased our expenditures, while they have slightly reduced theirs. If we compare expenditures in constant prices, they roughly correspond.

The cuts in the strength of the armed forces are also roughly proportional. Besides, even after these reductions we will have twice as many men in active service than the United States. Therefore, there is no basis for the concern that we are unilaterally disarming ourselves.

A Doubtful Approach

The task, defined as far back as 1988, was that of a reorientation from quantitative to qualitative parameters—both in regard to equipment and military science and armed forces strength. Nevertheless, despite the unilateral reduction in the Soviet Armed Forces and armaments, announced in December 1988, it turned out that the fallacious structure of military expenditures remained and even became stronger. In the defense budget for 1990 the percentage of expenditures on the procurement of weapons and military equipment has grown from 42.2 to 43.7 percent. Payments of monetary allowances to military personnel were reduced by 7.4 percent.

At the same time a trend toward reductions appeared—both absolute and relative—in expenditures on research and development and experimental design work; considering current Western superiority in a number of technologies, this can have potentially irreversible consequences for us. In 1991 expenditures on research and development and experimental design work will be reduced by 23 percent, while procurements will again increase. In 1989 the ratio between the two was 1:2; now it is less than 1:3. According to the USSR Ministry of Defense plans, in the 1990's procurement expenditures will increase even more in constant prices and will comprise more than 47 percent of the military budget, while expenditures on research and development and experimental design work will be reduced to 12 percent.

The Ministry of Defense draft of the military reform is based on the assumption that by the end of the 1990's strategic nuclear forces and their strength will decrease by 30 percent, Air Defense Troops by 18-20 percent, land forces by 10-12 percent, and the Air Force by six to eight percent; as to the Navy, there is no mention in the draft of any cuts in this area.

This approach brings up serious doubts, since the Paris Treaty on Conventional Forces requires quite substantial reductions in our land forces, three quarters of which were deployed in Europe before the start of the reductions. According to the treaty, their current level of 136,800 tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery systems

should be cut to approximately one third that number. Taking into account previously announced reductions of Soviet troops in Asia, the reduction in the land forces numerical strength should have come to 50 percent, not 10-12 percent.

However, we have undertaken the major expense of redeploying from Europe to behind the Urals approximately as much in ground forces armaments as will be left at NATO's disposal. In the course of this redeployment, a reoutfitting of our troops in the Asian part of the country has taken place, and considerable (to the scope of several years' production output) warehouse supplies of weapons have been established. It appears that the meaning of these actions is the result of the military leadership's desire to maintain, with minimal changes, the existing level and structure of the Armed Forces.

But are such "reserves" justified? Even after we comply with the Paris Treaty we will have in Europe between 33.3 and 37.8 percent of the total armaments on the continent—considerably more than any other country. It is true that today our military leaders argue that after fulfilling the conditions of the Paris Treaty, NATO will have a 1.5 superiority in tanks and armored vehicles, and a 1.3 superiority in artillery and aviation. However, these calculations do not take into account our armaments on Asian territory. Even if some of our military equipment in Asia is taken out of service, we will still have more armaments than all the NATO countries together (including American armaments on the territory of the United States).

Money for the Military-Industrial Complex

So, why is it that in the USSR in 1991 money is appropriated not for conversion but for an almost one-third increase in procurements of armaments and military equipment, and why is it that the share of defense expenditures in the Union budget has grown from 26 to 36 percent? After all, the production of military equipment is being cut. According to the statement by Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff M.A. Moiseyev, the volume of arms production in 1989-1990 decreased by almost one-fifth. In 1991, the procurement of armaments and equipment will be reduced by approximately another one-fifth.

Smaller production runs undoubtedly lead to increased equipment costs; for tanks, for instance, this means a 14 percent increase. However, starting in 1991 prices for military equipment will increase even more sharply. The cost of a tank will more than double; the price of a plane will go up 1.5 times; and so on. This is explained by salary increases and higher raw materials and energy costs. We are told that for these reasons the cost of armaments and equipment will increase by R13.8 billion.

This arithmetic, however, invokes some doubts. For instance, a reduction in the production of armored equipment by 50-65 percent, taking into account even the doubling of prices, should not result in increased

expenditure on this item. The 30 percent reduction in aircraft production combined with a 1.5-fold price increase will also result in only an insignificant increase in expenditure on aircraft procurement.

Item-by-item analysis of the procurement budget puts in question the validity of the calculations that serve as the basis for an unprecedented jump in the military budget this year. Expenditures on the social safety net for military personnel will go up insignificantly. The bulk of additional funds will go into the military-industrial complex, permitting it to maintain profitability in the new economic environment even with a somewhat reduced volume of armaments production.

Let us note, by the way, that without much fanfare our military expenditures were increased by more than R25 billion in just one year. This is the same amount the General Staff estimated as the cost of conversion to a professional army, and rejected this option on these grounds.

Thus, first, we are planning a relatively small quantitative reduction in the Armed Forces while not paying sufficient attention to quality indicators; second, the military-industrial complex not only does not intend to cut its expenses but is planning a considerable further increase, even after taking inflation into account; and, third, the emphasis on procurement is being retained and strengthened. At the same time, the share of military budget expenditures on the maintenance of the Army and Navy will be further reduced, which makes it impossible to resolve their long-standing social problems.

The emphasis on "gross output" in the defense development process is still being maintained; this not only affects the scope and depth of conversion but contradicts the course toward qualitative instead of quantitative factors in ensuring the security of the Soviet state.

Wearing Out... Ourselves

More than 40 years ago document NSC-68, which defined American strategy in the Cold War, laid stake on wearing the Soviet Union out through the arms race. We have accepted the American challenge and have reached parity, but at what price... Today the Cold War is over, but the departmental interests endure, and they are trying to keep us on the old track of quantitative security. Its inertia inflicts immense damage on our real national security interests. The planned jump in military expenditures in the environment of a radical decline in the need for armaments will probably nullify all calculations of profits from the conversion of the defense industry.

Does the current defense budget and its planned growth for the 1990's take into account the real economic potential of the Soviet Union and the change in the nature of the external threat to our country? Will our economy, which is only starting its reorientation toward market relations, not collapse under the burden of retaining the "gross output" of military production? If we want to reorient our economy toward the production

of consumer goods, develop culture, and have a social security system that would guarantee at least the subsistence minimum to the low-income strata of the population, this "gross output" should be stopped.

Without radical military reform, defense expenditures that will preserve planned volume and structures may lead to the aggravation of serious economic difficulties in our country and derail conversion without the benefit of strengthening the Soviet Union's defense capabilities.

General Dubynin on Soviet Troops in Poland

91EP0423A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 15,
13 Apr 91 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Colonel General Viktor Dubynin, Commander of the Northern Group of the Soviet Armed Forces, plenipotentiary of the USSR for Soviet troops stationed in Poland, by Witold Pawlowski; place and date not given: "Bugging Out Is My Specialty"]

[Text] Local residents call this extensive part of Legnica "Kwadrat" [The Square]. Behind a tall concrete wall bearing signs in Russian and Polish, "Boundary Checkpoint," is located the command of the Northern Group of Soviet Armed Forces. On passing through the first checkpoint at Kosciuszko Street I enter a veritable city within a city. The street signs are in Polish, which is slightly perplexing; neglected extensive areas built up with family houses, an amusement park with slides for children, murals depicting the wolf and the hare, tennis courts. Another checkpoint in front of the staff headquarters, a white building several stories tall with profiles of the "Fathers of Communism" on its facade and a large statue of Lenin. Yet another checkpoint at the entrance, and then I climb the stairs to the second floor, to a large waiting room with a huge map of Europe and a bank of telephones, whence I enter the still roomier office of General Dubynin. The general is broadshouldered and of athletic build. His uniform is loosened.

[Pawlowski] When old married couples divorce it usually is a difficult and unpleasant process. Particularly if one partner dominates the other and imposes his will on him, but now the other partner says, "I don't want you." General, Sir, can we part in a civilized manner?

[Dubynin] If mismatched spouses divorce, they divide their property. Sometimes they remain friends, but as a rule they do not. We would like to part as friends; and in the future to keep broadly cooperating, in economy and culture, to create the common great family of European nations. Above all, I believe, there is nothing that could divide us, and so our relations should not be spoiled.

[Pawlowski] That is good. Why then prolong the divorce formalities? There is the idea of appointing a farewell committee that would bid the Soviet Army farewell in a dignified manner, with flowers. Would this expedite matters?

[Dubynin] We appreciate this idea. I must say that the Polish public is not opposed to us; at most only three percent perhaps is against the Northern Troops Group. All others feel grateful to us, for liberating Polish territories together with the Polish Army, and subsequently for 45 years of peace. I would like peace and happiness to reign in Poland for many centuries.

[Pawlowski] But two months ago you wrote that you would leave Poland with banners flying and heads raised, and only when you yourself would decide the time to be right. To whom was that article addressed? To the Polish authorities? To Moscow? Or to your own troops, uncertain of the future as they may feel?

[Dubynin] That declaration was made during the talks in Moscow on 10 February. That was my reaction to certain unfavorable comments during negotiations with the Polish side. The Polish delegation had offered absolutely unacceptable terms. It demanded that our troops leave Poland without arms, without equipment, under the supervision of the police and the [Polish] Army. In other words, they wanted to deport us as if we were international criminals. This had prompted my protest.

[Pawlowski] And you still hold to your words?

[Dubynin] At the Military Council, after long deliberations, we concluded that my declaration should be published in your local newspaper. It was at once disseminated by the mass media which gave it unprecedented publicity. Let me say openly that our officers and soldiers were gratified by this declaration, gratified that someone was defending them, that they would not leave in sealed train cars. The declaration stated that if Poland sets unacceptable terms, Soviet troops will leave it with banners flying, with the feeling of having done their internationalist duty, and proud of having liberated Poland, having defeated Germany.

[Pawlowski] Did you realize that such language would cause unequivocally adverse publicity in Poland? Consider also the passage in which you declared that Soviet troops were occupying "post-German property" and living on "post-German" land.

[Dubynin] My point was not to emphasize that these are German facilities. Yes, I once, in passing, mentioned that our troops are located on former German territory, that is, in the western part of the Polish Republic. The facilities we occupy used to be German facilities. We understand the sense of the Potsdam Agreements, we understand that this territory is ethnically Polish and that it should remain Polish, that Silesia and Pomerania should remain joined to Poland. And this issue would never have been raised had not it been for the demand of the Polish side that these facilities be now overhauled. That would take a lot of money. These facilities had been built late last century or early this century and indeed require renovating. But in 1945 when we first took them over, they had already been destroyed. We renovated them and installed heating and water mains, and now, after nearly half a century, are we supposed to renovate

all this again? Moreover, the Soviet Army is called an occupying army and accused of causing unbearable living conditions for the Polish society. The Soviet Army has liberated your country and caused its territory to be enlarged by nearly one-fourth. This should be taken into consideration.

[Pawlowski] This historical reckoning is much more complicated, also as regards Poland's territory. Accord on assessments of history would be difficult. That is why we should get rid of the burden of history and discuss the present. This is exactly the tone adopted by your colleagues in Prague and Budapest when they say, "That Europe is in the past. The times have changed, and proper conclusions should be drawn from it." In those countries agreements for the withdrawal of your troops were reached smoothly. Why is it that only Poles always seem to have problems in this respect?

[Dubynin] The stationing of our troops in Hungary or Czechoslovakia cannot be compared with their stationing in Poland. Our government has acknowledged the entry of our troops to those countries, in 1956 and in 1968, to be a mistake. And since that was a mistake, apology and satisfaction are due. But as for Poland, we did not come here in order to suppress a rebellion.

[Pawlowski] You had come together with the new Polish government, brought on your tanks. But that again is a dispute over history. That is now all in the past.

[Dubynin] Let me tell you in this connection that we welcome the changes that have taken place in this part of Europe. We do not intend to do anything that would cause the old systems to return. We value all the democratic changes taking place in Poland and, while we live on its territory, in no way whatsoever do we interfere in your domestic issues. We respect your sovereignty and are obligated to respect fully the laws of the countries on whose territories we are stationed.

[Pawlowski] No one likes foreign troops to be stationed in one's country. No one likes American bases. At least, the Americans pay well; you do not. We have no idea about your armaments, and in general we know very little about you.

[Dubynin] Our doors are open; we have no secrets, especially not before the mass media. We are ready to cooperate with them and share with them our accomplishments and plans, especially as regards good-neighbor relations with the local inhabitants.

[Pawlowski] Television and the press point to many instances of demolished facilities which you are leaving us upon your departure: dismantled windowframes and water conduits, etc.

[Dubynin] We use more than 6,000 facilities, including broken-down ones or those in unsatisfactory condition, which total not more than 200. For example, does this room leave something to be desired? Usually there is a lot of [war-]destroyed housing in the cities. We plan

repairs and renovations, and when we leave we would like to be told that we leave them in good condition. Consider for example the facilities we had transferred to Poles in Swidnica. None of the authorities in Swidnica, including its mayor, had any complaints about their condition. We are now reviewing the condition of our facilities in Szczecin, and it also seems good.

[Pawlowski] The mass media report the situation to be less idyllic. Since you have nothing to hide, why did not you allow inspections by the Polish authorities? Are not such inspections the right of a sovereign country?

[Dubynin] We also have no secrets as regards our armaments. On Polish territory are stationed about 50,000 Soviet troops. If we include their families and auxiliary personnel, the total is 90,000. Our armaments include 20 ballistic missile launchers, and when we depart we shall show them to reporters. We have 100 tanks, about 800 infantry combat vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 400 artillery pieces, 200 aircraft, and 170 helicopters.

[Pawlowski] What about nuclear and chemical weapons?

[Dubynin] We maintain no nuclear or chemical weapons in Poland. We used to keep nuclear weapons here, but we moved them out, and as for chemical weapons we never kept any and, I believe, never will. And as for the inspections you mentioned, that was to determine whether we have chemical weapons or the components for their production. Let me tell you that this is a sensitive issue. Talks on inspections of this kind are still continuing in Geneva. Last year the USSR reached an agreement with Poland that, if a provision is made for such inspections, they shall be done under Polish supervision.

Our premise was that, since we keep no such weapons here, there is no need for an inspection. But the Polish side demanded it. We were surprised by this lack of trust in us, particularly considering that the Polish General Staff is perfectly familiar with what armaments we have at our disposal. Thus, of course, we refused, and asked that talks on this subject be held at the ministry level rather than at the level of military commanders. And since the Polish side kept insisting, we agreed to an inspection on 26 April. Let them go ahead and inspect. We guarantee that we have not and had not kept any chemical arms here. After the inspection is over, at the month's end, we shall present a joint Polish-Soviet declaration on this matter.

The Polish side expects the Soviet troops to withdraw by the end of 1991, but your latest proposal mentions the end of 1993. What do you think, which deadline will be negotiated by both sides, nearer to which date?

[Dubynin] During the talks in Moscow the Soviet side presented a timetable for the withdrawal of our troops. We reckoned that we would need three years for this purpose. In Poland we have few troops but extensive bases, storage facilities and stocks of equipment, much

more than in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. All this has to be safely transported out of the country. On the request of the Polish government, missile troops, aircraft, and tanks will be the first to leave Poland. We shall begin officially withdrawing troops from Poland with a Guards brigade of missile troops. Besides, we have already earlier withdrawn some troops, such as assault troops and aircraft reconnaissance personnel. Without waiting for the final figures to be arrived at in official talks, we are beginning to implement our own timetable, in accordance with the declaration made by General Moiseyev at a meeting with Minister Skubiszewski that we shall begin to withdraw troops as soon as this coming April and May.

[Pawlowski] In your opinion, shall we after the divorce live normally, maintain neighborly relations? What does [Polish-Soviet] brotherhood of arms mean nowadays?

[Dubynin] I believe that the brotherhood of arms will remain. In the end, your military equipment and arms derive chiefly from the USSR. A rapid change of armaments would require substantial financial outlays, and besides I do not think it necessary. Talks on good-neighbor relations, friendship, should be completed rapidly, so that we may really remain friends. As the saying goes, we live on the same earth.

[Pawlowski] What will the new European security system be like? Do you think that your former allies from this part of Europe will, like the former GDR, sooner or later join NATO?

[Dubynin] I would not know about the progress of any such talks at the governmental level; in the press, including the Polish press, one can find opinions that the countries of Central Europe should join NATO. But since the Warsaw Pact and the entire bloc of socialist countries have been liquidated, why retain NATO? We should limit armaments, on retaining only the means serving to maintain order, for example, in the police.

[Pawlowski] Will such a system guarantee security?

[Dubynin] We are disarming, reducing the number of our divisions, dismantling our equipment, aircraft. The West has not slashed its forces by even one soldier, one piece of equipment. This is worrisome.

[Pawlowski] We read in the Soviet press that the border threat has now shifted to the Bug River.

[Dubynin] If Poland joins NATO and the armies of that bloc become stationed here, we shall have no alternative but to fortify our border on the Bug. Anybody else would do so, too.

[Pawlowski] You certainly visit your country often in thought. How do you view the role of the Armed Forces in the changes taking place in the USSR?

[Dubynin] As you know, there is an ongoing perestroika in my country....

[Pawlowski] Some people say that the perestroika is over now and the old times are returning.

[Dubynin] The people who say so are clearly interested in saying so. The perestroika has affected the Armed Forces too. It is not progressing smoothly and there are many problems, chiefly economic ones, and also the relations among nationalities require a great deal of concern. But the most important thing is that in the referendum 73 percent of citizens declared, "Yes, the USSR should endure."

[Pawlowski] But six republics boycotted the referendum and are saying no.

[Dubynin] Let them go then. These republics are not that important to us, although I expect that they will remain in the USSR. What matters most is that Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan have declared themselves in favor of keeping the Union, on new principles. If the Union is retained, the Army, the Armed Forces, shall be retained too. We support one common union and one common army. We are resolutely against distributing nuclear weapons. Should they get into the hands of extremists, that would threaten not just the USSR but the entire world.

[Pawlowski] What is Mikhail Gorbachev's role in these changes?

[Dubynin] He is working strenuously to keep all the republics together, to keep the common Armed Forces together. And he is trying to pursue domestic policies so as to cope with economic problems, to improve the situation of our citizens, to add to pleasant moments in our lives.

[Pawlowski] What about Boris Yeltsin?

[Dubynin] He is not quite pursuing the right policy. He wants to create an army of [Russia's] own, which is not pertinent. Secondly, he wants to abolish our Union government and the Supreme Soviet. Yeltsin is calling for political strikes, awakening destructive forces in the society. He supports the liquidation of our system of society and a change in leadership. In the present difficult times a quarrel of ambitions between Yeltsin and Gorbachev is unnecessary. They should work together.

[Pawlowski] Your views and sympathies are unequivocal.

[Dubynin] Yes, unequivocal.

[Pawlowski] The Americans have their Vietnam syndrome—many films and books on this subject have appeared. How strong is the Afghanistan syndrome in the Soviet Army? I am referring to demoralization within the military, the growth of crime. The war veterans can live only dangerously, which means that they do not know how to live normally.

[Dubynin] That is the American syndrome, not ours.

[Pawlowski] You were in Afghanistan, were not you?

[Dubynin] Yes, during 1984-1987. I commanded the limited contingent of Soviet troops. I also used to be the plenipotentiary of the USSR government for the stationing of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. I moved six regiments out of Afghanistan. Afterward General Gromov came and finished up after me.

[Pawlowski] In other words, you became a specialist for moving troops out.

[Dubynin] You could say so. Some 500 to 700 officers and noncommissioned officers who had experienced Afghanistan are now serving in the Northern Troops Group. I really have not perceived them to be psychologically damaged. On the contrary, Afghanistan has refined in them the feelings of friendship and shared community of interests. They had personally witnessed death. They are experienced in using modern weapons, and we utilize their experience in our combat training. I believe that these young boys, the Afghans as they are nicknamed, are the mortar of our society and support peace and common consensus. Only isolated individuals among those who had been in Afghanistan have gone over to the side of extremists and nationalists; such instances have taken place in Georgia and Armenia and Azerbeidzhan, but they are few.

[Pawlowski] Even if the Afghanistan syndrome is fiction, a certain decay can be clearly perceived among the Soviet troops stationed in our countries, particularly in the former GDR—the trading, the escapes, the requests for asylum.

[Dubynin] People are like the forest, some trees are good and others rotten. In our Army, too, there are rotten trees, but they number at most only dozens. Instead of getting rid of them we are trying to educate them.

[Pawlowski] Morale among your officers is hardly the highest. Many simply have no place to return to.

[Dubynin] The reasons are more complex. This is not just a question of housing for those returning from Poland, although that, too, is a major issue. That is one of the reasons why we should like to postpone the total withdrawal of our troops until the end of 1993, in order to retain in Poland a small group of officers. Here we have housing for them, whereas in the USSR we are short of housing for 200,000 military personnel. The Western Troops Group is currently leaving Germany; for 50,000 there is no housing in the Soviet Union.

[Pawlowski] That must be a major political force, those 200,000 homeless soldiers.

[Dubynin] In the Armed Forces there is no room for politics, and the housing problem shall be resolved within two or three years.

[Pawlowski] The invincible American Army had Vietnam, the invincible Soviet Army had Afghanistan, and now we have the lightning war in the Middle East in

which Soviet military equipment and doctrine turned out to be quite ineffective, outdated, as it were, in Iraqi hands.

[Dubynin] The equipment of Saddam's Army was partly, not wholly, ours. It also included French, British, Polish, and Chinese, and even American equipment. And as for its military doctrine, it could not have been ours, because ours is not an aggressor's doctrine, whereas Saddam grabbed Kuwait. That is why the Iraqi weapons used in this war are not of too high a class and can in no way point to our weakness.

[Pawlowski] This means that you do not have the Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf complex.

[Dubynin] No, just as we do not have any Scud missile complex. Besides, we are not equipped with Scuds any longer, while Iraq has, with the help of German experts, altered their parameters only to make them worse. Instead, we have anti[ballistic] missiles that are much better than the Patriots. They can destroy not only Scuds but other ballistic missiles.

[Pawlowski] If you were in Gen. Schwarzkopf's shoes, how would you conduct the Kuwait operation? Differently?

[Dubynin] First of all, I would stick closely to the United Nations resolution, that is, engage in combat only on Kuwaiti territory. And I would liberate that territory. How? That is already a technical problem. Why was the civilian population also attacked? Hussein survived, but hundreds of thousands of innocent people have died. The international community again closed its eyes. To the Americans everything is permitted. They occupied Panama, and nobody protested. Did any one demand a trial for them when they dropped the bomb on Hiroshima?

[Pawlowski] You are 48 years old and already so high up on the ladder. Tell us about your career.

[Pawlowski] It has not been as rapid as that. During the war some generals had barely reached the age of 30. I come from behind the Urals. I completed two military academies, incidentally along with many Polish officers. I served in the Ukraine, in the Far East, in Kazakhstan, and in Belorussia. When I was asked to serve in Afghanistan I viewed it as my soldierly duty to carry out any order. After Afghanistan I was commander of the Belorussian Military District. Next I served on the staff of the Kiev Military District. Two years ago I came to Poland, and it has fallen to my lot to move troops out of Poland.

[Pawlowski] Afterward, will you want to return to this country as, say, a tourist. To see what is new?

[Dubynin] Of course, if only I am invited. I have no inimical feelings against the Polish public; sure, I may have had some against the Polish authorities, but none against Poland. And, I swear, I have no imperialist motives.

[Pawlowski] Thank you for the conversation.

Col-Gen Kostenko On Status Of Military In Current Crisis

91UM0604A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 10 Apr 91 p 2

[Article by Colonel General A. Kostenko, USSR People's Deputy and Troop Commander of the Red Banner Belorussian Military District: "The Union Treaty—Viewpoint: The Soldier's Fate Is One With The Motherland"]

[Text] Patriotism is the heart of military service, the moral essence of soldiers' heroism, and the philosophy under which they are entrusted with arms in peacetime. The historical role of every soldier is measured by his services to the motherland, and a person's dignity is a function of the strength of his patriotism. And this is not only an intellectual inference but a truth arrived at through great suffering, for the sake of whose triumph the blood of many generations of soldiers has been spilled on the enormous expanse of land from the Carpathians to the Pacific Ocean. Diverse have been these people, who were born of the centuries-old intermingling of blood, languages, cultures, and customs and have upheld their ideals and goals in combat—ideals and goals that have been confirmed by life or, from the vantage point of today, may sometimes seem to have been mistaken, or at times incomprehensible or naive. Be that as it may, a thousand years of history has crystalized from these diverse tribes of peoples, who have warred with each other as well as lived in peace, a single great state that has endured through two world wars and revolutions that have shaken the planet.

The soldiers and officers of today, faithful to their civic and professional duty, bear responsibility for the integrity and security of the fatherland and view it as heirs—heirs in whose hearts the names of D. Donskoy, A. Nevskiy, S. Suvorov, M. Kutuzov, A. Brusilov, M. Frunze, G. Zhukov, and other glorious military leaders evoke gratitude to these forfathers. For we are bound by service to the motherland. And every soldier has always felt the pain of the wounds inflicted on her.

Today, at a time when the thread that links these generations could be broken, when not only the sacrifices of those who gave their lives in battles for the motherland, but also the labor and lives of the many people who created her could prove in vain, I think it necessary to address the district's soldiers and voters and to share with them some thoughts that have become the convictions of the absolute majority of the men of the Soviet Army.

Mindful of the fact that the historic need to preserve the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is dictated by many circumstances—political, economic, and cultural—I, as a professional soldier, would like to emphasize that the military-political considerations in favor of a union of sovereign states are by no means least among these circumstances. And this is reflected in Article 5 of the new Union Treaty. It is quite clear to everyone—not just

military people—that the USSR Armed Forces, as the integral structure of our defense potential, with a single set of drive belts (the branches and combat arms stationed throughout the territory of the Union and outside it), cannot be divided up, just as it is impossible to take apart a car and expect each of its parts to replace the whole.

The collapse of the Union and the inevitable collapse of the army that would follow it would entail unprecedented world destabilization. In the ensuing clash of political ambitions and territorial and ethnic claims and the crisis of law that such a situation would inevitably entail, anyone who has recourse to force and arms would be tempted to use them.

And finally, when the notions of internal and external threats change places and the guarantee of protection from outside threats disappears, can sovereign entities possibly be strengthened by this?

It would seem that these dreadful but fully logical consequences of an anarchical turn of events would be understood by all, including separatists. For there can be no peace or happiness for anyone in a state that is being torn to pieces.

Yet even today, when there are not only dire forecasts of such an outcome, but also practical confirmation of the threat posed by unconstitutional steps to secede from the Union—steps that have led to our common suffering and shame in Baku, Fergana, Vilnius, and Tskhinvali—even today one hears it said here and there that the army is supposedly the bulwark of the center, an occupation force that is concerned only with curtailing all the democratic transformations in the republics. I submit that those who hurl these reproaches have their own reason for disinforming society about the current difficulties of the Armed Forces. But to those who have put their faith in these conjectures, I want to provide some "first-hand" information, so to speak.

Let the reader compare the facts whose authenticity has been confirmed not only by the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the district, but also by Western military experts, with the assertions of our political opponents.

And so to what extent do steps being taken in the district conform to claims of military preparations to encroach on Belorussia's sovereignty?

Today the troops are going through the first but very crucial and complex stage of military reform. The units being withdrawn from Eastern Europe are being redeployed and outfitted, operational and mobilizational plans are being revised in accordance with the new defensive doctrine, new legislative acts to govern our service are being drafted, and efforts have gotten under way to implement the special program of social safeguards for servicemen and members of their families.

I'm not going to enumerate the individual problems that have arisen in the course of reform. I will only say that today the volume of our work has increased to critical limits and that people are literally exhausting themselves in efforts to meet the deadlines for implementing the adopted programs.

And although sociopolitical conditions greatly complicate our efforts to carry out these plans, we are managing to stay on schedule. We are completing the unilateral reduction of the Armed Forces begun in 1987 and the elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles, including missiles on the territory of Belorussia. Information in the radical press about their numbers in the republic continue to serve as a trump card in the political game being played by the Belorussian People's Front. The fact is that under the treaty, 118 medium-range missiles and 46 short-range missile systems have been destroyed.

The program for reducing troops and conventional weapons is also being strictly implemented. In accordance with personnel cutbacks, the Belorussian Military District has discharged 1,700 officers and warrant officers into the reserve. For these most part, these are highly trained, experienced personnel between the ages of 40 and 45 who can be of service to the republic.

We have disbanded 10 combined units and units in the past year. Twelve units have been shifted to new, considerably smaller strength levels, and three units have been redeployed to other military districts. More than 7,000 units of equipment and heavy weapons have been withdrawn from the republic. The number of tanks, infantry combat vehicles, and rocket-firing artillery has been reduced.

Today, many people are asking the following question: Isn't the military contingent on the republic's territory going to increase as a result of the withdrawal of troops from Eastern Europe?

In this instance, one can give an unequivocal answer: No, it will not increase. For in addition to the redeployments, personnel and weapons are being reduced in the district, and all the arriving units are taking the place of those that have been disbanded. At the same time, the newly arriving units are also undergoing major changes in strength levels. The Geneva agreement sets a firm quota for the number of conventional weapons in the European part of the USSR: 13,500 tanks, 20,000 infantry combat vehicles, 13,700 artillery pieces, and 1,500 helicopters.

On this basis, we are creating a new structure for the district's grouping of forces, with due regard for the need to shift to the defense of the state border within the republic. Compliance with the agreement is under strict international verification. Plans call for more than 20 foreign inspections this year alone.

Two combined units—nearly 3,000 men and 2,760 families—have arrived and been garrisoned on Belorussian territory.

By dint of circumstance, they find themselves at the vortex of European processes and have fallen under the category of people lacking social safeguards. The Ministry of Defense and the district military council have not abandoned them to the whim of fate. They all have at least temporary dwellings. But what great effort it took to provide them with shelter!

There are 17,000 servicemen without apartments in the district. Virtually all our construction capabilities are directed toward housing. We are literally squeezing 2,500 apartments a year from these capabilities, which does not, of course, meet even half of our need for apartments.

Unfortunately, housing problems are not the only thing complicating our service. Centrifugal forces are tearing apart both the Union and the army, depriving it of an influx of skilled personnel each year. At present, more than 500 young people are evading military conscription. Of the total number of those who are not conscripted, we lose an unjustifiably large number to criminal conduct (1,927 in the republic as a whole) and sickness (nearly 7,000). Today the situation is such that we cannot entrust weapons to many young people because of their inclination to engage in crime and abuse narcotics.

We have been acutely affected by the declining prestige of military service and the psychological pressure that nationalist and right-wing radical forces are exerting on servicemen.

In other words, the army shoulders with the people the heavy weight of the sociopolitical shocks caused by the fundamental changes in society. And like all workers in our country, soldiers have an interest in the earliest possible stabilization of the situation, when they will be able to perform their immediate responsibilities and complete the military reform without being diverted to quell political and ethnic conflicts.

We understand that only civic accord on the basis of the Union Treaty can halt the destructive processes. Strictly speaking, we have no other political choice save the Union, for it alone is the sole guarantee of the existence of an internal and external security system; it alone can ensure the real sovereignty of all the peoples living it—and not just their sovereignty on paper.

Hopes and plans for entrusting this mission to republic and national military units are unfeasible first and foremost on practical grounds. Calculations, prepared by independent specialists, of the costs of maintaining a single division show that, at 1985 prices, such a division costs the treasury 120 million rubles a year, and that its initial formation takes 360 million rubles! Naturally,

these figures will increase manyfold under market conditions and be extremely burdensome for the budget of a single republic.

Bear in mind that these are purely the material costs of the idea of national armies. We can't ignore the psychological-political costs either.

For example, what would happen to the army's current personnel, the millions of servicemen on pension, and the employees of defense enterprises, all of whom are supported by the Defense Ministry budget?

Can it possibly be that the proponents of dividing the Union do not understand what kind of chain reaction of conflicts they will cause by depriving entire social strata of their means of existence?

I think that most people of various nationalities are pleased with the provisions of the draft Union treaty dealing with defense—provisions that ensure equal security conditions for all. In this complex situation, we must remain calm and show restraint, and have a deep belief in the people's inexhaustible spiritual potential, whose sources have always included common sense.

Let us remember that the referendum has given us a chance to arrive at civil accord on a national scale.

MIG-31, A-40 Albatross at Paris Air Show

91UM0739A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
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[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Lieutenant-Colonel V. Rudenko: "The MIG-31 and the Albatross in the Sky over France"]

[Text] Today the 39th International Aerospace Show is opening in France. Our country is a traditional participant in this prestigious and impressive public display of the achievements of scientific-technical progress in the sphere of aviation and space craft. The first domestically-produced aircraft that we demonstrated to the entire world in now remote 1937 was the ANT-25 aircraft which completed a legendary flight across the North Pole to America.

Since that time, Soviet aircraft builders have presented exclusively civilian aircraft at international air shows. But this tradition was violated at the Farnborough Exhibition (England) in 1988—at that time foreign experts could, as they say, become intimately familiar with the MIG-29 supersonic interceptor. The SU-27 interceptor was shown along with the MIG-29 at Le Bourget in 1989. These aircraft have such high aircraft handling and performance characteristics that they literally won the hearts of air show participants.

At the impending air show, the MIG-31 fighter-interceptor, which has received the designation Foxhound (gonchaya—hound) in the West, and the A-40 Albatross, the largest amphibious aircraft in the world, will undoubtedly be the highlight of the Soviet exposition.

"Despite the fact that the MIG-31 has been in series production since 1979, there has been nothing like it in the world up to now," said Academician R.A. Belyakov, chief designer of the OKB [experimental design bureau] imeni A.I. Mikoyan, on the eve of our delegation's departure to France. "I think that it will be a revelation for many Western experts that we already had an aircraft of this class 12 years ago."

"Naturally, a demonstration of the MIG-31's handling and performance characteristics will not produce the same effect as the flight of a MIG-29 or SU-27 since this aircraft has other missions but similar foreign fighter-interceptors still cannot perform the flight maneuvers that it can perform," said Experimental Design Bureau imeni A.I. Mikoyan Chief Pilot and USSR Honored Test-Pilot V. Menitskiy.

The MIG-31 is designed to destroy airborne targets both in free space and in the background of the earth at a range from extremely low to high altitudes. The aircraft has a two-man crew. Maximum speed is up to 3,000 kilometers per hour. The unique on-board radar which includes a phased-array antenna supports simultaneous tracking of 10 targets and destruction of four targets using on-board weapons systems.

The new multirole A-40 Albatross amphibious aircraft, which was designed at the Taganrog Aircraft Scientific-Technical Complex imeni G.M. Beriyeve—the oldest design complex in our country, will be shown for the first time at an international air show. This firm has very rich traditions. The majority of domestically-produced seaplanes, which were in the Navy inventory for a long time and some of which still are, were developed here. But the A-40 has justifiably become the object of special pride of the Taganrog aircraft builders.

The need to develop this aircraft was primarily dictated by the absence of a good rescue aircraft that allows us to efficiently and effectively render assistance to seamen who find themselves in distress and to representatives of other specialties who carry out missions in the world's oceans and also near reservoirs, rivers, and other large bodies of water. The statistics testify: nearly 850 (!) ocean-going vessels, whose crews we frequently do not manage to save only because help is late in arriving, are lost annually. The Albatross is capable of arriving at a disaster area, landing on the water, and supporting the evacuation of people a short time after receiving an SOS.

The Albatross is 42 meters long and 11 meters high. Its flying and seaworthiness characteristics permit it to conduct rescue work in a four-ball gale with wave heights of 1.5 meters, to take off and land on small lakes that are three kilometers long and on rivers that are a total of 2.5-3 meters deep. The A-40 can carry 60 passengers. Two 12,000 horsepower engines are installed on it. Flight range is 5,500 kilometers. Cruising speed is 700 kilometers per hour. When necessary, speed can be reduced to 320-400 kilometers per hour which is very important for a visual search for people in distress.

Modern radar and navigational equipment permits it to conduct rescue work under conditions of limited visibility and even in fog or at night. The Albatross has launches, mechanized boarding ramps, special equipment, and also resuscitation, surgical, and anti-hypothermia equipment, and a supply of required medicine on board.

The fact that the aircraft has already set more than 10 world records in its class during flight testing also attests to the Albatross' high aircraft handling, performance, and operating characteristics. And this is with the fact that the A-40 was developed after a 20-year break in work in the area of seaplanes in our country. It was thought that since the West had ceased producing these aircraft, therefore we also did not need to.

The Albatross was primarily conceived as a rescue aircraft but the circle of its "professions" is actually significantly broader than that. It can be successfully utilized both as a fire-fighting, transport, and passenger aircraft. While extinguishing fires, for example, the A-40 is capable of delivering 300 tons of a gas-foam mixture to the target without refueling. The Albatross' specific design features permits it to intake water without landing on the water, that is, directly in flight.

This aircraft is indispensable for delivering work teams to oil platforms and for replacing fishing vessel crews directly at sea and miners in remote areas of Siberia and the Far North.

While developing passenger and transport aircraft, aircraft builders task themselves to go beyond the limit which they have achieved in the production of military aircraft and primarily such aircraft as the MIG-29, SU-27, and MIG-31....

In many ways, this difficult task has already been realized in the new IL-96-300, TU-204, and IL-114 passenger airliners, and also in the YAK-42 E experimental aircraft, the KA-32 helicopter, and the SU-26M, SU-26T, and YAK-55 sports aircraft being demonstrated at the air show.

Furthermore, we are presenting the newest aircraft engines and also the latest developments of domestic aircraft firms and NII [scientific-research institutes] at the air show. Thus, our exposition will insure the widest showing of the Soviet aviation industry of today and tomorrow.

What does the USSR Ministry of the Aviation Industry expect from this air show? While answering this question, USSR Minister of the Aviation Industry A.S.

Systov pointed out that it would be naive to count on any momentary advantages or economic effect. But this does not at all mean that our participation in the air show is reduced just to a demonstration of aircraft. Soviet aircraft builders are counting on establishing business contacts on joint development of promising aircraft as occurred at the previous air show when the Experimental Design Bureau imeni P.O. Sukhoi and the American firm Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation decided to develop a supersonic aircraft for business people and also to exchange scientific-technical and technological information with leading Western firms, to discuss the issue on conducting international symposiums, conferences, and seminars on aviation and space science problems, and to offer its equipment and newest technologies to interested Western companies.

There are grounds for these hopes. We would like to hope that many countries will want to acquire them after having become intimately familiar with Soviet aircraft at the air show. Many of the aircraft and helicopters, aircraft engines and equipment, and parts manufactured from titanium and aluminum alloys and composites that we exhibited not only meet the world level but also exceed the best foreign models in a number of parameters.

Baltic Situation Increases Costs to Baltic Fleet

91UM0607A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 Apr 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Admiral V. Ivanov, commander, Baltic Fleet, by Captain 2nd Rank V. Gromak: "Defense Not Marketable"; date and place not given; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Our correspondent's questions are answered by USSR People's Deputy, Baltic Fleet Commander Admiral V. Ivanov.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Comrade Admiral! Our society is experiencing difficulties in weathering the change to a market economy and the new economic procedures. The Armed Forces are having their own problems in their attempt to enter the marketplace. In a specific geographic area, one in which ships and units of the Baltic Fleet are stationed, this as far as I know is being felt even now.

[Ivanov] Yes, and it has had the immediate effect of lowering the base of social protection of seamen, their dependents, blue collar and white collar workers employed by Ministry of Defense enterprises. The situation is such that—at the official, enablement level—they have been deprived of virtually all political and economic rights and guarantees.

The well-known actions taken by the governments of the Baltic republics and local organs of authority have placed the fleet into a difficult position, one I would say of being discriminated against. For example, there has been a sharp rise in prices of groceries and manufactured goods; local soviets no longer budget for housing for military personnel; the latter are no longer allotted lots to build housing with the assistance of military construction detachments; local soviets are keeping for themselves land that has been set aside for the Ministry of Defense. Republic governments have made provision to raise salaries and wages to stabilize the cost of living of the populace, while for service personnel there is nothing in the offing. Since the costs incurred by the price policy instituted in the Baltics cannot easily be compensated for by the limited and indeed previously set budget of the USSR Ministry of Defense, many servicemen, white and blue collar workers have found themselves virtually at the threshold of poverty.

The point here is that the officers, Army and Navy warrant officers, and enlisted personnel in compulsory service are not here on someone's whim: They are carrying out a state mission. This means that the approach to solving their problems should likewise be state-like in nature. All the more since the gears of the market machine are starting to turn throughout the country.

This kind of approach should be adopted as soon as possible, as preparations are being made to sign the interrepublic and Union treaties, within the context of

discussions pertaining to the stationing of fleet troops and forces and the Armed Forces in general. In the case of service personnel, blue and white collar workers of the Soviet Army and Navy, their dependents, and personnel discharged into the reserves, this is where provision should be made—with the future in mind—for guarantees which include a complex of social aspects: housing, residency registration, essential goods, medical care, nursery service, kindergartens, schools, etc.

At the same time, there is something else that in my opinion is just as clear: The Army and Navy must not be treated as "equal" participants in a market economy. There is no army in the world that is capable of functioning on the basis of self-repayment and self-financing, given the types of missions it is assigned. This is the direction in which we are actually being pushed. For example, the Baltic Fleet is literally suffocating under the burden of "concerns" imposed on it relative to construction of housing and cultural and communal facilities, in addition to maintenance of existing housing, water and gas lines, and public facilities. Elementary logic dictates that all of this should be the responsibility of the soviets. On top of that, in the RSFSR Council of Ministers Decree of 23 April 1990: "Measures Promoting Further Economic and Social Development of Kaliningrad Oblast in 1990-1995," it is proposed that the fleet employ military construction organizations to erect a number of facilities. Specifically, it is charged with building for local soviets housing in the amount of 35,000 square meters and a number of cultural, communal, and educational facilities.

This, even though the fleet does not have enough military construction organizations to cover its own servicemen's housing needs.

This, even though military reform involves reduction in military construction organizations.

This, even though on every street corner one hears assertions relative to the Armed Forces obligation to tend to their own affairs.

Incidentally, I made the above statements and associated suggestions during last September's meeting between RSFSR Council of Ministers Chairman I.S. Silayev and representatives of the Armed Forces. The Prime Minister of Russia reacted positively at that time. However, the question still remains open.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] The fleet renders considerable assistance to republic governments by way of its personnel and equipment. This was once more made evident by the Baltic servicemen's participation in last fall's harvest. Can the Navy expect any support in return?

[Ivanov] The facts show otherwise. One example will suffice. Of the amount of bricks allotted the Baltic Fleet for 1990—3 million bricks—Kaliningrad Oblast delivered only 900,000. Deliveries by the Baltic republics broke down. The situation is even worse this year. How are we to build, may I ask you?

The conclusion is inescapable: Without fixed wholesale prices of a number of necessary materials; without retaining the state order for the most important special-purpose military technical deliveries, the fleet will simply be in no position to carry out whatever capital construction tasks are assigned.

Allotment of capital construction sites, especially for housing, is proceeding with great difficulty. In a number of areas of the oblast and in Kaliningrad itself, land assignments for 1991 housing construction have not been executed. In those locations where land assignments have been made, local authorities have come up with impossible requirements relative to erection of buildings and water and gas services for entire towns, rayons, and areas. This is to be done at the expense of the Ministry of Defense. However, the Armed Forces budget has nothing in it covering this activity.

Is there a way out? Yes, there is, and I believe that it is responsive to the requirements posed by the market. This would be the share principle by which local soviets would apportion resources for the military to erect social facilities in proportion to the size of the civilian populace served by these facilities. Service in the Army and Navy always was and remains as service to the state. With this as a basis, we should determine the role of the Armed Forces in the developing economic conditions. That is, we must base our actions on the interests of the state, not on immediate market considerations.

Defense always was expensive. I believe that it is possible to have an economical defense, within the context of reasonable sufficiency, only if we make efficient use of material and financial resources and employ our armaments and equipment in a skillful manner. The Baltic Fleet is already rendering the state partial compensation for expenditures by developing subsidiary farms; transferring to the national economy various valuable materials, raw materials, and scrap; and by utilizing the fleet's scientific and technical potential in the interests of civilian departments. However, I repeat that complete self-repayment in the future is out of the question. The existence of the Armed Forces as a state institution without state support is impossible.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] You said that the fleet is already providing the government with some compensation for its upkeep. Can you be more specific about that?

[Ivanov] I can give you several examples. Annual savings on resources amount to several million rubles. The fleet is partially satisfying its agricultural products requirements. The Resources Office operates independently, effecting the sale of hundreds of thousands of rubles' worth of valuable materials yearly. We turn in large amounts of ferrous and nonferrous metals. Baltic servicemen every year participate in the harvest and provide assistance in resolving essential national economic tasks for the country and area.

I am not saying that defense expenditures are completely offset by the partial compensation the fleet renders now

and can render in the future. It is necessary to put the passions generated at wildcat meetings aside and have a hard look at the situation: In the shadow of a preeminent market, we cannot treat defense as we would small change, betraying the vital interests of those who are entrusted with the state's defense. The fact that the state must have strong Armed Forces was illustrated by recent world events.

New Automated Navigation System Nears Completion

91UM06364 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 May 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Captain 2nd Rank S. Petrov, deputy commander of the oceanographic survey ship Mikhail Krupskiy, and Candidate of Technical Science Vyacheslav Vladimirovich Burlakov, chief designer of the "Pervyy" automated navigation system, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Captain 1st Rank A. Zlydnev: "The New System Is in the Throes of Being Born"]

[Text] There were only rumors on the oceanographic vessel Mikhail Krupskiy which has been conducting research work in the North Atlantic about the impending final stage of testing of the system of instruments and mechanisms that has been installed here and that is intended to machine process navigation information and the parameters of the fields that are under study that are linked to it. These are the basic "functional responsibilities" of the new system in domestic oceanography (for convenience, we will give it the code name "Pervyy" [First]). By the way, the adjective "new" is also extremely tentative since the research and development of this entire very complex system has been drawn out over more than one five-year plan.

Captain 2nd Rank S. Petrov, deputy commander of the oceanographic survey ship, told me, "We are just in our sixth year of involvement with the system. During this time, I personally have accumulated so many business papers of every possible type that the papers and folders weigh more than two kilograms."

This is a joke like any other joke but the development of the system has actually been drawn out for an unparalleled length of time. The appropriate CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers resolutions had already been adopted in 1976. Three years later, the deputy commander-in-chief of the navy for ship building and weaponry approved a plan task for production of the "Pervyy" based on the scientific research conducted.

How do we explain the delay? We posed this question to Candidate of Technical Science V. Burlakov, chief designer of the system.

"The institute where I head the surface ship oceanographic systems laboratory is part of the Ministry of the Ship Building Industry," said Vyacheslav Vladimirovich. "Its main customer is the Navy which is primarily

concerned about the modern fitting out of warships. Therefore development of the 'Pervyy' system has been conducted according to the residual principle. And the technical task itself was substantially flawed because it followed the trend that existed at that time of embracing the un-embraceable. Adequately improved calculator-instruments were not available and the appropriate computer programs did not exist. Now the situation has changed. Using sports jargon, after a difficult start, 'Pervyy' finished first. Leading specialists, Candidate of Technical Sciences Yevgeniy Shvedov and Senior Scientific Associates Vladimir Kozlov and Anatoliy Borisov, made a decisive contribution to the development of the system. The future specialist-operators proposed a number of interesting ideas to improve its operation as a result of which they managed to avoid a quite cumbersome primordial structure for inputting information into the computer and its subsequent automatic processing and the output of interesting data. Now it meets world standards."

And well it seems that "Pervyy" actually finished first. The system has good prospects associated with further expansion of its capabilities based on new generation computer technology. Leading NII [Scientific Research Institute] specialists have already developed plans to install the apparatus on several oceanographic ships and at coastal stations. And if "Pervyy" goes into series production after State Testing, no special problems will arise with accepting it into the inventory. The main thing is that no bureaucratic road blocks are dropped in front of it as before.

Komsomolets Ship's Doctor Comments on Disaster

91UM0636B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
11 May 91 Union Edition p 3

[Interview with Komsomolets Submarine Doctor Captain Igor Kochergin by IZVESTIYA Special Correspondent S. Tutorskaya, Leningrad-Moscow: "And that Which Was Beyond Human Strength: New Details of the Komsomolets Submarine Accident"]

[Text] The newspapers have reported that the Main Military Procuracy has decided to once again painstakingly study all of the circumstances of the loss of the nuclear submarine Komsomolets.

In Moscow at a scientific conference, a Navy medical service commander said that the young submarine doctor Igor Kochergin (now he wears the rank of captain) proved himself admirably during the accident on the Komsomolets. While working in a gas-filled compartment, he gave his individual breathing device to a crew member which seriously undermined his health. Doctor Kochergin himself, whom we sought out in Leningrad, told us what happened before and after that.

[Kochergin] It was my first trip after graduating from the institute. It is true that I also completed a special internship.

Everything began early in the morning when the boat was several hundred kilometers from the Bermuda Islands. I was already on my feet. There was a sharp blow and I was tossed nearly a meter up into the air. The accident alarm signal and the command on individual protection systems sounded immediately. Then about 15 seconds later the submarine sank very rapidly, like a rock. Visibility deteriorated in my compartment, an orange fog appeared, and I sensed a burning sensation and dryness in my throat—the symptoms of poisoning.

An hour later, I received the first victims from the accident compartment. Their condition was serious: cramps of the hands and feet and loss of consciousness. I managed to inject them with promedol intramuscularly and then we were ordered to leave the compartment. We needed to put the victims in a safe compartment, but how? They were wet, they were slipping out of our hands, and the boat's ladder was almost vertical. The breathing apparatuses were cumbersome and it was difficult to turn around. We rolled them up in a tourniquet made from a sheet, put them under the victims' arms, and carried them to a safe compartment that way. We had just dealt with that when the command came through to look for the commander of the accident compartment. We found him and I immediately went to the seventh compartment and relayed that there were two more unconscious men there. We did everything that we could to get the lads' hearts started. Alas, nothing helped. And they were already summoning me to the eighth compartment....

When I later testified about this accident at a special conference, I proposed that "cocktails" of various combined medicines in a single syringe be prepared for such situations beforehand. This would have freed up a lot of time for me and my assistants. The artificial breathing devices have oxygen tanks. We did not manage to turn the valve to "on" on many of them although people with exceptional strength attempted to do this. Oxygen with spirits are needed at the most serious moment when people begin to suffocate from breathing poisonous gases while exuding lots of foam.

Those two that we did not manage to save, according to the crew's testimony, tore off their breathing apparatus while there were still in the accident compartment. Why—did they run out of oxygen? No one has investigated that situation.

[Tutorskaya] But nevertheless, how did it happen that you gave away your breathing apparatus? And to whom?

[Kochergin] To an officer. And this is how it transpired. Understand, each seaman, no matter where he is, has a PDU—a portable breathing device—on his person while we are submerged. It operates for ten minutes. During that time, it is entirely possible to reach your battle station and to don your IP—self-contained breathing protection mask. When the air in it is exhausted, you transfer to an individual breathing apparatus—IDA. I gave my IDA to an officer in the accident compartment.

Until some moment, everything was normal with me. I was precisely side by side with Senior Lieutenant Oleg Kuzmenko. Suddenly the air ran out and I motioned with my hands: I could not breathe. They transmitted over the intercom that the doctor's apparatus had run out of air. I had to breathe poisonous air while they brought me a spare cartridge. I exhaled and moved farther on: there were still five seamen in harm's way in the adjacent compartment. I did everything necessary. And here I began to feel that things were not going well. I had difficulty breathing: I laid down—it was nothing, I raised myself slightly, foam was coming from my mouth. I administered medicine to myself intravenously and a warrant officer pulled my hand.

We moved all of the deceased into one compartment. We found the captain 3rd rank—he was dead. And one other seaman died—Sergey Priminin. He volunteered to close the reactor lid in order to extinguish it. But they were not able to extract Serezha from the compartment....

Those of us who could assembled on deck.

When ships arrived to aid us, the sea was rough, four balls, and it was difficult for the rescue sloops to approach. And here again I had edema of the lungs. Gennadiy Novikov, a doctor from a ship that had pulled alongside, dragged me back from death.

[Tutorskaya] Later, to your knowledge, was there a serious analysis of everything that occurred?

[Kochergin] When I recovered, I talked at the conference in Moscow about the irrational placement of medicines and breathing apparatuses in the compartments, about the mixtures in the syringes with which it would have been somewhat easier, and about the fact that the valves were jammed. I also suggested that there should be a medical assistant as well as a doctor on a submarine. I also talked about the imperfections of gas analyzers during accidents. They need to accurately indicate how much and what kind of harmful admixtures are in the air.

Finally, a special medical assistance ship group could have come to our aid. It simply did not manage to reach

us. But the recommendations of leading doctors began to arrive via communications five hours after the accident began....

When we ended up in Cuba, we were greeted very warmly. They gave us "Icaruses" and treated us well. When we arrived in Moscow, they carried us in small PAZ's [automobiles made by the Pavlovo Bus Plant imeni A.A. Zhdanov] and they had already begun to yell: they said, you are guilty. But in the north, where the submarine was written off, they sent a truck for us at the port. And they talked to us almost like we were criminals....

Our Epilogue. We are sitting with the doctor in his very narrow room that looks like a ship's cabin. He lives in a communal apartment with his wife and son. The house was built in the 1820's and he can hardly breathe. Igor is generally satisfied with his work. He is a fleet admiral's doctor. After the accident, they found that he had serious health complications and pronounced him unfit for service on ships.

Those several hours that the crew members fought for their lives turned out to be invaluable: In Kochergin's words, the accident began suddenly at 5:30 a.m. and the boat sank at 11:03 a.m. Fortunately, everyone who remained alive was brought on board ships that had pulled up alongside.

I was listening and I caught myself thinking: Alas, those very signs of preparation for an accident appear among the military that seem somehow unreal to a civilian. It may happen but it sooner will not. So that everything is known: Those valves which it is impossible to open in the decisive instant for life. And those breathing instruments which the seamen tore away from their own faces. And transporting victims using sheets.

Specialists are analyzing the actions of the crew in detail right now. It seemed unbelievably important to me that lessons should be drawn from what the doctor told me. So that not only a narrow circle of people know how the boat's crew and its doctor attempted to do everything in their power and at times even exceeding human strength during that horrible minute.

Market's Impact on Combat Training

91UM0633A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 May 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel O. Bedula, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Military Reform: Practical Steps": "According to the Laws of the Market"]

[Text] The market and combat training. No matter how this word combination grates on the ears of a military person, there is nowhere to hide from it. The market has also come to the training ground, where, as a matter of fact, the resources allocated for combat training always materialized for the military work of soldiers, except that somehow this was not usually talked about. But now?

...Colonel A. Maslov, deputy commander of a division, and Major N. Khitrov, chief of the "Nth" training center, had never before experienced the kind of difficulties in the preparation of exercises that they were experiencing this time. An exercise with the combat firing of a tank regiment was pending. The first thing that its organizers got stuck on was the problem of equipping the target ranges. As the saying goes, the question was put point blank: Where to get the material that is needed to make the targets—plywood, foil, and metal screening?

A reminder by the military that an order was placed here at the furniture factory, which previously supplied all of this to the troops, was met, for understandable reasons, without enthusiasm. Agreeing, nevertheless, to sell the plywood for "wooden" money, they asked 700 rubles [R] per cubic meter. A year ago, the cost of such a purchase did not exceed R150.

"It is the market price," explained a representative of the furniture workers. "Believe me, tomorrow it will be more expensive..."

Market surprises, of course, did not end with this. The railroad reported new prices for the use of flatcars to convey equipment to the exercise area. The motor transport road service of several Russian oblasts presented a bill for the movement of wheeled vehicles on the main highways and country roads. But then it was learned that repairing equipment after the exercise will be more expensive now. In a word, the directorate of combat training of the district calculated that an exercise for one regiment will cost R1.5 million. But how many such exercises and those of a larger scale have to be conducted in the Army and Navy in the final stage of winter training? Will it not become necessary to curtail combat training in the second half of the training year?

Of course, the problems on the district scale are not comparable to the overall Army problems. But, then, the combat readiness of the Armed Forces is determined by the level of training of all its elements. But what kind of level can be talked about in this case? The training periods were approaching, but the soldiers did not have appropriate field clothing—the Ivanovskiy worsted

fabric combine sent only "justifying" telegrams. The food service was agitated—Chelyabinsk, Samarskiy, and Sverdlovsk Oblasts refused to supply the full amount of meat, milk, and butter. Difficulties also arose with fuel and lubricants. The oil bases demanded additional payment, for which the POL [petroleum, oil, and lubricants] service of the district did not receive instructions from its own central directorate. As a result, the pay, food, and clothing services had to use part of their emergency reserves. Afterward, Colonel Maslov will say: "The market was the most threatening enemy for the trainees..."

It would be incorrect to assert that new economic relations have already caught the military by surprise. At a recent conference of supervisory personnel of the Rear Services of the Armed Forces, the Volga-Ural district was named among the best both for its readiness to overcome the administrative command threshold of the economy and for promising operating times concerning support of the combat readiness of the troops under the new conditions.

"It is apparent that we must proceed, nevertheless, from the fact that we are not a commercial organization," Colonel V. Kumanev, deputy commander of the troops of the district for rear services, told me. "But this does not at all mean isolation from market relations. We are simply obliged to take into account the specific character of the market in the organization of the life and combat training of troops. The decentralization of supply and contract deliveries requires us to enter into direct ties with production associations and enterprises."

But it was explained to me that it is not that easy to establish these ties under present conditions. Some industrial enterprises, taking advantage of their monopolist position, began to demand almost in the form of an ultimatum a redesign in production, apportionment of building materials and automobile equipment, and personnel for subsidiary work. Suppliers are less and less interested in money as such, and the rule "you scratch my back, and I will scratch yours" is almost becoming the basis for mutual calculations. And some are quite ready to move the interests of combat readiness to a secondary level. "Military comrades, why do you need high combat readiness in Udmurtia if there are only our own everywhere in the republic—Russians, Tatars, and Bashkirs?" Or: "You should fire fewer rounds and save fuel..."

It is difficult to say what such statements contain more of—political speculation, historical unconsciousness, or intoxication with the market. But the reality is that the adaptation of the troops to market relations is not going easily. Nonetheless, it is moving along, and a gradual transition from principally administrative methods to principally economic methods of supply is being accomplished.

An economic group has been established in the district headquarters whose main task is to render assistance in

the conclusion of contracts and the organization of cooperation between Army customers and industrial enterprises and local territorial material-and-technical support organs. The commercial services that have been established in units have assumed the supply of everyday materials and the provision of municipal and domestic services. Commercial and economic activity is being accomplished with the help of the already existing technical support service, rear services, and the financial service.

This structure has demonstrated its viability. However, it is also apparent that the effectiveness of its work in many ways depends on analogous services established by the center—economic departments in the main headquarters of the services of the Armed Forces, and in the Ministry of Defense. The quicker it is possible to arrange comprehensive cooperation between the new structures, the less the suffocating administrative embraces will be felt. In particular, these are already becoming apparent in the fact that, in the transition to the market, the centralized financing of military units has begun to hopelessly lag behind the increase in their requirements. It was said earlier that, because of the central motor transport support department's nonacceptance of the five percent turnover tax, the district was almost left without gasoline. But let us take the supply of spare parts for equipment. The main directorate for motor transport support does not give permission to the motor transport support service of the district to pay suppliers the higher prices established for spare parts and repairs. But the market exceeded these prices a long time ago. In order not to end up entirely "without wheels," thought is being given in the motor transport support service to the sale of motor vehicles...

Of course, the market will win out, and no departmental barriers will withstand its onslaught. Nevertheless, it would be better for the combat readiness of the troops if the central departments took changes in the local situation into account in a more timely way and reacted to them not with prohibitive measures but, first and foremost, with constructive decisions. As was done, for example, when the center gave the "go ahead" to compensating for the shortage of finances through self-financing sources. Money appeared immediately. The food service successfully sold a trailer slaughter house, hulling mill, kitchens, and baking ovens. In exchange the district received construction materials that were used in the interests of combat readiness. The clothing service sold quilted jackets and old-style wide trousers at cost, and also canvass shoes and Russian leather shoes in sizes that were not in demand, after acquiring several storehouses. In order to lessen dependence on suppliers in the acquisition of food, the rear services of the district is now investigating the possibility of supplying itself with meat for four and a half months, potatoes for eight months, and milk and eggs for an entire year. Will it succeed? This depends on enterprise and on the cooperation between subunits of the rear services and local organs of authority, and, of course, on the attitude of the central administrative organs to their initiative.

Great hopes are also being placed in skillfully combining the activity of the troops in resolving national economic problems. The economic group calculated that the greatest reserves here are in the topographic and engineering services and in the motor transport and repair units [chast]. It will look like this in practice. Engineering equipment is used not only for digging trenches on training ranges but also in the interests, for example, of municipal and highway services. Personnel will acquire the very same skills in the operation of equipment, and they will also earn money for the district. And the labor of military topographers will also be useful to civilian land surveyors and other specialists, providing it is not classified.

The economic group has a lot of ideas that could be put into operation in the interests of increasing the combat readiness of troops under market conditions. The problem lies elsewhere—to what extent will their implementation conform to the laws? The market assumes initiative and enterprise. But it is risky to swim in a market sea without an appropriate legislative basis. For it is one thing to resolve a problem, for example, with plywood (incidentally, as far as I know, a way out of the situation has already been found in the Main Directorate of Combat Training of the Ground Forces), and it is quite another matter with armaments and military equipment that come from various regions of the country.

"A lot in this plan should be envisaged in the Union treaty," says Lieutenant General V. Konstantinov, first deputy commander of the troops of the district. "Including the right of the center to decide questions of defense. At that time also, there will be an untying of the 'sovereignty of the republics—economic support of defense' knot, which, while it is not being tightened now, is also not being loosened."

It is obvious that there is a need here for all-Union legislation in the field of economic support of defense on the principle of maximum unification with laws that already exist or are being prepared, and also with its compulsory coordination with the Union and autonomous republics. For example, the law on land reform evidently should clearly stipulate the procedure for granting and using land for defense needs. But the law on defense should define the area of responsibility and powers of the organs of authority, enterprises, and associations in resolving questions of economic support of the Armed Forces. A law is also needed on state orders which would clearly state the orders of food products for defense needs.

Indeed, all of us today, very likely, understand that the market is not a Trojan horse, not a subversive activity of the West, and not a disgraceful capitulation to the imperialists. The market is an economic reality in which we must live, serve, and strengthen the defense of the country. We must learn how to do all of this qualitatively—it is a paramount task, equally important for the rear services directorate, for the military-political directorate, for the procuracy, and for each of us.

Volga-Ural MD Housing Shortage

91UM0722A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
12 Jun 91 First Edition p 2

[Letter to the Editor by Lieutenant Colonel of Justice V. Khlyzov: "Strange Logic"]

[Text] In everyday life people frequently say: They are waiting for what has been promised for three years. That is, according to worldly criteria, this time period is entirely adequate to test anyone's patience. Obviously, Sverdlovsk Gorispolkom thinks completely differently because they have already been totally ignoring the Volga-Ural Military District in the person of its quarters and utilities organs over the last four years. The quarters and utilities organs have received only negative responses to their repeated requests for allocation of living space in homes built in the city using Ministry of Defense funds.

Meanwhile, during the period from 1987 through 1990, nearly five million rubles has been allocated to the gorispolkom capital construction department for housing construction as share holding. In accordance with the USSR Council of Ministers resolution, the contractor was to have annually allocated living space in

newly erected housing to Sverdlovsk Garrison in proportion to the transferred capital investments. But as of today, the garrison has under-received 35,188 square meters of living space that is worth a total of more than R8 million.

Having exhausted all arguments, the quarters and utilities department sent a statement of claim to the Sverdlovsk Oblast Board of Arbitration in February 1991. But, unfortunately, State Arbitrator V. Okulova terminated action on the case without conducting a hearing. She did not even begin to demand clarification from the defendant. Moreover, she frankly stated that the State Board of Arbitration is not an assistant in this matter because the plaintiff's demands about granting living space were not specific. In her opinion, it must be a question of specific housing.

Obviously, we need to understand this as follows: if the military would seize and move into a newly erected house and later demand its own, that would be normal. But from the point of view of the law, this is nothing more than arbitrariness, even if you consider that the Ministry of Defense has already paid for this housing. It cannot be denied that the arbitrator's logic is strange.

Deputy Cadre Chief on Officer Recruitment Problems

91UM0579A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 Apr 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Colonel General A.K. Mironov, deputy chief of the Main Cadre Administration of the USSR Ministry of Defense, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA supernumerary correspondent Lieutenant-Colonel V. Silkin; place and time not given: "The Sore Points of Professional Selection"]

[Text] Choosing the officer profession has become considerably more complicated in conjunction with substantial transformations under way in our state. The emergence of a far-ranging preparatory chain of educational establishments geared to commercial professions is one of the reasons. The increasing bent of the young people for humanities, art, and culture is also a factor. A change in the material living conditions is significant. A segment of young men strive to avoid difficulties that are inescapable in the course of military service, and to evade the constitutional duty to defend the USSR. The destruction of the moral foundations of society, the desire of a significant stratum of the young people to lead a so-called "free life," exultation and infantilism, frequently the inclination to use drugs and alcoholic beverages, and poor physical condition make the representatives of this stratum reluctant to opt for a military career. A distorted notion of military service and its traditions and a weakening of the military-patriotic upbringing result in making the Western way of life into a fetish, and as a result, a lessened interest in glorious combat chapters of the past of our state and the military profession, and the reluctance to assume responsibility for the future of the Motherland. All of these "sore points" were touched upon in a conversation between our supernumerary correspondent and Deputy Chief of the Main Cadre Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense Colonel General A. Mironov.

[Silkin] Comrade Colonel General, there is a lot of talk now about competition for slots at service schools declining considerably. Is this true?

[Mironov] Indeed, there is less competition, but not to the point of saying that there is a crisis. In recent years, our schools were filled by 80 percent civilian young people, 15-16 percent servicemen in compulsory military service, and four to five percent young men of indigenous nationalities who are admitted on a noncompetitive basis. This made it possible to ensure the necessary degree of competition. However, the levels of competition became uneven in some places. Take, for example, the Ryazan Higher Command School of Airborne Troops. Superior personality traits, general and physical training, and the number of those wishing to be admitted to this school frequently create a problem for the members of the professional selection commission: "Who should we choose?" However, there are higher

schools, to which admissions have not been very competitive for years. They are military-technical schools, radiotechnical schools, and a number of others.

[Silkin] It seems that a trend toward less competition is apparent, after all...

[Mironov] Yes, to a degree. However, this is not only because some mass media provide grist for the mill of antiarmy propaganda. The successful selection of candidates for studies depends first of all on the involvement of the chiefs of service schools, commanders at all levels, and cadre organs. We should note that the involvement of many of them has lessened. Military professional-orientation work and the selection of candidates for study proceed in some military districts in a disorganized manner and with little effect. On occasion, this is done by inadequately trained people.

The situation is exacerbated by the fact that certain officials who are responsible for selection only strive to meet the numbers in request papers without paying due attention to the qualitative aspect. The absence selection progress monitoring by superior echelons, lack of interest on the part of unit commanders in selecting the best sergeants and soldiers from among crew commanders, mechanic drivers, and crew leaders and referring them for study in service schools, absence of an opportunity for rayon commissars to pay due attention to this segment, and consequently, manifestations of a hands-off approach, pro forma activities, and irresponsibility have all played an unfavorable role.

[Silkin] Is this situation also a consequence of the absence of appropriate advertising of military service in our country?

[Mironov] Indeed, military professional orientation in our country is still quite nondescript, despite its mission being to create an interest in military art as completely as possible and making a choice at an early stage. There is no need to prove that the more candidates there are, the higher the qualitative parameters of the candidates selected. Perhaps, there is a reason why expenditures for military recruitment in the United States keep growing year after year.

[Silkin] It is known that a lot of attention was paid in its time to advertising the Russian Army, and not by the military ministry alone...

[Mironov] Unfortunately, at present the Military Publishing House and the DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy] are not keeping up with growing needs. There are disgracefully few vivid books for preinduction and induction-age youths which answer the questions of the moment. Meanwhile, in Russia there were always many private printed organs which were commissioned by service schools. Let us look at, for example, the first private weekly military magazine RAZVEDCHIK or VITYAZ, the magazine for the troops and the people, and other publications which covered the heroic aspect of military

service and advertised its advantages. At present, the press is used very little to this end. The army and the navy are represented on Central Television only by the program "In the Service of the Motherland" which also pays insufficient attention to the issue of propagating the officer profession among young people. There are few books and videotapes about service schools; expressive video clips are virtually nonexistent. In the absence of this, it is hard to expect success.

[Silkin] To what degree has an arrangement for selecting candidates through military districts been fine-tuned?

[Mironov] The system of preparatory training sessions for examinations in military districts for candidates from all armed services has not become purposeful. It is no accident that a trend toward revising it has emerged. In particular, the Rocket Forces have long practiced training sessions for their candidates independently, following which the candidates are directly referred to schools. They do the same in the Navy, and with good results.

[Silkin] Pardon me, Aleksey Kirillovich, but why is this not done in other services of the Armed Forces?

[Mironov] The situation has now changed. An order by the minister of defense has been issued, pursuant to which 25-day training seminars are held for servicemen selected as cadet candidates directly at the higher schools which they enter. For civilian young people, paid preparatory courses are organized at military commissariats and Officer Houses. We count on this approach being fruitful.

[Silkin] However, the style of work of the representatives of a number of service schools in military districts, when seminars are held for cadet candidates, is frequently superficial and ineffective. The desire to take care only of one's own higher school is manifested. No interest is seen in filling related service schools with qualified people...

[Mironov] Yes, this does happen. High drop-out rates of cadets in the course of studies are the result of poor selection in the military districts. Previously, 10 percent of those admitted to the first year were dismissed during the entire course of study, whereas in 1990 this number came to 18 percent. Almost one person in five is dismissed. At present, chiefs of service schools are given the right of dismissal for all years of study. With a view to preventing a subjective approach, this process should be monitored, grounds for dismissals should be continuously analyzed, and appropriate measures should be taken.

[Silkin] Could you give us the most characteristic grounds for dismissals?

[Mironov] They vary. Thus, in 1990 the reasons for dismissals during the entire course of study were: poor progress—24.7 percent, lack of discipline—28.3 percent,

health reasons—8.7, lack of desire to study—35.7 percent, and other causes—2.6 percent. As we can see, lack of the desire to study, dissatisfaction with prospects for military service is the weightiest motive.

[Silkin] It is known that the drop-out rate is quite high at a prestigious American higher school, the West Point Military Academy. On the average, 70 percent of those who enter graduate from the academy...

[Mironov] I will say more: Some leave this military service school having failed to handle high physical (in particular) and mental stress. This is despite the fact that in this case it is necessary to pay \$15,000 for every year of study, as well as to serve as a soldier for several years. However, this does not have to do with someone being dissatisfied with a military career.

[Silkin] In addition, those leaving pay back the cost of education.

[Mironov] Yes, over there. As far as our country is concerned... Calculations done in cooperation with the Central Finance Administration indicate that financial losses in conjunction with the dismissal of cadets from service schools as a result of poor professional selection are tremendous. Millions of rubles from the state budget are lost in the course of a study cycle. This is why it is necessary to fight for literally every cadet.

[Silkin] Apparently, professional orientation, selection, and preventive efforts should be made at vocational technical schools, schools, and production facilities in order to reduce the drop-out rate in service schools to a minimum.

[Mironov] This is an urgent necessity. Plans specifically developed by service schools do not cover the entire array of professional-orientation efforts. Frequently, they are not in line with the scope and urgency of problems which develop in our country and the army. Commanders of cadet units, and primarily commanders of cadet companies, do not participate vigorously in professional-orientation trips by the representatives of higher schools. The leaves of cadets in order to meet school students are not used on a sufficient scale. Visits by the representatives of higher schools to the troops, military commissariats, schools, and vocational technical schools are short and random. The effectiveness of such trips is not always monitored by the chiefs to whom the higher schools report. Some deputy commanders of the troops of districts for higher schools, putting it mildly, withdraw from this work, despite their duty being to coordinate the operation of the higher school representatives in the territory of districts.

Practice suggests that such efforts may be made more effective by assigning officers from the command and instructor cadres of higher schools to appropriate regions. They should visit these regions on a continuous basis, year after year, extending their influence not only to the young men of draft age, but also to young men two to three years younger, and conditioning them in

advance for the officer profession. Predraft training instructors who know the personality traits of their wards should provide support in this case.

[Silkin] Comrade Colonel General, has the outflow of candidates for service schools been influenced by the weakening of military-political upbringing?

[Mironov] Recently, such upbringing has been greatly neglected. Pacifism has invariably spread everywhere like oil on pure water. The hope that the need to defend the Motherland supposedly no longer exists may bring about serious consequences. Incidentally, there are many pacifists among Americans, but actually... Look at how they are greeting servicemen returning from the conflict zone! Is this not patriotism? Is this not love of their army?

We are frequently accused of some kind of wholesale militarization of teenagers; meanwhile, the Scout organizations of the United States carry out preparations for military service. Boys between 10 and 15 years of age learn the lessons of courage and honor. This system has been in operation for several decades now. The doors of more than 80 museums of the U.S. Armed Forces are open to teenagers. Virtually all museums of services and combat arms have agreements with Scout organizations for holding military history classes.

[Silkin] Could the introduction of new special boarding schools whose graduates will for the most part become cadets in service schools stabilize the situation?

[Mironov] So far, these schools are not sufficiently numerous to solve the problem. There are only 21 of them. Their students study the Russian language in depth and take extended military and physical training. Several special schools for initial flight training have been opened. The Ministry of Defense has only eight Suvorov military schools and one Nakhimov naval school. In our opinion, the quality of professional selection and the stability of enrollment at service schools may be improved to a certain degree by just expanding educational establishments of this type, including a military-patriotic track in schools with the participation of service schools, and creating various preparatory courses at service schools, garrison Officer Houses, and military commissariats.

Central Finance Directorate on Compensation for Retail Prices

91UM06204 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
30 Apr 91 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed interview with Colonel V. Korolenko, deputy directorate chief of the Central Finance Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense: "Assistance and Compensation for Wives and Children of Servicemen, Workers and Employees of the Soviet Army and Navy"]

[Text] With the reform in retail prices, the editors have received numerous letters requesting clarification of the

amount of assistance and compensation for the wives and children of servicemen, workers and employees of the Soviet Army and Navy. Having selected the most typical of these, we ask that they be answered by the Deputy Directorate Chief of the Central Finance Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Col V. Korolenko.

[Editors] Regardless of the explanations in the press, radio and television, for many of the procedure for paying out the assistance and compensation has remained not completely comprehensible, particularly in terms of women and children. Let us begin by what was introduced in the new Decree of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers of 19 March 1991. No 105 for the social protection of families with children of servicemen, workers and employees of the Army and Navy.

[Korolenko] It must be said first of all that provision has been made to increase the existing assistance to families with children and which had been set by the government on 1 December 1990 and 1 January 1991. Thus, the single assistance with the birth of a child will now be 250 rubles instead of 210 rubles.

Working wives who are on paid leave to look after a child up to 18 months as well as the wives of servicemen in regular service are to receive monthly assistance of 110 rubles, including compensation of 40 rubles. Those who have been employed for under a year as well as non-working mothers, aside from the wives of servicemen in regular service, are to receive 80 rubles and this would include 45 rubles of compensation. Previously, respectively, 70 and 35 rubles were paid.

The unified monthly assistance for each child from the age of 18 months to 6 years and which as of 1 December 1990 was 35 rubles (one-half the minimum wage) was paid under the condition that the average income per family member did not exceed 140 rubles, and as of 1 April is to be supplemented by compensation of 45 rubles, even if the income per family member reaches 280 rubles but not more.

Now about the new types of assistance introduced by the government decree No 105. For the first time a monthly payment of 40 rubles has been established for children not receiving assistance and pensions under the current social security system and under the age of 16 (students not receiving scholarships up to the age of 18). In truth, under the condition that the aggregate income per family member does not exceed 280 rubles. In such instances, provision has also been made to pay compensation for the increased cost of children's goods in the following amounts per child per quarter: 50 rubles up to the age of 6, 60 rubles from 6 to 13 and 70 rubles from 13 to 18.

I would like to point out that the designated amounts of assistance and compensation for children are guaranteed by the USSR government. However, if the republic bodies decide to pay out assistance and compensation in larger amounts, these are to be extended to the children of servicemen, workers and employees of the military

units, military schools, institutions, enterprises and organizations of the USSR Ministry of Defense located on the territory of the corresponding republics. For example, in the RSFSR and Belorussia, the monthly assistance for children from 18 months to six years and compensation related to the increased cost of children's goods are not restricted to the limits of the aggregate income per family member of up to 280 rubles. Hence, this decision also applies to the children of servicemen, workers and employees of the Army and Navy residing on the territory of these republics.

If the servicemen, workers and employees serve and work in areas and localities where regional wage coefficients have been established, then the amounts of the assistance and monthly payments for children (except for the compensation to families with under-age children related to the increased cost of children's goods) will be set considering the regional coefficients established for the wages of workers in the nonproduction sectors of the national economy.

Assistance and compensation for children are to be paid at the place of service or employment of the mother and if she is not employed, at the place of service or employment of the father.

[Editors] What seems to be of greatest concern to the authors of the letters to the editor is the following. They complain that on the spot they still are not paying the assistance and compensation in the new amounts referring to a lack of instructions from above. This was written about by L. Petrunya from the Crimea, the servicewomen A. Lysenko and O. Alentyeva from Rostov Oblast, M. Pronko from Leningrad, Ye. Akse-nova from Novocherkassk, Sr Lt L. Krylov from Kazan, A. Danilova from Lithuania, T. Luporeva from Belorussia and others. Some even voiced the doubt that the Government Decree No 105 was even to extend to the families of servicemen.

[Korolenko] Unfortunately, similar letters have been received by our directorate and also by the Directorate for Labor and Wages of Workers and Employees of the USSR Ministry of Defense. This can only be explained by irresponsibility and bureaucratic indifference by some officials. I can state with all categoricalness that there have been and are no grounds for delaying the designation and payment of assistance and compensation for children in the troop units, organizations and institutions of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Long before the issuing of the corresponding order of the USSR minister of defense, the troops received the Detailed Instructions No 1-197 from the Central Finance Directorate and the Directorate of Labor and Wages of Workers and Employees. Two days after the issuing of the Decree of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers of 19 March, No 105, a directive was telegraphed to the spot with a detailed description of the amounts and procedure for paying the assistance and compensation

and with an explanation as to the sources for covering the expenditures for these purposes.

As you can see, it is merely a matter of sluggishness and inefficiency on the spot. Certainly, the commanders and chiefs of all levels without delay should check how the troop units subordinate to them are implementing the government decisions aimed at the social protection of the families of servicemen, workers and employees and adopt decisive measures on each instance of red tape or idleness by officials responsible for these questions. Certainly families with children are finding it particularly difficult right now, at present.

It remains to add that if for some reason there have been delays with the assigning and paying of assistance and compensation, these will be recalculated for all the time for which they have been in effect.

Kyrgyz Conscription Proceeding Normally

91UM0748A Bishkek SLOVO KYRGYZSTANA
in Russian 11 Jun 91 p 7

[Article by Ye. Denisenko in the column "Spring Call-Up": "What Lies Beyond the First Stage?"]

[Text] The current spring call-up of young men for military service is under way in Kyrgyzstan. It is to be accomplished in the last 10 days of May and the first 10 days of June. Many Kyrgyz youths as before will fulfill their constitutional obligation in units and subunits of the Turkestan Military District, while others will perform their tour of duty in other districts of the country.

Responding to the editors' request for comments on the course of events, Lieutenant-Colonel Oleg Chechel, responsible worker in the Political Section of the Republic Military Commissariat, states that the present call-up the same as before is proceeding normally. The call-up's purpose and tasks are properly understood by those about to join the ranks and their relatives and friends. Likewise, provision has been made for this in the Declaration of Sovereignty of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, which defers the details of service and conditions of assignment of its citizens to the Union and the union ministry. However, certain aspects of this service, in accordance with society's requests and suggestions, are to be governed by a number of important changes that have been introduced.

Attempts will be made whenever possible, the same as last year, to assign to duty within the confines of their native republic those soldiers that have families and certain others on a case-by-case basis, as determined by their family situation. Not subject to the draft are youths whose older brother lost his life while on duty. An order that has assumed the force of law this year requires that conscripts be assigned to the Transcaucasus Military District only upon execution of their signature testifying to their agreement to such assignment. Those who accept such assignment are to become eligible for a number of benefits: a guaranteed annual leave of up to 20 days'

duration; an increase in pay in the amount of 200 rubles; and greater availability—compared to other areas—of personal comfort items.

Of equal importance is the introduction of insurance coverage for all categories of servicemen, including enlisted ranks. Personnel suffering a group I disability will be due 15,000 rubles; groups II and III will receive 10,000 and 5,000 rubles, respectively. The family of a soldier who loses his life will become eligible to receive 25,000 rubles. (Heaven forbid that anyone need collect on this insurance!)

The country's leadership's recent decision to shorten naval service from three years to two years is expected to attract a greater number of inductees to that service. The first group of Kyrgyz youths has already been sent to the Baltic Military District.

Oleg Chechel shares another item of concern: the level of physical fitness, including state of health of Kyrgyz draft-age youths. The incidence of common disorders and chronic illnesses is high in this group. It is natural to expect that some of them will be unfit for duty, while others will find it difficult to withstand the rigors of the service.

Preliminary analysis indicates that the republic is once more fulfilling its quota of applicants for admission to USSR Ministry of Defense schools. However, once again there has been a drop in number of youths of Kyrgyz origin expressing interest in the profession of officer. The number of applications is half that of last year's figure. Oleg Chechel considers that the causes lie in poor quality of pre-draft training in a number of schools, especially rural schools, and a lack of a directed program for working with students in secondary school upper classes, with unqualified persons often administering the instruction. The cadre shortage has led to military instructor positions being filled by former enlisted personnel and NCOs, even by persons who served in military construction units. The Bishkek Boarding School is the principal supplier of youths of native ethnic origin for officer cadre. However, the Armed Forces still adhere to the multi-ethnic principle so that the officer corps can maintain complete viability within the service.

All in all, we see in the actions of state power structures that organize the call-up and of the executive element—the military commissariats—greater smoothness of teamwork and cooperation and mutual responsibility. Major repair of the Republic Induction Station has finally been recently accomplished, under the sponsorship of the Bishkek City Soviet.

The above is still referred to as the first stage of army life. May the two years separating it and the last stage pass quickly for all those who are joining the ranks as well as those who are seeing them off!

Initial Look at Problems of Transition to 2-Year Naval Manning

91UM0725A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
12 Jun 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Temporary Correspondent Lieutenant V. Fatigarov: "To Transition to a Two-Year Term of Service—It's not Easy"]

[Text] Our temporary correspondent was sent to a centrally subordinated Naval unit in order to ask one question: What problems have arisen in the military collective as a result of the transition to a 2-year term of service. Deputy Unit Commander Captain 2nd Rank D. Tokarev said:

"Our unit is equipped with the most modern communications equipment and it is not easy to master it. Suffice it to say that many seamen become specialists 1st class shortly prior to their release into the reserves—during their third year of service. We need to point out that training in training detachments lags behind demands made in the units. The reason is that training is being performed on yesterday's equipment. This problem will become even more acute as a result of the reduction of the terms of service. I think that we need to look closely at the experience of the Russian Army: a training subunit existed in each regiment in those times. From the first day, people mastered the equipment that was entering unit inventories. I am not calling for blind copying but for fundamental approaches. Both on Naval ships and in units we have to set up retraining of specialists who have arrived from training units.

Right now we are building a new training center which will possibly begin operating by the end of this year. This will permit training high class specialists in shorter periods of time. The only thing that worries us is interrupting the training of some personnel, for example, for agricultural work. We understand that it is impossible to do otherwise under the situation that has developed but will combat readiness really increase from this? It is time to practically solve the alternative service issue. The person who serves must only serve and the person who does not want to serve—let him participate in the "battle" for the harvest.

There is another problem. We cannot take skilled specialists from civilian life into warrant officer's positions and we cannot leave the most highly trained servicemen for extended service. Residence permits and housing are like a high stone wall. The army of the state must be extra-territorial, otherwise we will soon be serving in our own yards. And one more thing. We need to rationally use people with higher educations in compulsory service. So that communications engineers enter communications units and automobile engineers enter motor vehicle subunits, etc.

On the whole, the reduction of terms of service, even though quite a few difficulties are arising, is perceived with approval by the majority of the people. I think that people will now willingly serve in the navy. But we need to solve the problems.

Declassification of Documents on Tukhachevskiy's Fate

91UM0575A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Apr 91 First Edition p 4

[Article by Aleksey Khorev: "How Tukhachevskiy Was Condemned; The USSR State Security Committee Has Declassified Materials Related to the Conviction of Marshal of the Soviet Union Tukhachevskiy and the Other Military Leaders in 1937. The Archives Have Revealed the Documents on Their Execution and Cremation"]

[Text] There were eight of them: MSU M.N. Tukhachevskiy, Army Cmdrs 1st Rank I.P. Uborevich and I.E. Yakir, Army Cmdr 2d Rank A.I. Kork, Corps Cmdrs V.M. Primakov, V.K. Putna, B.M. Feldman and R.P. Eydeman. All of them had been active participants in the Civil War, prominent commanders in the Red Army decorated with high awards. Leveled against them was the monstrous accusation of betraying the motherland, espionage and wrecking.... According to the sentence of a Special Court Presence they were all executed, while in 1957 the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court completely rehabilitated them.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already written about the service record and falsified accusation against these military leaders. In the notes offered today by our special correspondent, for the first time certain details of the case which have now become known have been examined for the first time.

1.

The first to be arrested were the Corps Cmdrs Primakov and Putna. Both were charged with belonging to a militant group of a Trotskyite-Zinovyevite counterrevolutionary organization. On the fifth day after his arrest, on 25 August 1936, Putna stated that he was not a member of this organization and knew nothing about its activities. This was stated in the minutes of the interrogation but instead of Putna's signature there was a strange note written in his own hand: "The answers in the current minutes have set down my words accurately but I would like to request that I be permitted not to sign these minutes as the denial set down in it of my involvement in the activities of the Zinovyevite-Trotskyite organization does not correspond to actuality."

Thus, things started well and ended badly.

In the next interrogation held on 31 August and in a confrontation with Radek on 23 September, Putna admitted that he had been in the organization since 1926 and that while serving as a military attache in Germany and England he had met with Trotsky's son, Sedov, and from whom he had received instructions from Trotsky to organize terroristic acts against Stalin and Voroshilov.

After this for almost eight months, Putna was not bothered anymore with interrogations (in any event there are no records of this in the file), but they continued to keep

him first at Butyrka and then Lefortovo Prisons. In the investigatory file there is the "personal file of prisoner Putna" and from this it is possible to judge the conditions of his detention as well as his physical and spiritual state at that time. Here is an official entry of 28 December 1936: "Upon arrival at the internal prison, prisoner V.K. Putna was placed in isolation cell 29 and closely watched whether he was inclined to suicide." For a certain period of time he was in the prison hospital (also in a single, strictly isolated ward) because of a chronic stomach ailment. Once, in February 1937, someone gave him 50 rubles.

In the subsequent interrogations in May-June 1937 and at the court session, Putna, judging from the records and minutes, did not deny the previous evidence and admitted his guilt completely. However, one can scarcely take this confession as honest. We have seen, for example, that from the investigative file Putna had supposedly given evidence of his confession at the very first interrogation. But the former department chief of the NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] A.A. Avseyevich, in an interrogation at the procuracy office on 5 July 1956, stated something quite different: "In the first interrogations Primakov and Putna categorically refused to admit their involvement in a counterrevolutionary, terroristic organization. I called them in 10-20 times.... In addition to being summoned to my interrogations, they were repeatedly summoned by Yezhov and Frinovskiy.... The former NKVD employee V.K. Budarev added to this: "In the period of investigating the case of Primakov and Putna, it was learned that they had both given evidence on participation in a conspiracy after they had been beaten in Lefortovo Prison."

Primakov's file showed that until May 1937 he for a period of nine months had categorically denied his involvement in conspiracy. At the interrogation of 10-11 September 1936, he merely admitted that with his old friends he had indulged in conversations "which had the nature of Trotskyite slander of Voroshilov but that there were no terroristic conversations. There were discussions that the Central Committee itself would see the unsuitability of Voroshilov...."

Subsequently, he was also seemingly left without further interrogation. The file does not contain any records. There are notes and letters.

To Stalin: "I am not a Trotskyite and I did not know about the existence of an organization.... I am guilty of the fact that...until 1932 I was hostile to Comrades Budenny and Voroshilov.... My hostile attitude toward them was based on the unhealthy competition between the Cavalry Army and the Chervonny Cossacks."

To Yagoda: "I am certain that my innocence will be upheld. Is it necessary to hold me under solitary conditions in a small (3 x 6 paces) and semidark cell...? I strongly request that my form of arrest be changed and,

if possible, I be sent to a hospital where I could be treated for my kidneys and strained back muscles...."

To Agranov: "I strongly request that you personally call me in for interrogation on the matter of the Trotskyite organization. I am becoming more and more confused and I myself cannot understand certain things and explain them to the investigator.... Every day I have heart palpitations. I know nothing at all about my family...I have completely ceased to understand the situation."

We do not know whether there was any response from Stalin and the NKVD leaders of Yagoda and Agranov, to Primakov's letter.

Finally, on 8 May 1937, he even wrote to Yezhov: "For a period of nine months I have remained silent on the investigation of the case involving the Trotskyite counterrevolutionary organization and in this closed-mouthness I reached such a point of brazenness that even before the Politburo, even before Comrade Stalin, I continued to be silent and in every possible way reduce my guilt."

"Comrade Stalin has correctly said that 'Primakov is a coward and it is cowardice to remain silent on such a case.' In actuality, on my behalf this was cowardice and false shame for deception. At present, I state that upon returning from Japan in 1930, I...began Trotskyite work and I have given complete evidence about this to the investigation...."

In an interrogation on 21 May, in answering the question of who headed the conspiracy, he said:

"Yakir and Tukhachevskiy.... From Yakir I heard negative comments about collectivization. And always as a joke.... In the autumn of 1934, I personally observed a direct close link (?) between Tukhachevskiy and the participants in the conspiracy Feldman, Yefimov, Kork, Ganner, Garkov, Appoga, Rozyanno, Kazanskiy, Ols-hanskiy and Turovskiy. This group was the basic aktiv of the conspiracy."

In naming many conspirators, Primakov stubbornly emphasized for some reason chiefly their mistrust of collectivization. Here, for example, is what he said about the corps commander in Krasnodar, Kovalev:

"Our conversation was at his apartment. He was feeling no pain. He said that they would never rebuild the economy as it had been under the Cossacks. There would be a lot of grain as in the Kuban the land was fertile but there would not be any orchards, melon fields, vineyards or apiaries as this required an owner's eye and this did not exist on a kolkhoz."

And here is what he said about the commander of an anti-aircraft division in Leningrad, Rybkin:

"Having shown me a village next to which the division's camp was located he said that during NEP [New Economic Policy] the village here had supplied the entire camp but now grain itself was shipped from Leningrad."

Considering our current food situation, we cannot help but admit that the commanders, after all, saw the heart of the matter. And Primakov possibly emphasized these ideas because they were clearly not invented in the military conspiracy but had actually impressed him.

2.

All six of the remaining accused from this tragic group were arrested at short intervals in the second half of May 1937. If one believes the investigation, Kork, Feldman and Eydemian confessed in the very first interrogations. Yakir and Uborevich resisted for a certain time. Here is how this looked in the records of a face-to-face confrontation of both with Kork on 30 May.

Question to Kork: Did you know anything about the counterrevolutionary activities of Yakir?

Kork: In 1931, Yakir and I were part of a leading group of the military conspiracy to overthrow the Stalinist government.

There then followed five and a half pages of testimony by Kork on meetings, conversations and plans of the conspirators.

Question to Yakir: Did you hear this? Do you agree?

Yakir: I categorically deny it. I have always known that Kork was a very bad man to put it mildly, but I could never imagine him as a provocateur. In April of this year, we actually were at Tukhachevskiy's apartment but we certainly did not say anything of the sort.

Question to Kork: What did you know about the counterrevolutionary activities of Uborevich?

In reply Kork repeated approximately the same that he had said about Yakir: about meetings and plans of the conspirators with the involvement of Uborevich. This took up five pages of typewritten text.

Uborevich: I never had any such conversations with Kork about a counterrevolutionary organization. In part, there were the meetings which he described but of the sort where you went for a visit with your wives.... Kork's evidence is a lie from start to finish.

This was on 30 May. On the same day, Yakir was interrogated by Yezhov himself. At 2100 hours on 31 May, Yakir wrote to Yezhov: "I can no longer conceal my criminal anti-Soviet activities and confess myself guilty.... My guilt is enormous and I have no right for leniency." On 1 June, using 22 sheets of paper, Yakir in his own hand wrote out his confession and atonement. He mentioned many participants in the conspiracy. Then he was interrogated on 3, 5 and 7 June. On 9 June,

he signed for a copy of the charges. On 10 June, he wrote a long—about 30 typewritten pages—handwritten letter to Yezhov:

"If you consider it possible and necessary, I request this be turned over to the Central Committee and the NKO [People's Commissariat of Defense].

"I have told everything. It seems to me that I am again one with my beloved country, with my own Red Army. It seems to me that I have again become that honest, party-loyal fighter as I was for around 17 years and for this reason I am bold enough to raise a number of questions for you, a number of last thoughts and proposals...."

He then proceeded to set out his views on the questions of the organization and establishment of the troops, he spoke about improved combat training, personnel work and logistic support. And he ended as follows: "I had very good relations with an enormous number of commanders and political workers.... I am afraid least these relations on the spot create accusations and a situation of mistrust." Here Yakir, as they say, was prophetic as after the judgment of him and his comrades in misfortune, 108 leading workers of the Army and Navy were repressed (and subsequently rehabilitated) over the issue of the "military-fascist conspiracy."

Ubovich was somewhat more restrained. A letter to Yezhov which clearly was seen as a scenario for the investigation was also written by him. He admitted that he considered the policy of collectivization to be wrong and felt right; like all the conspirators, he did not approve of the activities of Voroshilov; that he personally had involved 12 persons in the conspiracy and, in addition, was counting on implementing his plans for the defeat of the Red Army on others who did not know of the conspiracy.... And as his last word before the court he said:

"I will now die with my former faith in the victory of the Red Army."

That was what was written: Now, Ubovich clearly was not hoping to remain alive. For this reason, he did not make a great effort to exculpate his guilt before the investigation and court. At the same time, they possibly instilled this hope in others as compensation for refusing to resist implicating oneself and others.

In the investigatory file on Feldman there is a plan written in his hand and clearly dictated to him of evidence essential to the investigation with a handwritten statement by the accused. This contains 14 points: No 13 "about oneself" and No 13 "about others": whom I personally knew; with whom I maintained direct contact; about whom I knew from conversations with others; whom I personally wanted to recruit but did not do this out of arising circumstances and so forth. Ubovich answered these jesuitical more sparingly.

If one is to believe the record, the entire investigation involving a case which was so severe and fraught with death sentences was carried out without a hitch and went on swimmingly with question and answer. Only rarely did the investigator remind them very sharply: "You are telling the entire truth" and immediately the person under investigation would produce several other pages of revealing and self-implicating text. Below we will see that the "details" here were clearly not settled.

Certain investigators clearly achieved their goals not only with the whip but also with solicitude. Here is a curious note from Feldman to the Assistant Chief of the Third Department of the GUGB [Main State Security Administration] of the NKVD, Capt State Sec Z.M. Ushakov: "Zinovi Markovich! I have written the beginning and end of the statement at my own discretion. I am certain that you will summon me and will point out personally and I will copy it quickly. I hope you will forgive my handwriting. It is hard for me to write without my glasses in the poor light. Thank you for your attention and concern as on the 29th I received the jam, apples and cigarettes and today more cigarettes. They did not say from where or from whom but I know from whom."

Here is one other characteristic note from the same author to the same recipient: "Having set out for you all the facts which I have been able to recall in recent days, I would hope that you, Comrade Ushakov, would summon me personally to you. Through you or Comrade Leplevskiy I would like to inform the NKVD and Comrade Yezhov that I am ready, if this is required for the Red Army, to speak before whomever and wherever and describe all that I know about the military conspiracy. I am ready to go through this purging (as you called my confrontation with Tukhachevskiy) and show to everyone who has extended to me a hand of help to pull me out of this mire that you have not erred that Feldman is not an inveterate, hopeless enemy, but rather a person worth working on so that he might atone for himself and help the investigation in dealing a blow to the conspiracy. Would you please pass on my last appeal to Comrade Voroshilov.

V. Feldman.

31 May 37"

It is hard to guess what could have been written upon demand. Most probably it was done upon his own initiative although, of course, dictated by circumstances. The well-known anecdote comes to mind: Comrade Wolf knows whom to eat.

3.

Tukhachevskiy was arrested on 22 May in Kuybyshev where he had just arrived from Moscow to take up the post of commander of the Volga Military District. He had not even reached his apartment or hotel. The search

was conducted in the marshal's railway car in the company of the wife of Mikhail Nikolayevich, Nina Yevgenyevna. In the search they confiscated his decorations, a Mauser, a gun, seven cartridges, a battery commander's telescope and binoculars. And immediately following this list not devoid of a certain military charm, in the file came the stunningly surprising handwritten statement by Tukhachevskiy addressed to Capt State Sec Ushakov: "There have been confrontations with Primakov, Putna and Feldman who accuse me of being the leader of an anti-Soviet military-Trotskyite conspiracy. Would you please give me a couple of other statements by other participants of this conspiracy who also accuse me? I promise to provide full evidence without the slightest concealing of any of my guilt in this matter and likewise the guilt of other persons in the conspiracy."

The statement was dated 26 May, four days after his arrest. The same date is found on two other documents also written in his own hand: a statement to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Yezhov consisting of one page and testimony to the investigator on six and a half pages. In the archives before I had read papers written in Tukhachevskiy's hand and here seemingly I was the first journalist to hold in my hand his own file and there was no doubt that it was the same fine, firm, sloping drawn-out handwriting.

Here is what the statement to Yezhov contained: "Being arrested on 22 May and arriving in Moscow on the 24th, I was interrogated for the first time on the 25th and today, 26 May, I state that I admit the presence of an anti-Soviet conspiracy and that I was at the head of it. I vow independently to set out for the investigation everything involving the conspiracy, without concealing any of its participants, a single fact or document."

"The founding of the conspiracy dated back to 1932. Participating in it were Feldman, Alafuzo, Primakov, Putna and others and I will provide additional detailed information about this."

Here briefly is the contents of the mentioned testimony of 6.5 pages and consisting of nine points.

The marshal wrote that in 1932 he was very dissatisfied with his situation at the people's commissariat. At that time, he had the idea, with the aid of his fellow serviceman Feldman who headed personnel work at the people's commissariat, to select a group of persons from the superior command personnel and which could ensure the strong influence of him, Tukhachevskiy, in the army. Initially, this organization did not have a Trotskyite influence but subsequently this was interjected by Putna and Primakov who had been overseas where they maintained contact with Trotsky. The aim of the conspiracy was to seize power in the army. The instigator of it was Yenukidze who trusted Tukhachevskiy and was proud of him as his protege (Tukhachevskiy began serving in the Red Army at the beginning of 1918 in the Military Department of the VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee] which at that time was

headed by Yenukidze). They endeavored to cause damage in the weapons area. At that time, the greatest lag was in the area of gas defense.

"I firmly carried out a line of increasing the strength of the Red Army which I considered necessary under all conditions" is a quote from the testimony of Tukhachevskiy which stands next to words about wrecking...here clearly they were not very concerned about logic.

On 27 May, Tukhachevskiy, again in his own handwriting, sent a statement to Ushakov where he atones for the fact that he had not said everything in the previous day's testimony: "But since my crimes are immeasurably great and base, as I personally and the organization which I headed were involved in wrecking, sabotage, espionage and betrayed the motherland, I could not set out to make a full confession of all the facts.... I would like to be able to dictate to a secretary and I assure you honestly that I will not conceal a single fact...."

Beneath the confession of Tukhachevskiy almost invisible is the note: "The statement was taken by Capt State Sec Ushakov." In reading this one feels like substituting the word "dictated" for the word "taken." But who, upon his own initiative, would indulge in such empty self-flagellation?

It has been said that after the rehabilitation of Tukhachevskiy, Voroshilov, his eyes averted, said: "Why would he write that about himself?..." Such a question actually and inevitably arises and will probably arise for many years to come for anyone who reads the fat volumes of the investigatory files of Tukhachevskiy and the others condemned along with him. But of whom should this question be asked and from whom should an answer be obtained?

At present, it can be said with certainty that there is not even a whiff in the file of the "facts and documents" promised by Tukhachevskiy in the statement to Yezhov of 26 May. What is in abundance is papers, words, contradictions and guesses. But let us take a look from the very start.

From the very first statement by Tukhachevskiy to Ushakov it is clear that there had already been confrontations between the marshal and Corps Cmdrs Primakov, Putna and Feldman and from the second statement written on the same day, 26 May, sent to Yezhov, the marshal had been interrogated for the first time on the 25th. However, the file contains no records of either investigatory action. Was this happenstance? Scarcely. Here also could be the key to the answer of the Voroshilov question of why he "had written about himself." Of course, at one time Voroshilov could have obtained an exhaustive answer to this question from Tukhachevskiy himself. But he clearly preferred the reading of papers to personal contact with a living person. And he certainly did read those papers. Otherwise, he could not help but notice that in the file in essence there was not a single concrete, solid, verified and objectively proven fact.

It would have been interesting for Voroshilov to check out the only, in essence, more or less, sound story about the conspiracy, namely the preparations for an attack on himself. In the investigation everyone was asked about this and everyone in reply said something but there was nothing real. Finally, one seemingly concrete link appears: Corps Cmdr S.A. Turovskiy in the investigation was presented with a secret copy of a schedule calendar confiscated in searching Div Cmdr D.A. Shmidt and showing the whereabouts of People's Commissar Voroshilov in the area of the Kiev maneuvers and where it is stated: "For Turovskiy personally" (incidentally, this calendar is missing in the file).

"How did the document end up in the possession of terrorist Shmidt?" asked the investigator.

"Evidently, Shmidt stole it from me."

"Why did you not inform the appropriate authorities of this?"

"After the maneuvers I did not discover that it was missing...."

Hence the maneuvers had gone well, Shmidt had not used Turovskiy's document, there was no attack, not a single hair was lost from the head of the people's commissar, but eight military leaders had their heads removed...supposedly for organizing a terror—how can this be understood, explained and justified? The whole essence of the conspiracy against Voroshilov, we feel, was set out by Ubovich in the court session:

"We went to the government and raised the question of attacking Voroshilov, and in essence we agreed with Gamarnik who said that he would act strongly against Voroshilov."

4.

Would it be possible to call the attitude existing among a portion of the military leaders about Voroshilov as a conspiracy? Certainly it would be possible, although with a certain exaggeration. A conspiracy, as the dictionaries state, is a secret agreement between several persons on joint actions against someone or something for achieving certain definite political aims. But this was not a conspiracy against the constitutional system. It was a conspiracy precisely against Voroshilov as an official who lacked the professional qualities to hold the corresponding position. By the mid-1930s, many military leaders shared this opinion of him.

"Corps Cmdr Kuybyshev said to me," Primakov pointed out at the investigation, "that aside from firing a revolver, Voroshilov was not interested in anything. He only had use for lackeys like Khmelnitskiy or fools like Kulik or complacent old men like Shaposhnikov. Voroshilov did not understand a modern army, he did not understand the importance of equipment...."

Ultimately, such an opinion about the "leader of the Red Army" was confirmed by the Politburo which in 1940

removed him from the post of people's commissar of defense. It turns out that Tukhachevskiy and his supporters had actually been right. This was confirmed persuasively by the beginning period of the Great Patriotic War.

Let us assume that such collusion, such an exchange of opinions between them were for those times contrary to the law. However, would this be the betrayal of the motherland, espionage and wrecking? Finally, would this be a palace coup? And why was such a rapid and such unjust verdict needed?

From the archival file one can clearly follow how events were forced.

On 8 June, the Chairman of the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court, V.V. Ulrikh, requested that the Presidium of the USSR TsIK [Central Executive Committee] approve as members of the Special Court Presence Mars V.K. Blyukher and S.M. Budennyi, Army Cmdrs 1st Rank B.M. Shaposhnikov and I.P. Belov and Army Cmdrs 2d Rank N.D. Kashirin and P.Ye. Dybenko.

Subsequent to this it petitioned for the introduction to membership on the court of two alternate members: Army Cmdr 2d Rank Ya.I. Alksnis and Div Cmdr Ye.I. Goryachev.

The membership was approved quickly.

On 10 June, there was a preparatory session of the Special Court Presence and this ruled that the case would begin for hearing in a closed court session without the involvement of the defense and the prosecutor and without the summoning of witnesses.

On 11 June, the case had already been reviewed. The time for the start of the court session was not shown in the minutes but the end was given: at 2115 hours, the court retired to confer and at 2335 hours the sentence was read. The Presiding Judge Ulrikh clearly was trying to complete the trial on the same day. In the course of the proceedings, he repeatedly urged the accused to speak briefly. Just two breaks were given: for 1 hour and for 10 minutes.

On the following day, 12 June, are the dated orders for immediately carrying out the sentence and the rapid cremation of the eight bodies at the Moscow Crematorium. How can one explain such rush? Certainly it did not seem that the enemy was before the gates of Moscow....

Incidentally, in the encyclopedic references the date for the death of those condemned is for some reason given as 11 June. This is an error. The sentence was carried out on the 12th. The file contains the corresponding official papers on this question.

The file does not contain any mention of evidence against Tukhachevskiy which supposedly had been concocted and fed in by German intelligence and about

which so much has been said and written in our country (even Khrushchev seemingly, publically repeated this story). The question was raised of espionage for Germany and Poland but no evidence was given. Probably because this did not exist. Otherwise, what sense does it make to omit this in the supersecret court session or in the top secret minutes of this session?

On the pages of our press there have been various stories of how the members of the court behaved during the interrogating of the accused: Blyukher supposedly was silent all the time or was not even present at the court and so forth. I do not know how accurate the record is but judging from it no one or virtually no one from the members of the court in the session was silent (certain questions by the judges of the accused are not identified in the record). But Blyukher, in particular, like Budennyi and Alksnis, in no way behaved passively. For example, he tenaciously questioned Yakir about Gamarnik:

"Could you give us greater detail about the role of Gamarnik in the counterrevolutionary Trotskiyite conspiracy? I feel that you know more than you are saying."

Dybenko said to Tukhachevskiy:

"I cannot imagine how you organized the question of a palace coup. It is not possible that you, as a leader of the center, were not interested in a plan."

The accused actually had nothing to reply....

Blyukher to Yakir: "What specifically was involved in your preparations for defeating the aviation of the Red Army in a future war?"

Yakir: "I cannot say anything intelligible to you aside from what I have written.... On the question of manning, logistics and so forth."

Beneath the sentence are the handwritten signatures of the entire membership of the Court Presence. Of course, it is difficult to say with certainty what feelings they experienced in signing this bloody document and sending their former military comrades to the block. A majority of them in the future, as is known, was to suffer the same fate. Army Cmdr 2d Rank N.D. Kashirin, being arrested, wrote to Yezhov on 3 April 1938 that "during this court I felt myself to be the condemned and not the judge." It might be assumed that he was not alone in this....

5.

Of course, in addition to the accused and the victims themselves, there was one other group of persons who could have shed light on the obsessive and still unresolved question of why all the same they confessed. This was those who carried out the investigation and court proceedings. But at present, none of them remains alive and they scarcely would have left evidence on this question

However, the innocent victims, as the people believe, have the custom of calling for retribution and this in turn comes sooner or later. And this came in the form of Capt State Sec Zinoviy Markovich Ushakov (Ushamirskiy) who has been repeatedly mentioned in these notes. In 1938, he himself was arrested and in an investigation confessed to being an agent of German intelligence, he was sentenced to the extreme penalty and executed.

In a handwritten confession, in complaining of beatings, Ushakov wrote that he had surrendered physically as he could not endure not only the beatings but even the mentioning of them. Then I quote: "It can be said firmly that with such beatings the volitional qualities of a person, no matter how great they might be, cannot provide immunity against the physical impotence with the exception, possibly, of rare individual examples of humans.... It seemed to me previously that under no circumstances would I give false evidence, but then I was forced to.... I myself at Lefortovo Prison had beaten the enemies of the party and Soviet power but I had never any notion of the tortures and feelings experienced by those being beaten."

Ushakov went on to write with pride that he had beaten the evidence from Feldman about the military conspiracy and on the basis of which on 21 or 22 May a decision had been taken by the Central Committee to arrest Tukhachevskiy and a number of others. In describing subsequently his "services," Ushakov boasted that even on the day of the trial, early in the morning, he had gained additional testimony from Tukhachevskiy about Apanasenko and certain others. When the arrested Aronshtam and Fishman said nothing to the other investigators, Ushakov requested that they be turned over to him and on the next day had what he had wanted.

The former Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Frinovskiy at the investigation stated that Ushakov generally was a "false testimony seurer," that is, an expert at gaining false evidence. Even when Frinovskiy asked him not to be involved in any "false evidence," he did not restrain himself and beat the arrested fiercely.

Ushakov secured evidence sufficient for arresting not only those whom we know at present as repressed and rehabilitated, but also many others. These included Budennyi and Shchadenko. Ushakov was able to collect around 20 testimonies about Budennyi as a "participant in the conspiracy."

The arrested military leaders were delivered into these butcher hands without mercy. One need not be surprised that certain of them confessed virtually in the first interrogation. These investigatory files—for history!—were drawn up after the fact in such a manner that the records reveal complete confessions and were dated only 4 or 5 days after the arrest. What actually stood behind this can only be guessed, proceeding from what we know dependably. We do know, for example from the evidence of the same Ushakov, Leplevskiy and other butchers,

that an interrogation written up as a single record often lasted many days and that initially they drew up a rough draft which was submitted to the leadership and into this was inserted and also deleted everything which was considered essential.

As they say, only God knows what was the physical and mental state of the person arrested who had been forced to sign the record. The investigator Ya.L. Karpeyskiy who arrested and interrogated Corps Cmdr Eydeman, for example, related that Eydeman in the interrogations behaved strangely, he was distracted and kept mumbling: "Airplanes, airplanes...." He, Karpeyskiy, pointed out that during the period of investigating the case of the "military conspiracy" there were noises, shouts and groans coming from the investigatory offices of the Lefortovo Prison.

Rarefied methods were employed of not only physical but also mental affect on the arrested. In the record of an interrogation as a witness of the former worker of the Special Department, A.M. Vul, of 2 July 1956, there was the following disturbing detail. "I personally," the witness said, "saw Tukhachevskiy in the corridor of Building 2, when he was being taken to Leplevskiy for interrogation. He was dressed in a fine gray civilian suit and over this was thrown a peasant coat of heavy cloth and on his feet were bast shoes. Then I realized that Tukhachevskiy had been dressed in such a way as to humiliate him."

For what reason was this spurious, harsh and cynical process played out? Judging from everything, there was no logical, material or documentary evidence for the existence of a "military-Trotskyite center" for handing down a death sentence and why were there neither

procurator, lawyer or witnesses permitted to participate in the trial? Now, from the letter of Primakov, it can be considered established that Stalin was personally involved in this case and previously this could only be assumed. He had enough information from agents that the accused did not believe in the success of his offspring, the treacherously carried out collectivization and that they were even thinking of shoving aside his pal Voroshilov and he, Stalin, might even be next. That dissatisfaction was growing against him both in the party and in society he could not help but know. Possibly, it was merely a question of so stunning and frightening all those who dissented or did not agree that they would remember for all times that there would be no quarter. If such honored, respected and prestigious persons were not spared, then what could be expected, what could be hoped for by others?

All of this was to become, we feel, a lesson of depressive cruelty for many years to come and could not help but be reflected in the psychology of future generations. A year or two ago, I wrote in a newspaper about the tragic fate of Tukhachevskiy and the others tried with him drawing upon the then existing materials. And among the responses to these publications were ones that were unbelievably cruel: they got what they deserved.... And when you now observe the sway of street passions, the bacchanal of challenging and fratricidal slogans, when you read about the bloody events in Nagorny Karabakh and Southern Ossetia, when you hear the fierce cursing addressed against the army, involuntarily you catch in this the echoes of the terrible cruelty and evil sown in our souls, possibly even back then, in the 1930s, and even now not eradicated. And who can eradicate these if not ourselves?

Akhromeyev Comments on Iraqi Defeat

91UM0603A Moscow *NOVOYE VREMYA* in Russian
No 10, Mar 91 p 22

[Interview with Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Akhromeyev, USSR people's deputy and presidential adviser, by *NOVOYE VREMYA*; place and date not given: "Why Baghdad Suffered Defeat—Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev on the War in the Persian Gulf"]

[Text]

[*NOVOYE VREMYA*] Not long ago Academician Yevgeniy Primakov recalled in *PRAVDA* that during the Soviet-American summit meeting in Helsinki in September of last year, you shared your views with the Americans on the combat capabilities of the Iraqi Army. How did you see the situation at that time, and did your forecast prove to be correct?

[S. Akhromeyev] In Helsinki, while talking with representatives of the U.S. administration, I expressed the opinion that it would not be easy to wage war with the Iraqi Army. I was sincerely convinced then that war should not be unleashed, but that sanctions should be made tougher, right up to the total isolation of Baghdad and up to a break in diplomatic relations. But now, considering recent events and Saddam Husayn's behavior in this case, I suppose that sanctions would hardly have been able to achieve Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. Iraq had a strong army, and Baghdad possessed ground forces that were hardened in battles with Iraq and that had a well organized command and control system.

Iraq's vulnerable spot was an almost total lack of naval forces. There were only individual ships and cutters, and there was virtually no system of national air defense. Baghdad had only tactical air defense, intended for defense of the troops against air strikes.

The Iraqi Air Force was incommensurable with the air armada of the multinational coalition. Ground-based air control stations were destroyed, and the Air Force, as a service, practically ceased to exist. The ground troops were left virtually defenseless against air strikes.

From the beginning of the war, the Americans operated in accordance with air-land operations doctrine, which envisages the delivery of massive air strikes against the enemy before the initiation of operations of ground troops. According to the classical theory and practice of exercises in recent years, five to seven days are allotted to independent air actions in such an operation. But taking into account expected fierce opposition of the Iraqi troops, the American command authority changed its operations radically, and it conducted independent Air Force operations not for seven days, but for 40 days. As a result of powerful air strikes, troop command and control was disrupted, and the Iraqi Army was demoralized and lost its combat capability. This predetermined

the subsequent fast-moving nature and high efficiency of operations by the coalition of ground forces.

From a purely military point of view, the Americans selected an optimal variant for conducting operations that was expedient for them. You see, nothing threatened and hindered them. The political side of the matter is another question. In a massive employment of aviation, to deliver strikes only on military targets is a happy wish. But it is impossible to implement it. A pilot cannot always deliver a strike onto a target. A lot depends on the weather. In addition, the Americans (in any case, this is the impression I have gained) sought to destroy not only Iraq's military, but also its economic potential.

For the first time during military operations, the Americans employed new automated systems of command and control of troops. New weapons were applied on a wide scale. The mass employment of highly accurate munitions played an especially large role: "air-to-air" and "ship-to-air" guided missiles and guided aviation bombs.

Iraq is utterly defeated. But there is also something instructive in its operations. First and foremost, the skillful use of camouflage, concealment, and deception [*maskirovka*], and, moreover, on an operational-strategic scale, should be noted. The systems of decoy targets and even decoy groups in the first week or two disoriented the Americans to a certain degree.

[*NOVOYE VREMYA*] Up until recently, our military press rated Iraq's combat capabilities highly, and a prolonged and bloody land war was prognosticated. Did our military have inaccurate information, or were the skillful operations of the Americans a surprise?

[Akhromeyev] I answered this question partly. I have already said that we proceeded with estimates from the classical variant of the American conduct of air-land operations. The increase in the duration and intensity of air strikes by several times sharply changed the nature of the war, which demoralized the Iraqi Army.

[*NOVOYE VREMYA*] At times, directly opposite inferences are drawn in our country from the war in the Persian Gulf area. Some believe that henceforth it will be difficult for us to vie with the Americans, and that it is better not to find oneself face to face with them. Others are calling to mobilize ourselves and throw in all forces in order to overtake and surpass the Americans in the area of "smart gadgets." What do you think in this regard?

[Akhromeyev] You see, the situation in the world is taking shape in different ways. Whom we find ourselves, as you say, "face to face" with, often does not depend on us. The military proceed from this. A lot is also being said about the fact that the war supposedly showed the power of American weapons and the weakness of Soviet weapons. I consider such arguments to be propagandistic. First, there were various wars during the last 45 years in which Soviet and American weapons were

employed, and the outcome was different in them. But to declare the advantage of Soviet weapons on the basis of the fact that Vietnam defeated the Americans, and that Iraq defeated Iran, would be a crude simplification. Just as it is to show the reverse on the basis of the latest war. Second, it should be taken into account that not only weapons have significance, but also the people who employ them; but the main thing is the correlation of forces in this or some other war. And in this case, the correlation of military forces was incommensurable. The multinational coalition had absolute superiority in naval forces, and even before the war, the ratio of air assets was 6:1. In addition, the Americans employed the most modern weapons and munitions, but Iraq—weapons and munitions of 10-12 years' vintage. Iraq did not have new weapons similar to that of the Americans.

I would like to emphasize that the conduct of air operations of such duration against an enemy approximately equal in strength would have been impossible.

Did the Iraqi leadership know about the strong and weak aspects of its army and of the enemy? Of course it knew. Why then did it bring the matter to a suicidal war? Most likely, an answer to this question, even though incomplete, will be received in the near future.

The USSR Armed Forces also must draw conclusions from the war in the Persian Gulf area. What kinds? It will be possible to answer this question after a thorough analysis of the preparations for and the course of the war.

Does a military threat exist? Does Soviet military doctrine correspond to the realities of the world? What kind of army should there be under a strategy of "reasonable sufficiency?" These and other questions were answered by Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, a USSR people's deputy and adviser to the president, during a discussion in the NOVOYE VREMYA editorial office. A report on the discussion will be printed in one of the next issues.

R-Adm Pauk: Naval Aspects of Gulf War

91UM05934 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
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[Article by Rear Adm A. Pauk and Capt 1st Rank V Karandeyev: "The Gulf War: The Naval Aspect"]

[Text] The results of the military operations in the Persian Gulf area and the role of the various service branches and troop arms will long be the subject of analysis for military specialists, including naval specialists.

With thoroughly planned and organized measures to prepare for combat operations, the nations in the coalition succeeded in building up a powerful grouping of armed forces numbering around 700,000 men. The multinational naval force alone had a numerical strength of more than 170,000 men, as many as 160 combat ships and 40 auxiliary vessels, 700 combat aircraft, including 450 deck-based aircraft on six aircraft-carriers and

around 230 aircraft of the Marines. This comprised more than 30% of all the coalition's air forces. The U.S. Navy made up the bulk of the multinational fleet. It had in the area, in addition to six aircraft-carriers, as many as eight multipurpose, nuclear-powered submarines, two battle-ships, five helicopter assault carriers, two multipurpose landing ships, several dozen missile ships, 24 landing ships and others. The USA assembled more than a third of its combat ships in the area of the conflict.

The operational disposition of the multinational naval force made it possible to carry out combat operations against Iraq from three directions: from the Persian Gulf, the northern part of the Red Sea and the eastern Mediterranean. More than half of the entire allied naval force operated in the Persian Gulf, including four aircraft carrier strike groups (AUG), two operational missile groups (ORG) and all the ships and transports of an amphibious landing force. There were two carrier battle groups and two nuclear-powered, attack, missile submarines in the Red Sea. Six nuclear-powered submarines maneuvered in the Arabian and Mediterranean seas.

The process of creating the grouping of allied naval forces can hypothetically be broken down into three stages. In the first stage, which took approximately a month following the decision to begin the deployment, nations in the coalition urgently sent their task forces and elements to the eastern Mediterranean, the northern Arabian Sea, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. A total of as many as 90 combat ships, including three aircraft-carrier battle groups and one operational missile group of the U.S. Navy, were assembled in these areas during this stage. During the second stage, which lasted until January 1991, there was a systematic buildup of the groupings with individual ships of the allied countries. The third stage began following the UN Security Council's passage of the resolution authorizing all measures, including military measures, to liberate Kuwait and punish the aggressor. During this stage, which ended immediately prior to the beginning of military operations, three more American aircraft-carrier battle groups, one operational missile group and an amphibious landing force with more than 30 units arrived in the area of the conflict.

By the beginning of the conflict in the gulf region the U.S. Marines had up to 73,000 men, more than 230 tanks, over 530 artillery pieces and mortars, as many as 800 antitank guided missile launchers and around 230 antiaircraft guns in the gulf area. Organizationally they were formed into five expeditionary Marine brigades of the 1st and 2nd expeditionary divisions.

When the operation to liberate Kuwait began, the multinational naval forces carried out what we consider to be three main missions:

1. Gaining and retaining superiority in the Persian Gulf;

2. Participation in the offensive air operation of the multinational force, during which sea-based Tomahawk cruise missiles were extensively used and deck-based aircraft operated actively;

3. Participation in the AirLand offensive operation of the multinational force and action against Iraq's armed forces;

4. The conduct of minesweeping operations to clear mines from the Persian Gulf and ensure navigational safety, which are still being conducted by minesweepers of the USA, Great Britain and Saudi Arabia.

The first mission posed no difficulties. The main reason was the small size and weakness of Iraq's navy, which offered practically no resistance to the coalition forces in the situation of their absolute air superiority. Iraq's few attempts to strike at allied ships with air-to-ship and shore-to-ship cruise missiles were unsuccessful. Good illumination of the air situation provided from ships of the multinational force made it possible promptly to warn their forces of missile launchings and to destroy the missiles or divert them to false areas with radioelectronic countermeasures.

Deck-based aircraft of the U.S. Navy took an active part in the offensive air operation, performing a total of around 20% of all the sorties flown by aircraft of the multinational force. In addition, they provided air security for ships in the naval groups, destroyed Iraq's ships, launches and vessels, struck at Iraq's military industrial facilities on the ground and its air defense system on the Kuwaiti coast, and provided combat stability for B-52 strategic bombers in the air. Deck-based, long-range E-2C Hawkeye detection and guidance aircraft, together with E-3 AWACS aircraft provided illumination of the situation over the water and in the air in the Persian Gulf area and directed diverse aircraft within their assigned zones.

The U.S. Navy used the deck-based Tomahawk cruise missile for the first time in a combat situation. It demonstrated good combat effectiveness. Around 100 of these missiles were launched from U.S. ships at land targets just during the first 24 hours. The launchings were coordinated with the operations of deck-based and tactical aircraft, and the trajectories programed into their onboard computers were such that the missiles approached targets with powerful air defenses from various directions. The targets of the cruise missiles were command posts of the Iraqi armed forces, air observation posts and centers, administrative and industrial buildings, electric power plants and the communication system. According to available information, more than 300 Tomahawk cruise missiles were launched from ships and submarines of the U.S. Navy during the period of combat operations. This was approximately 60% of the supply in the crisis area.

It should be noted that the combat zone served as a sort of testing ground for testing the most modern, high-technology weapons and armaments. For example, the

multinational force used for the first time SLAM cruise missiles, ALARM antiradar missiles, short-range Sea Skua antiship missiles, MK-117 and BLU-109B aerial bombs, GBU-58 cluster bombs and certain other types of high-precision weapons, which demonstrated good combat effectiveness.

The unmanned Pioneer-1 aircraft based on the battleships Missouri and Wisconsin demonstrated good capabilities. They performed missions of pinpointing targets, adjusting artillery fire from the battleships to shore, determined the results, and a number of others. Because Iraq had succeeded in creating a real mine danger in the northern part of the Persian Gulf, the command element of the multinational force had to devote a great deal of attention to antimine operations. Helicopter minesweepers were actively employed for the first time along with regular minesweepers. They operated from the landing helicopter-carrier Tripoli. Despite the extensive steps taken to secure the area against mines, however, the allies did not succeed in avoiding incidents of ships striking mines. The American guided-missile cruiser suffered major damage in the area of its engine room, and the helicopter-carrier Tripoli itself suffered slight damage.

The armed conflict in the Persian Gulf area demonstrated the important role of such components of military art as operational camouflage and disinformation of the enemy. Specifically, diversionary actions of the multinational force led the Iraqi leadership to believe that a naval landing operation by the allies on the coast of Kuwait was inevitable. This caused Iraq to assemble up to five of its divisions there, thereby simplifying things for the 1st and 2nd expeditionary divisions of the U.S. Marines on the coastal sector.

The Gulf War, as the West named it, convincingly confirmed the role of naval forces in modern warfare. They proved themselves to be the most universal and mobile branch of the armed forces, capable of carrying out a broad range of missions at sea, on land and in the air. Without downplaying the success of the multinational naval force, however, it should be pointed out that it conducted combat operations practically under test-range conditions, encountering no real resistance from Iraq. In a war against an enemy with a powerful navy the buildup of such a grouping within a limited area, with combat operations conducted in direct proximity to the enemy, would present a multinational force with far greater difficulty and inevitably result in significant losses.

Future of U.S. Military Forces in Europe Considered

91UM0638A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 May 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by TASS correspondent V. Chistyakov for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "It Is Interesting To Compare How the Americans Will Leave"]

[Text] Until very recently, it was thought in Bonn that the United States, guided by recent international agreements, will retain approximately 195,000 soldiers and officers on the territory of central Europe, a large part of whom will remain in the FRG. However, in connection with the impending complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, it was decided in the White House that their military contingent in Europe as well can and should be subjected to further reductions. As applied to Germany, this could mean a decrease in the number of ground troops from 204,000 to 70,000, and of air force personnel—from 47,000 to 5,000.

Simultaneously, the Pentagon and the command element of the American armed forces in Germany also amended the plans for eliminating their military bases: In accordance with the latest data, the total number of installations subject to closing or partial dismantling increased by 27 units and now constitutes 139.

Thus, in the next few years, a substantial part of the U.S. troops will leave German territory. The Americans will vacate a large number of various kinds of installations—from barracks, dwelling units, and auto repair shops to gunnery ranges and ammunition dumps, and hundreds of large and small land sectors with a network structure, and they will leave behind them hundreds of tons of equipment and other property. And already now, at the very start of this long road, a composite of rather complicated questions arises.

One of these, in particular, is associated with the specific conditions for vacation by the allies of military installations under their control. In addition, it is quite obvious that in many cases the Germans and Americans will be guided by directly opposite interests. The command element of the American troops is trying to reduce to a minimum expenses associated with the withdrawal of servicemen and combat equipment, and also with the transfer of installations, at a time when local authorities will try, in turn, to lower impending expenditures for the "demilitarization" of areas and preparing them for use in civilian pursuits.

Do legislative acts exist on the basis of which it is planned to resolve the entire complex of problems associated with allied military installations? I asked this question of a famous expert and author of a number of books and articles on this subject, an official of the federal constitutional court in the city of Karlsruhe, Doctor Diter Dayzerot [as transliterated].

"Of course, such legislative acts do exist, although they do not contain 'prescriptions for all cases in life,'" my interlocutor said. "Mention should be made first of all of international agreements: the agreement on the status of NATO armed forces on German territory and the supplementary protocol to it, and also a number of national laws that regulate questions of property."

In consonance with the letter and spirit of these documents, in a majority of cases the question about the

elimination of one or another installation is not decided by German authorities and even not jointly with them. It falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the leading organs of the corresponding states that are empowered to make decisions individually and on the basis of their own evaluations. Accordingly, in the event of changes in the situation, Germany's NATO allies can revise the existing plan for eliminating their bases and stop its implementation at any moment.

A supplementary protocol provides that the command element of the armed forces of the allies will periodically analyze its requirements and determine whether there is a need for the further use of specific installations. Those land areas that are under the command of foreign troops, which for one reason or another are no longer needed, must be transferred to the German side. After vacating any installation, the allies completely lose the right to it.

"However, in practice, the question of returning military installations looks much more complicated, inasmuch as many details from a legal standpoint are not settled in an exhaustive way," noted D. Dayzerot. "For example, unavoidable difficulties will arise in the resolution of the question concerning the fate of engineering-technical structures erected by the Americans with their own resources and equipment that belongs to them that it is impossible to dismantle, and other property. Another set of problems can be denoted this way: Which of the sides must bear the expenses for eliminating damage done to the environment."

According to supplementary protocols, my interlocutor explains, Germany's allies, after vacating one or another installation, are not obliged in principle to eliminate housing and administrative buildings or other engineering-technical structures constructed by them here, and also to remove equipment and machinery belonging to them. From this standpoint, the FRG has no legal basis to demand that the allies "clean" the territory of an installation, or "bring it to its former state."

But, on the other hand, if the American command intends to leave any kind of property on this land area; for example, containers for fuel storage, they do not have the right to require German authorities to pay monetary compensation. Therefore, in many cases the allies themselves will have to provide for the removal of property belonging to them, or (if this is impossible or economically disadvantageous) turn it over free of charge to representatives of the German Government.

In accordance with the law, the payment of compensation for property left by the allies is possible only in those cases where there are agreements between their commands and Germany on this score and when local authorities have an interest in this. In this case, negotiations must be conducted between representatives of the Pentagon and the FRG Government, during which the amount of compensation is determined. In addition, the German side proceeds first and foremost from how structures, equipment, and other property left by the

Americans will be used in the future (for military or civilian purposes). If they do not find an application, they have the complete right to refuse to pay any compensation.

In the opinion of D. Dayzerot, it will also be difficult to resolve numerous questions associated with the compensation by the allies of that damage that they caused to the environment. It is affirmed in a supplementary protocol that foreign troops must bear the responsibility for negative ecological consequences of their stay on German land and make compensation for damage inflicted. At the same time, this provision is accompanied by a whole series of substantial exceptions which practically reduces it to naught.

Thus, for example, the allies do not bear responsibility for damage they cause to autobahns, roads, bridges, and other transport arteries. Moreover, in a unilateral way, Germany has waived a demand for compensation for damage that the activity of the allies can cause property turned over to their full jurisdiction, including land areas as well. This waiver of compensation does not apply only in those cases when foreign troops intentionally or through criminal negligence inflict damage to the environment, and also to property of the German railroad and postal department.

Data was cited in the German press, according to which hazardous chemical contamination of the soil and water was noted on the territory of approximately 300 installations of the American ground forces, and, in addition, about 80 of them require substantial ecological cleansing. However, in many cases it is still not clear just who will pay for the damage done to the environment. When you consider that the cost of many programs amounts to tens of millions of dollars, then the hesitation on the American side becomes perfectly understandable. Some of the German experts even think that the allies, desiring to avoid payment of compensation, will in general not transfer the "dirtiest" installations to the Germans, even if they have lost their military significance.

Yes, the Americans are reducing their military contingent, but the problems associated with their military installations remain. The author of one of the newspaper articles on this subject hit on an apt, in my opinion, metaphor that characterizes the situation that has developed. The bases being vacated, in his opinion, are a Trojan horse in that: receiving this "gift" from the allies, the Germans still do not suspect what surprises can be hidden inside its belly.

Northern Group Still Struggling with Property Settlement

91UM06534 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 May 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Captain A. Maksimchuk under the rubric: "Northern Group of Forces": "The Units Are Withdrawing. The Military Posts Are Being Left Behind"]

[Text] So far, Soviet-Polish intergovernmental negotiations have not provided an answer to the question: will the withdrawal of Northern Group troops have the nature of a withdrawal or will it be transformed, figuratively speaking, into a retreat. Alas, this question arises because the treaty on the withdrawal has not been signed and, accordingly, the time period for completion of this large-scale action has not been finally agreed upon.

The treaty signing is being impeded because the talks have reached an impasse. Specifically, the delegations cannot find common grounds in the solution of financial and property problems. It is a question of the procedures for transferring the facilities that we have built during our 45-year-long stay in Poland and the method to pay for them. The Polish side is simply conducting the matter in such a way that we not only simply give them up but also pay a pretty fair sum because we are abandoning them to the discretion of the owners. While smoothing out certain aspects of their demands with regard to the withdrawal, members of the Polish delegation are actually rigidly conducting the policy that the political leadership took at the very beginning. Should we be surprised that a strange situation has developed at the talks even after the sixth round that took place in Warsaw?

Without waiting for the signing of the appropriate treaty, our country has begun to withdraw our troops from Poland. Troop trains of the Guards Missile Brigade from Borne-Sulinowo set out on April 9. This found a positive response among Polish society. But here is the question: What will happen to the movable property and real estate that the missile brigade had at its disposal? I am already not talking about the property of other units at other garrisons from which our troops will be withdrawn this year. Is there a possibility of selling it even now? "No, that is impossible," the Poles answer. "We have still not agreed on how to do this."

Having abandoned the buildings, it turns out that we will have to, as they say, let the grass grow under our feet. And we already have the bitter experience of a similar wait in Swidnica where three military installations and many other facilities were prepared for transfer a long time ago. But they have not been accepted and some of them have lost, as they say, their marketability during the months that have passed.

And what will happen to movable property? For example, with the tons of fuel which Polish citizens are ready to purchase even today? Progress was noted in this direction at the talks in Warsaw but the Polish side suddenly laid down its conditions. If you want to sell—establish a firm and pay taxes on sales and profits.

There is another argument in the discussion: we do not have any legal documents on the construction of facilities and the persons who own the land can manage them. Legally, this appears to be correct. But those people who are building a rule-of-law state in Poland today know very well that various Soviet military unit facilities were

built not contrary to but with the approval of the highest Polish state and local authorities.

So the situation that has currently developed is strange only at first glance. It seems that it is also advantageous for our neighbors to drag out the solution of this issue.

Response to Rumors of Soviet Participation in Gulf War

91UM07294 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
8 Jun 91 First Edition p 2

[USSR Ministry of Defense Press Center Release: "Who is Fabricating 'Killed in Battle' Notices?"]

[Text] A query from a group of RSFSR People's Deputies has arrived at the USSR Ministry of Defense as a result of rumors about the participation of Soviet Armed Forces servicemen in the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict. Specifically, the query contains a reference to a statement by parents of servicemen that asserts that "there have been cases of families receiving 'killed in battle' notices which state: 'died in the Persian Gulf'."

The response to this query that was quickly dispatched to the RSFSR People's Deputies once again unambiguously stressed that Soviet servicemen did not in any way participate in the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict. What is more, while carrying out the orders of the USSR Council of Ministers, the USSR Ministry of Defense suspended military-technical cooperation with Iraq on January 9, 1991, that is, all military specialists were returned to the USSR prior to the initiation of combat operations.

Thus, no action of ours on the international arena has been understood or even under the most unrestrained fantasy could be understood as any sort of participation of Soviet combat, support, or any other troops or formations in combat operations in the Persian Gulf region. Speculation on this score is totally unfounded.

As for the references in the letter of the 17 RSFSR People's Deputies to the statements of the servicemen's parents about the previously mentioned 'killed in battle' notices they have received, we suggest that even if one instance is seriously investigated, we will determine just who is nevertheless knowingly disseminating false information and just how easy it is for people to set the hook in some people's deputies. The response contains a request to send at least one of those 'killed in battle' notices to the USSR Ministry of Defense with an indication of who sent it and who received it.

Is it not time to finally bring to light those people who are fabricating such falsehoods and to severely punish the provocateurs who are criminally speculating on sacred parental feelings?

Notes on U.S. Equipment Used in Persian Gulf

91UM0747A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 Jun 91 First Edition p 5

[Letter to the editors and reply in the "Informed Sources Reply" column: "Very Few 'Surprises'"]

[Text] Editors: What new military equipment did the U.S. Armed Forces use in the Persian Gulf War?

I. Shimalo

Lvov

Most of the weapons used by the American forces in this war are well-known and do not constitute a revelation for military specialists. Of most interest to experts and the public alike were the precision weapons.

Heading the list are U.S. Air Force guided aerial bombs offering a range of 2.5 to 80 kilometers; anti-radiation missiles, particularly the Harm, with a range of 80 kilometers; and the U.S. Navy's Tomahawk cruise missile. This combat employment indicated that the kill probability of these weapons generally did not exceed 30 to 40 percent.

Analysis of 39 confirmed aerial combat kills of Iraqi aircraft shows that most of them (especially the most recent models: the Mirage, F-1, MiGs-23, 25, and 29) were downed by Sparrow AIM-7M air-to-air missiles of 55- to 70-kilometer range, depending upon the version. The Iraqi aircraft were destroyed at considerable distances, due to their being recognized with a high degree of reliability as enemy targets by AWACS early warning aircraft E-3A and the E-2C Hawkeye.

The Near East was also a kind of proving ground for two experimental E-8 ground surveillance systems, which are actually not slated for delivery to the U.S. Air Force until 1997. A modification of the Boeing 707-323C, these aircraft carry radar for spotting ground targets and employing the Joint Stars to strike against the targets; range is up to 160 kilometers.

Tried in combat virtually for the first time (with the exception of the military action in Panama) were the new F-117A tactical fighters; incidentally, one was downed by the Iraqis. The modern B-1 or B-2 strategic bombers were not used, however. The U.S. Air Force leadership decided that the B-52G could be more effective in the environment of complete air superiority and weak Iraqi air defense capability.

There can be no doubt that the practical employment of new weapon systems demands thorough study. However, we repeat that the Persian Gulf War has offered few genuine "surprises" as far as military specialists are concerned.

The above reply was obtained in the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.

Problems of Conversion Examined

914A0874A Moscow *FINANSY SSSR in Russian No 1*, 91 pp 21-27

[Article by V. M. Tkachuk, student at the Academy of the National Economy, under USSR Council of Ministers: "Economics of Disarmament"]

[Text] For two years conversion has been proclaimed as state policy, but neither the plans for conducting it, nor any concept, have appeared. The Presidential Council, having considered the draft of the Conversion Program, stated firmly only the existence of various points of view and, has already become a tradition, sent back the document for additional work. Meanwhile, the reduction of military production orders has already affected the plants in the defense complex. The reduction of budgetary financing for scientific-research and experimental-design projects and, as a consequence, the annulling of the contracts with the customers, have lead to a reduction in the number of NII [scientific-research institutes] and KB [design bureaus] and to the firing of some of the workers from experimental production entities and laboratories.

The transition from the economics of armament to the economics of disarmament and conversion as a mechanism for implementing the socioeconomic benefits of disarmament, saturating the market (primarily with technically complicated output), expanding the export capabilities, and lowering the level of military preparations contains within itself a considerable potential for economic and scientific-technical growth. Under present-day conditions it is becoming a persistent necessity.

Without a doubt, the economy is put in motion by policy. After 21 March 1989, when the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, entitled: "Reducing the USSR Armed Forces and the Defense Expenses" appeared, during the course of 1989-1990 the country officially entered a completely new period in its life.

The peculiarities of conversion in the USSR Ministry of the Radio Industry are determined by the accumulated scientific-technical, production, and intellectual potential. It resolves vitally important national-economic problems involved in saturating the market with consumer goods, medical technology, equipment for the APK [agroindustrial complex], trade, and light industry, and means of ecological monitoring, not to mention such traditional directions as computer technology, control systems, and radio and electronic appliances. In 1989 alone this branch increased the production of consumer goods by 24 percent.

During the first nine months of 1990, the defense enterprises considerably increased—by almost one-fourth—the production of nonedible consumer goods. Unfortunately, the breakdown of monetary circulation

in the country makes it possible to see on the shelves of our stores what one can call in plain terms a gigantic spurt by industry.

The output coming off the conveyor belts of the plants in Minradioprom [Ministry of the Radio Industry] alone every month includes more than a half-million television receivers, including almost 400,000 color television sets, more than 30,000 refrigerators, 36,000 washing machines, 45,000 electric vacuum cleaners, et. Is this the result of conversion? Yes and no.

The Soviet defense industry never did confine itself to meeting purely military needs. It is simply that, behind the shroud of complete secrecy, many persons did not even suspect that we are surrounded by the most ordinary things that were manufactured at plants identified only by number. In 1988 (prior to conversion) they produced approximately 2000 different items of commodities intended for cultural and everyday purposes.

The work indicators of the enterprises specializing in defense production can be kept at the level surpassing the average work indicators for the country's industry as a whole, and individual enterprise are preserving practically the same rates of output of production that existed prior to the beginning of conversion.

And this is not only the result of a command issued from above, "Produce more consumer goods!" There is also an economic explanation for this, and it is despite the current opinion concerning the superprofitability of producing military technology. According to a survey by the International Labor Organization (according to official 1989 data for our country), at the Gorkiy Television Plant, which is known as a defense enterprise, 55.4 percent of all the workers produced military output, the share of which constitutes only 43.5 percent of the total volume of production. The remaining workers are engaged in the production of civilian output—television receivers, the value of which constitutes 56.5 percent of the value of the total output. The production of civilian output, at least of the technically complicated radio and television appliances, is economically more profitable.

However, conversion is not simply the mechanical transition of a part of defense production to the production of peacetime output, but is a fundamentally new policy. The breaking of the mechanism governing the existing and activity of defense enterprises occurs in economics, technology, and psychology. And that break occurs extremely painfully. Thus, as a result of the first steps of conversion, the losses of the volumes of output for Minradioprom constitute approximately 2.5 billion rubles; profit, 700 million rubles; and the economic incentive funds, 400 million rubles.

One need not think that conversion is something that production has difficulty in experiencing as a result of some specific peculiarities that are inherent only to socialism. The reduction or freezing at a constant level of expenses for purchasing military output, which reduction or freezing was caused, in particular, by the events

in the East European countries in late 1989; the consumers' changeover from concluding contracts with the payment of the supplier's costs to contracts based on firm prices; the reduction of the profitability of contracts; the increase of expenses for NIOKR [scientific-research and experimental-design projects]; and the non-desirability of developing complicated systems for domestic consumer alone cause serious financial difficulties for the West European companies that are the manufacturers of armaments and military technology.

In those countries there has been an intensive reorganization of branches with a military orientation. (A probable exception in Italy, where that reorganization has been made difficult by the fact that most of those companies are controlled by the state—a factor that limits the degree of freedom on transactions among them.) Specific problems of reorganization are resolved by the companies with the following methods: the sale of military enterprises; the organizing of joint enterprises; the reduction of the production of output intended for military purposes, at the expense of the diversification of production and the partial changeover to the production of civilian output; and the acquisition of enterprises specializing in the same production area from other companies, with the intention of obtaining profit after carrying out efficiency-improvement measures. For example, in 1989 the Ericson company, a producer of military radio-electronic equipment, suffered losses amount to \$8.2 million and within the near future is planning to sell a number of military enterprises. At the (Rekal) company, the share of military sales in the 1970's was 75 percent; at the present time, as a result of the diversification of production, it has been reduced to 15 percent. In 1990 it is expected to create a joint Aerodynamic enterprise (weapon guidance system) by the British Aerospace company (Great Britain) and the (Tomson-KSF) company (France) ("Merger and Division of West European Companies That Produce Military REA [radio-electronic equipment]," "Radioelektronika za rubezhom" [Radio Electronics Abroad]," Moscow, NIEIR [Scientific-Research and Experimental Institute of Radio Electronics], 1990, No. 17, p 22.)

A peculiarity of the present-day situation is the fact that the process of conversion in the USSR is affected by questions of the changeover to market relations. It is not surprising that, under these conditions, enterprises that operate at a loss or with a low rate of profitability are beginning to appear in the branch for the first time. In 1991 there will be approximately 60 such enterprises, and for their normal activities in the new system of taxation there will be a shortfall of 300 million rubles of profit.

Today we are observing the breakdown of the production structures that were created by incredible efforts and gigantic expenditures of resources. But time will pass and once again the question of improving the technological base will arise, and there will be a need for high-technology commodities which, if there is intelligent planning, can already be produced today.

The enterprises and scientific organizations in the defense complex are unique in their technological and personnel potential, and, it would seem, their preservation deserves becoming a nationwide task. It would seem that that should be promoted by another differentiating feature of conversion in the USSR—its implementation under conditions of an economy of shortages, a vast sales market, a practically bottomless demand for consumer goods. It is precisely that peculiarity that inspired the managers at all levels to give speeches concerning the rapid dividends of conversion. To the accompaniment of sounds of approval, the hide of the "potential bear" was divided. Time passed, but there was no commodity abundance, and there still isn't any. The problem proved to be more complicated than appeared at first. An air of pessimism began to exude from the pages of magazines and newspaper. And there is a good reason why it did.

All the best plans for conversion were implemented practically nowhere. Another plan that also was not fated to be implemented is the wonderfully detailed plan for conversion by a united committee of shop stewards of the British Lucas Aerospace military concern, the originators of which even received a Nobel Prize. It did not get beyond the theoretical computations. (V. Potapov, "Plans, Plans, Plans... Reflections of a Soviet Specialist and Finnish Specialists About Problems of Conversion," NTR TRIBUNA, No 11-12, 1990.) The enterprises in the defense complex could produce more civilian commodities right now. If they had the materials to produce them with. The basic difficulty that the enterprises being converted come up against after they have defined for themselves their new area of production specialization is guaranteed supply. The resource support of conversion, to a decisive degree, can define its final results. The President's Ukase, entitled: "Urgent Measures To Stabilize the Economic Ties in the Fourth Quarter of 1990 and During 1991," has aggravated the situation even more. Aimed at the preservation and consolidation of the economic ties that have already formed and at the execution of the contractual pledges for the shipment of raw and other materials and components, that Ukase, essentially speaking, does not leave any room for the establishment of new ties. But the enterprises to be converted, when changing their orientation to civilian output, do not have any well-established ties and they must organize their network of suppliers "from scratch." Those ties have proven to be the least defended.

But the existing approaches to conversion, including those in the Basic Directions For Stabilizing the National Economy and Converting to the Market Economy, are characterized by two extremes. On the one hand, all the problems of carrying out the conversion are placed on the enterprises, and, on the other hand, there are declarations of the state's support of conversion, with a stipulation concerning the limited nature of financial resources to implement it.

And, then, operating in a consumer goods market, which outwardly is simple, is much more complicated and more dangerous than making very shrewd technology on

the basis of production orders from the military. They have their own laws and their own leaders. The only ones who win are those who diversify the production on the basis of the existing technological schemes. It has turned out that it is better to use one's own experience in an area that is not up to everyone's capabilities as a result of a complicated technological scheme and high intellectual saturation. For the country as a whole as of today, the scientific intensity of military output is 20 times greater than the civilian.

Theoretically speaking, the rate of results in conversion is determined by the degree of resolution of a number of tasks:

- change in the investment policy; definition of the relationship between the expenses in the military and civilian spheres of activity;
- the freeing of material resources; the restructuring of their use; the elimination of disproportions;
- the freeing and retraining of labor resources, and the increasing of the effectiveness of their use;
- the preservation of the accumulated scientific-technical, economic, and personnel potential.

In March 1990 U.S. Secretary of Defense Cheney, speaking about conversion, stated that the United States cannot allow itself to reduce the expenditures for defense by more than five percent annually, since those reductions can result in negative social consequences. In our country, however, the Program for changeover to the market economy proposes reducing the expenses of the Ministry of Defense by 20 percent. (The Program referred to is the Program submitted by the President for review by USSR Supreme Soviet.) For which item can the basic reduction be made? Pensions for military retirees? No. Basically for purchases of arms and military technology and for expenditures for NIOKR. Thus the real level of conversion for the defense complex will be considerably higher. The question arises: can we allow ourselves that? The redistribution of expenses among the items of the defense budget to meet civilian needs is limited by the capabilities of converting the resources, in physical terms. The increase or decrease of expenditures is admissible only to the degree that it is supported by the appropriate technology, materials, products, and construction capacities, not even to mention the social consequences.

Today no one will deny that conversion must be planned long before its proposed implementation. For example, the bill introduced by U.S. Senator T. (Veys), entitled: "An Act to Regulate the Military Economy," recommends warning military contractors no less than a year in advance concerning the reduction of the level of financing the military program or a contract from the federal budget (or the complete cessation of financing). The reorientation of production requires time.

Like any other restructuring, conversion is inevitably linked with additional expenditures. Therefore it is necessary to guarantee the economic effectiveness of conversion. Otherwise the load placed on the state budget in the course of conversion not only will not be reduced, but will increase even more, especially at the initial stages. As has been shown by experience, the chief complexity for a specific enterprise is to find market niches which it can fill rather quickly with its output which, on the basis of technical and technological parameters, is not below the output being removed from production. Otherwise it is impossible to feel seriously that conversion, in and of itself (only by virtue of the fact that, instead of "guns," we will produce "butter"), will result in the improvement of the economy. If the costs of production at the enterprises that have changed their area of specialization are so great that their output will not find any sales, then, in essence, that conversion will become the unproductive expenditure of resources in a form that is different from military production. And, from the economic point of view, there will not be any difference about the form in which society "throws down a rat-hole" part of its wealth—in the form of military technology or commodities that no one needs.

A significant shortcoming in carrying out conversion is the underestimation of its social consequences. People in labor collectives are profoundly alarmed and concerned about questions of the employment rate and the steady drop in the standard of living. There has not yet been any determination of the prospects for the development of arms production in our country, or, accordingly, the fate of many defense enterprises. In USSR Minradioprom alone, there are hundreds of thousands of highly skilled workers, ITR [engineer-technical workers], and scientists. To a large extent, they determine the effectiveness of scientific-technical progress in our country, and the maintaining of the necessary defense potential. Because of the unfavorable conditions that developed during the past two years, the branch has already lost approximately 50,000 persons. The most highly skilled and most dynamic specialists are leaving. It will be necessary to do a lot to make conversion part of the philosophy of the workers and specialists. It is necessary to remove the psychological tension caused by this indefiniteness. There must be openness and glasnost in conversion. Its program must be simple and understandable by the nation.

The structure of the military branches that developed historically is monopolistic in its essence. Without a doubt, for a period of many years the state did not stint on defense expenses, putting at the disposal of the military sector the best of everything in the country—personnel, raw materials, technology. And the military sector made a big leap forward. The existence of a large number of monopolistic enterprises objectively requires rigid state administration and regulation of their activities, especially under the conditions of carrying out conversion.

The geography of the enterprises in the defense branches encompasses all the country's republics and regions. The destructive processes occurring there are in contradiction to the objective requirements of modern science-intensive production. The enterprises in the defense complex are already being declared republic property; new managers are being appointed; and the status of enterprises as suppliers of military output is changing. The consequences of this policy can be catastrophic. For example, in the event of stopping the cooperative shipments to enterprises situated in Lithuania, the losses of output will be billions of rubles for Minradioprom alone.

The other extreme that is expressed by certain people's deputies and members of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Committee on Defense and State Security consists in isolating the production of military technology from civilian technology, and breaking up the defense associations into smaller entities. At first glance this would seem to be reasonable: the production of military technology has its own specifics, which, under the conditions of the introduction of market relations, will require the adoption of a special legal and economic mechanism. However, in the defense industry the existence of separate production of civilian technology is more frequently the exception than the rule: its production is eroded in the complicated grid of the association's infrastructure. It is difficult (and is it even necessary?) to isolate the production of tennis rackets and ski poles made of plastics if that production entity occupies one floor out of four.

In our country the most competitive sector of the economy is the production of defense technology. Knocking it down and dragging it out to the various national areas means undermining that competitiveness, means causing irreparable damage to the economy of the entire country. However, that can become a reality against the background of the destructive criticism and attacks on the defense branches, and the attempts by the authorities at all levels to interfere in the administration of the defense enterprises. This places in doubt the need to preserve the country's defense complex, and, as a result, will lead to the uncontrollability of the conversion process itself, a process which, like any other nationwide program, could promote the unification of the Union.

If one proceeds from the assumption that the Union acts (together with the republics) as a sovereign state that has its own system of administrative agencies, then the successful carrying out of conversion requires the determination of the status of the defense enterprise as an object of unionwide ownership. In the defense branches, conversion programs must be developed with the participation of the customer who is responsible for the prospects and directions in the development of military technology. These programs receive the government's legislative support and are tied in with the actually possible financial resources. One of the basic goals of these programs is the preservation of the scientific-technical potential of the defense branches. It is also necessary to carry out the following measures:

- 1) to form a fund to promote conversion, in the amount of 40-50 percent of the reduced volumes of military technology (in the draft, two-three percent);

- 2) to concretize the mechanism for intrabranched distribution of the conversion fund, granting the appropriate powers to the agencies of state administration;

- 3) to stipulate the informing of the enterprises of the state's conversion program two years before the beginning of its implementation, in order to have the necessary time to prepare the scientific-technical, financial, and resource support

- 4) to give, in the necessary instances, to civilian output being produced within the framework of the conversion program the status of a state production order, which would simplify at first the organization of a new cooperative system

With regard to the first point, I would like to note that in our country we have had the shameful practice of direct issuance of funds from centralized sources. This does not occur anywhere else in the world. Between the state and the enterprise there stands a bank that acts as a completely equal partner (in our country, on the other hand, the bank participates in this operation only as the account holder). The granting of funds must be carried out in accordance with a specific program for the conversion of a specific enterprise. The right to receive funds must be proven to the bank experts, who then determine the desirability of investing the capital.

The changeover to conversion must be comprehensive and economically verified, and a factor that takes on special importance here is the correct price and tax policy.

An uncontrollable market will exert a pernicious effect upon our branch of the national economy, in which there is broad cooperative actions and in which the bulk of the final articles, especially those for defense, must have firm prices.

The planned liberalization of prices in our country can proceed along two paths: the introduction of a system of free prices or the use of a system of contract prices, when the value of the component parts depends on the level of the price of the final article. Taking into consideration the direct dependency between the value of the military output and the budget capabilities, it would seem that the most desirable system is the contract system for establishing prices. However, the customer and the lead executors must have a definite reserve for compensating the unforeseen expenditures.

It is necessary to consider urgently such a fundamental question as the establishment of prices for science-intensive output, which prices include the expenditures for development. Worldwide practice attests to the fact that the prices of the final output enable the companies to compensate all the expenditures mentioned. For our branch, as a result of the proposed sharp reduction in

budgetary financing, both for defense production and for civilian, the changeover to the new model of pricing would make it possible, to a certain degree, to resolve the question of self-financing. For the transitional period it is necessary to stipulate an economic mechanism for compensating the losses in the profit of the defense enterprises that are linked with the existence of firm wholesale prices for the final defense output and the free prices for material resources. When making the decision about introducing, effective 1 January 1991, new wholesale prices and coefficients to them, additional payments should have been introduced, to be added to the prices of military output.

In order to resolve the key questions of the reform being carried out to make the transition to the market, it seems to us to be necessary to delegate to the agencies of state administration the rights of the owner of state property and to allocate to them the appropriate funds. They must guarantee the conversion of their subordinate enterprises and organizations to market relations, while preserving the priority of state interests, on the one hand, and the corporative interests of their enterprises, on the other.

Simultaneously those agencies must become legal entities operating under cost accountability in that part which is linked with the receipt and use by them of dividends for controlling packages of shares, branch financial resources controlled in commercial banks, and other attributes of a market economy.

A factor of tremendous importance is the fundamental restructuring of the finance and credit policy, and the creation of a flexible tax system. From the point of view of the interests of the defense industry, the necessity of supporting the conversion, the development of cooperative ties that guarantee the rapid increase in the production of consumer goods, we need an effective system of tax benefits and preferential credit.

In particular, we propose freeing from taxation the entire increase in profit that is channeled into the development of science and production; establishing reduced taxation for defense enterprises that assimilate the production of consumer goods; and, in individual instances, preserving the subsidies for the production of the types of output that are in shortest supply, that are socially significant, but that are produced at a loss. With a consideration of the specifics of the defense complex to be preserved in the state sector, and the intensification of the monitoring of the effective use of capital investments for defense needs, we will not be able to do without state appropriations for those purposes.

Serious objections in our country caused the decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, entitled: "Measures to Demonopolize the National Economy." The requirement that all structures must refrain from making economic decisions unless their antimonopolistic directedness is guaranteed seems to be unrealistic. In addition, any enterprise will always strive (especially under conditions of the market) to use innovations that are unknown

to its competitors in order to extract greater profit. But since they can sometimes be unprofitable for a certain period of time, the tax legislation must determine the policy.

In the normative documents that have been issued (the laws governing the enterprise in the USSR and property in the USSR; decrees of the USSR Council of Ministers, entitled: "Measures to Demonopolize the National Economy," "The Creation of Small Enterprises," etc.), there has been omitted such a very important detail as the impossibility of the direct application of many of the principles in the documents to the defense branches of industry, with a consideration of their specific nature, without a real threat of destabilizing that very important complex in the national economy.

One cannot fail to keep in mind the obvious fact that the approaches to questions of deconsolidation; privatization; the granting to enterprises of the freedom to leave the ministries and to enter into any kind of voluntary associations, or to leave them; the transformation of enterprises from state union property into a different kind; material-technical support; pricing and taxation when making the changeover to the market must be different for different branches, both with regard to the deadlines and the depth of those reforms. Whereas, for the consumer sector of the economy (trade, public nutrition, personal services, light industry, the agroindustrial complex), the overwhelming majority of the principles stated in the mentioned programs and documents are definitely acceptable, for the defense branches, with their very high concentration and coordination of science and production, their rigid intercooperation, and economic-contract discipline, many of them are either completely unacceptable or are acceptable with definite limitations. And yet the drafts of the programs for changeover to the market which are being reviewed do not take that peculiarity into consideration.

The destabilization of the work of the defense branches has taken on a threatening nature and has been caused not only, and not so much, by conversion as it has been caused by the large number of other factors—the disorganization of the system of material-technical supply, the destruction of the cooperative ties, the leakage of skilled cadres into cooperatives, the use of payments in kind, the disorganization of production as a consequence of strikes, blockades, etc.

All this is fraught with irreparable losses of the scientific-technical and production potential of the defense branches, which will reflect not only on the country's defense capability, but also on the contribution made by those branches to the resolution of tasks in the national economy.

Summing up everything that has been stated, one cannot fail to note that today, as never before, conversion needs economic and legal protection. Populist tendencies in the approach to conversion are completely inadmissible. The idea is being suggested to the people that it is

possible, without doing anything, by means of issuing directives to require the plants in the military-industrial complex to undertake the production of the necessary civilian output, thus assuring that all the problems of the technical and technological backwardness of entire branches will be resolved as though by one wave of a magic wand. And no one knows what there is more of in this approach: militant dilettantism or a conscious desire to destroy those few things that still, perhaps by virtue of the existing inertia, represent an economic and organizational force.

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'Lazurit' Design Bureau Working on Multipurpose Submarine

91UM0749B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 6 Mar 91 p 4

[Interview with S. Lovkovskiy, chief designer, Lazurit design bureau, by PROVINTSIYA correspondent: "An Underwater 'Shuttle'"; first paragraph is ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA introduction]

[Text] Conversion is no longer a source of amazement, even if you mention foreign partners. However, a project under way in the Nizhegorodskiy Lazurit Central Design Bureau, a facility which until recently could not even be mentioned in the press, is truly something amazing. The bureau teamed up with Canadian firms to design a reusable underwater vehicle, a sort of arctic Shuttle. This is the topic of conversation a correspondent from the PROVINTSIYA agency held with Lazurit Chief Designer S. Lovkovskiy.

[Lovkovskiy] We have been making underwater craft for a long time, while the Canadians are interested in creating power sources and electronic systems. So along came the idea of combining our efforts and coming up with an undersea "Shuttle"—a nonmilitary vehicle capable of remaining submerged under Arctic ice for extended periods of time. This joint project is the only one of its kind in the world. It is just as complex as reusable spaceships.

[PROVINTSIYA] Why was the Arctic selected?

[Lovkovskiy] The USSR and Canada signed an agreement way back in November of 1989 to carry out Arctic research. The Arctic has long been a link between the USSR and Canada. As far as science is concerned, this has been in many ways an unknown area, one concealing enormous natural riches. The shuttle has been a life-long dream for Greg MacDonald, the Canadian firm's head. In Canada, this joint project is considered to be a high-priority scientific endeavour; the Canadian government is not only sympathetic and interested, but in addition is willing to participate in its financing. Also interested and supportive are the USSR Government and Ministry of Shipbuilding. The Canadians are to have charge of the power, underwater robotics, and scientific equipment for the future vehicle, and of course the

commercial aspect of this joint enterprise; we are to do all the engineering aspects and develop the interest of other Soviet partners.

[PROVINTSIYA] The work is scheduled to take six to seven years for completion. This time frame is reasonable for this kind of project, even by Western standards. What is to take place after that?

[Lovkovskiy] When the vehicle is completed, we will be able to make joint use of it, taking on various orders.

[PROVINTSIYA] Where is the craft to be built?

[Lovkovskiy] We have suggested the facilities of the Krasnoye Sormovo association. However, N. Zharkov, the general director, is unwilling to engage in collaborative effort. This unwillingness is difficult to understand. Conversion is causing a reduction in the work force at the plant; an offer has been made to pay in dollars. So there is incentive to do so.

[PROVINTSIYA] All the more since the Canadians may ask American, English, or French designers to join the project.

[Lovkovskiy] They indeed are formidable competitors. However, our collaboration would be cheaper. We can do just as good a job as Western specialists. On top of that, advertising of the ocean shuttle has already been initiated abroad; it is important that we not lose time or our leading position in this matter.

'Magnit' Struggles with Conversion to Computer Production

91UM0749A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Jun 91 First Edition p 4

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lieutenant-Colonel A. Dolgikh in the column "A Look at the Problem": "'Defense' Goes to Market"]

[Text] Located in the city of Kanev, in Cherkassy Oblast, is the Magnit plant. Belonging to the USSR Ministry of the Radio Industry, its activity until recently was limited to filling state production orders—defense orders, to be more precise. So, Magnit made a change to manufacturing consumer goods: the PK 8641 personal computer and the ES 7979 terminal. These are machines that are actually quite good. Their design and capabilities are such that they differ little from their Western counterparts. However, ...

The warehouses of the Kanev enterprises and enterprises like it are overstocked, in the amount of several million rubles. There is no market for the goods; as a result, there is no money with which to pay for the labor (honest labor, I might add) of the blue and white collar workers. This, at a time when the country is experiencing a rising demand for computers. A paradox? For a planned economy, yes; for a market economy, no. Marketing of output previously was not a headache, but now the manufacturers themselves have to look for customers. In

addition, this must be done in an environment of fierce competition not only from domestic firms, but also on the part of well-established foreign firms.

Our defense enterprises are generally having a difficult time of it. After all, until recently no one was supposed to know that they existed, to say nothing of their products. That is, the capabilities and attainments of our defense sector must be made known on a wide scale; everyone should lend them assistance in this.

Something is already being done in this area by the Prolog Innovation Center at the interarea Garant firm. In February of this year, the center organized a combination sales and exhibition event in one of the pavilions of the VDNKh [Exhibition of Achievements of the National Economy], featuring consumer items made by Ministry of the Radio Industry defense enterprises. It was then that many plants, including the Magnit, were able to find customers. Not without the help of center specialists, it is true. The latter are highly qualified, it must be said.

The Kanev people have once more gathered in the white building. On 20 June, in the Elektrifikatsiya SSSR pavilion of the VDNKh, the Innovation Center is to present another exhibit, this time called the Prolog-Salon. It will be possible to "see and be seen" there, and additionally participate in sales and auctions to be held there. Incidentally, Prolog intends to make the exhibit permanent.

Defense Industry Minister Belousov on Conversion

914A0830A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 7 Jun 91 p 2

[Report by Valeriy Badov on Round Table organized by *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*: "All About Conversion. I Makers of Weapons on the Road to the Market"; passages in boldface as printed]

[Text] What will conversion bring to the national economy? What will its impact be on workers of the defense industry? These were the issues discussed at the Round Table organized by *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* [RT]. Today we begin publication of its materials. Other aspects of conversion discussed at the Round Table will be published in subsequent issues of RT. The first speaker at the Round Table was Boris Belousov, Minister of Defense Industry.

[RT] What have the country and the people to gain from conversion in practical terms?

[Belousov] More than a million people are affected by the conversion program. It involves our industry more than any other. Between 1988 and 1990 we significantly reduced the output of multiple-launch rocket systems, tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, shorter-range missile

systems, ammunition and other types of military hardware and armaments. I must tell you, this is no simple matter. Behind each "product" there are people, families, social problems.

But we are finding solutions, albeit with difficulty. We put forward the idea of additional measures for the social protection of worker collectives. Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov supported us at the time.

The second problem which we must resolve is the replacement of "eliminated" output with civilian products. This is where numerous conflicts arise. Everyone wants everything to be done in a hurry. But we have to balance our reserves made available in the process of conversion.

The productivity of one worker at a military production conveyor is six-eight times higher than in civilian production. Sometimes even 10 times higher. Yet no one takes this into account except the specialists. We are sometimes accused: how come that you have "eliminated" a billion rubles' worth but made up only 800 million? You're working poorly, they say. It's wrong to heap accusations on people engaged in work. The fact is that sometime in 1992 we'll replace virtually all that was "eliminated" from our total output. And we will no longer have grave economic problems. But today, if I produce less marketable output the economic incentive funds decline. Unfortunately, the latter circumstance is not fully taken into account. I would like our economists to have a deeper understanding of the situation and help us.

Now on the subject of conversion. Whereas in 1988 civilian products accounted for 35 percent of our total output, in 1991 we will be having 65 percent civilian output.

Our ministry manufactures more than 3,000 items of consumer goods. This year conversion accounted for an increase in 2.8 billion rubles' worth of goods for the counter. Look: in 1990 alone the output of radio receivers increased 123.5 percent, in terms of units, tape recorders—139.6 percent, washing machines—130 percent, electric food blenders—250 percent, electric meat grinders—341 percent, etc. We are manufacturing 177.9 million rubles' worth of toys alone. In furniture the growth was 125.6, in perfumery 338, in detergents 167 percent. So as a result of our efforts last year we rose from one ruble 27 kopeks' worth of manufactured goods per ruble of wages to one ruble 67 kopeks. We aren't dependents of the people.

We have involved 62 plants of the defense sector in the implementation of centralized assignments. Since 1988 output has increased by more than 190 percent. By 1995 we intend to increase deliveries to the agrarian sector 4.8-fold. This is, obviously, quite a lot of help. But, unfortunately, so far we haven't managed to achieve systemic work with our partner.

Why? Because there is no coordinator in agriculture who would help the collective farms, state farms and individual farmers have their orders filled. So far the Gosnab system is operating. It is a purely formal system. It takes no account of either the dynamics or the specifics of consumer demand. We have been forced to set up a service of our own which would contact directly with the customer.

The light industry people manufacture 76-80 billion rubles' worth of consumer goods a year with equipment built by the Ministry of Defense Industry. By 1995 we must double the output of this manufacturing equipment. We have 50 plants of the defense sector involved in solving this problem. There are plenty of failings. Communication with customers is poor.

Things went from bad to worse after the Ministry of Light Industry was terminated. Orders were being filled, but as a result we built equipment which no one now takes. For example, for many years our country purchased automatic silk reeling machines from Japan. The former Ministry of Light Industry Machine Building was assigned to develop similar equipment. They spent eight years on this and eventually failed. We gave top priority to those automatic machines and built them. Now orders for such machines have suddenly declined sharply, actually down to nothing. Why? Because the mills which were to receive them under long-range plans simply haven't been built yet. This is what happens when you work for a customer at the whim of an intermediary, out of sight, so to say. We are coming to the conclusion that it is, of course, necessary to have more obligatory relations with the customer. So now we are trying to deal directly with factories, spinning and weaving mills so as not to allow such blunders.

We ourselves have offered light industry officials, in the person of the USSR State Light Industry Committee, to develop, jointly with branch institutes, a reconstruction program for factories, spinning and weaving mills. In their time the light industry people had rejected our STB weaving machine. We launched another program and organized the manufacture of a machine in Novosibirsk under import license. It is a modern, rather complex machine. By agreement with the Light Industry Ministry we ceased production of the STB in Novosibirsk and sold Cheboksary STBs for exports to Middle-Eastern countries. Then suddenly our light industry people started to clamor: Why had we reduced deliveries of STB machines? But, we told them, you yourselves had rejected them! So now we're again forced to restore production of the STB at the Novosibirsk plant. Now they tell us it's a good machine. We've even limited some exports to more fully meet the demands of our domestic consumer.

We need 106,000,000 rubles to implement programs agreed with the government. The light industry cannot find this money. For that reason we can't sign a business contract. The situation is similar with production equipment for the agroindustrial complex.

Paradox: The Ministry of Defense Industry, where there is science, moreover, very potent science, and the people to tackle these things at the lowest cost for the economy, cannot realize its potential. Because no funds are allocated for civilian science. It's simply beyond comprehension. This year we need 670,000,000 rubles for civilian science. So far just over half this amount has been allocated. If we do not find the money, 80,000 specialists will have to be laid off, including 20,000 in Moscow.

I have already said that conversion is linked with the well-being of the workers of the industry. In 1991, our centralized sources for non-industrial construction were reduced by 83 percent. How are we supposed to finance housing construction? As far as I know, no one has repealed the Housing-2000 Program. How is one to explain what is happening to the worker collective, to a person who was in line for housing?


What is the situation of enterprises which were engaged in developing and building missile systems? The SS-20 missiles were products of our Ministry of Defense Industry. Now the plants that built those missiles are engaged in, among other things, manufacturing marine drilling equipment. These are extremely complex systems. We once bought a set from the Americans. It cost somewhere around 30,000,000 dollars. Our Perm, Nizhny-Novgorod and other plants participating in the program. There are unique solutions which preclude any discharge of oil into the sea in case of an accident at the drilling rig.

Our comrades who develop missile systems are making a self-propelled unit which drives piles into the ground non-destructively, by vibro-oscillations. Or here is another interesting job. We use our own gun-powders to "resuscitate" wells at oilfields. We lower a powder charge down and burn through paraffin-coated places, increasing bed yield 20 to 25 percent.

Or a mobile operating room, a "cross-country ambulance." On another of our missile transporting vehicles we have mounted a crane which can lift 100-ton loads. We have a highly efficient automatic sugar compacting line...

[RT] Boris Mikhaylovich, our readers were gratified to hear that the Ministry of Defense Industry was one of the founders of the Unemployment Protection Fund. Thank you for supporting the paper's initiative. In this connection, what is happening to the personnel and specialists of work collectives? Will they run away from you to America?

[Belousov] Look at what's happening now. The Nizhny Novgorod Machine Building Plant has found a unique solution for a district boiler room. The Finns and other countries are already ordering it because of its high efficiency. Before, the Nizhny Novgorod people used to build engines for various ships, and now they're building these boilers. One of our chemists has built a line for baking ice-cream cones. Six thousand cones an hour. Yes, he is a high-class chemist, but life has forced him to



Key: 1. TV sets, 2. VCRs, 3. Toys, 4. Furniture, 5. Refrigerators, 6. Washing machines *

do new things. His installation has, incidentally, been certified for a State Quality Seal. Now about jobs. For various reasons—either funding is lacking or specialists and plant managers have dallied in developing programs—our lag in the realization of technological backlogs inevitably results in people leaving. We are currently engaged in a virtual struggle at our plants to keep competent personnel, engineers, technicians and scientists, and skilled workers. After all, whatever people may say, the qualifications of our engineers and workers are very high.

For example, the State Optical Institute in Leningrad employs five corresponding members of the Academy of Sciences, 80 doctors of technical sciences, and 800 candidates of science. If we lose that institute then one can bid farewell to state-of-the-art optics in our country. Of course, we cannot tolerate such damage and will look for a way out, but... We are greatly undercut by free-wheeling cooperatives. Nowadays, with the high cost of living, wages decide everything. It is hard to compete with wages in cooperatives, which pay twice as much for less qualified work. We, too, had originally opted for numerous cooperatives to be set up alongside our plants. We are chastised even for this. Currently we have 481

cooperatives alongside our plants. What kind of cooperatives are they? Many produce output, but in most cases cooperatives were not born of good life. They ease bottlenecks.

What does a director do? A bottleneck appears with respect to some parts or operations, so he hastily organizes a cooperative, where the pay is higher. But when we analyzed productivity and whether it matched the rapid increase in pay, we once again found that productivity in the cooperative was still at times virtually one-half lower. Yet the pay was double! And now the answer to the question you asked: Will the best personnel go away or not? As a practical worker I can say: Not all will leave, of course, but some will certainly give up their jobs if we don't create the necessary conditions. They may, of course, be worse than in the West, but at least bearable. Otherwise the "brain drain" will begin. That is what I consider to be the most terrible thing that can happen in our economy, in our society. Because any civilized country, when something goes wrong in the economy or technology lags, looks for talented and knowledgeable people all over the world. They buy them and take them away. That is no secret.

* Output of consumer goods in ministries of the defense complex: TV sets, VCRs, refrigerators, washing machines—in thousands of units; Toys and furniture—in millions of rubles.

Defense, Defense Industries Establish Commodities Exchange

91UM0736A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 23, Jun 91 p 4

[Interview with Deputy USSR Defense Industry Minister L. Zabelin by an unidentified ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent: "The Defense Industry will Trade"]

[Text] Right now under conditions of universal shortages, many industrial enterprises and cooperatives are participating in commercial raw materials exchanges. But how do defense industry plants and NII [Scientific Research Institutes] plan to survive in this situation? Many of them have been placed on the verge of ruin by the conversion of military production that is occurring.
N. Sidorov, Leningrad

An ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent asked USSR Deputy Minister of the Defense Industry L. Zabelin to answer this reader's question.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] For a long time, our people have associated the defense industry with the output of weapons and military equipment. However, few people can imagine the "civilian" potential of the defense industry....

[Zabelin] Actually, nonmilitary production has a prominent place in defense enterprises production. By way of illustration, we produce nearly seven percent of all nonfood consumer goods in the country. Defense industry plants produce 44 percent of all refrigerators, 31 percent of washing machines, 12 percent of tape recorders, 15 percent of vacuum cleaners, 25 percent of baby carriages, 50 percent of bicycles, and 55 percent of motorcycles.

The production of sewing machines, motor scooters, binoculars, sports-hunting rifles, and a number of other goods is totally concentrated in defense enterprises in the USSR.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] How does your ministry intend to expand production of a civilian assortment of manufactured products under conditions of the reduction of military production?

[Zabelin] Right now, when conversion has resulted in a drastic reduction of the volume of military orders at many defense sector enterprises, we have decided that the best form of entry into the market for defense enterprises will be the creation of a joint-stock company-commodities exchange. The Ministry of the Defense

Industry has acted as its founder jointly with Soyuz Scientific Production Association, Industrial Construction Bank, and other organizations and enterprises.

We named the new exchange Konversiya [Conversion] and its initial charter capital totals 10 million rubles, which is divided into 100 shares of inscribed stock worth R100,000 or \$25,000 U.S. each.

Konversiya Exchange is conducting shares subscription until June 30 1991 among enterprises and organizations with a conversion direction of work. At the present time, 73 shares have been distributed and another nearly 40 organizations and commercial firms have stated their desire to become participants in Konversiya a/o [Joint-Stock Company] TB [Commodities Exchange].

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] What are the primary goals for creating this commodities-raw materials exchange?

[Zabelin] Protection of enterprises' interests with the conversion direction of work under conditions of the radical changes of the entire system of production supply and product sales, and also the guarantee during this process of considering the specific conditions of primary production and the difficulties of conversion problems within the framework of developing market relations in the country.

The formation of a universal consumer goods and civilian product market for goods produced by industry's defense enterprises sectors based on the high technologies they have mastered.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] And what do enterprises that are interested in participating in Konversiya Commodities-Raw Materials Exchange need to do?

[Zabelin] We invite everyone who wants to participate in test trades and the exchange is insuring the participation of organizations, firms, and brokers' offices under conditions of offering commodities in the first trades. Applications for participation must be submitted prior to July 15 1991.

A 2,100 square meter operating hall, required communications systems, warehouse facilities, and the very process of conducting totally automated exchange operations have already been prepared to conduct trades. Those desiring to participate in the exchange can contact the following address: Konversiya a/o TB, 6 Sovetskaya Street, Dzerzhinskiy City, Moscow Oblast, 140056.

Telephone: 551-01-88, 551-01-27.

Fax: 175-24-94.

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